This article is from the source 'bbc' and was first published or seen on . It will not be checked again for changes.

You can find the current article at its original source at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/rss/-/1/hi/uk_politics/8408370.stm

The article has changed 2 times. There is an RSS feed of changes available.

Version 0 Version 1
Spies in the spotlight over Iraq WMD claims Spies in the spotlight over Iraq WMD claims
(about 8 hours later)
By Peter Biles BBC world affairs correspondent Sir John Scarlett was the biggest name yet interviewed by the inquiryBy Peter Biles BBC world affairs correspondent Sir John Scarlett was the biggest name yet interviewed by the inquiry
It was a week when spooks and soldiers came to give evidence.It was a week when spooks and soldiers came to give evidence.
There was huge interest and curiosity in the appearance of Sir John Scarlett, the former MI6 chief and former chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee.There was huge interest and curiosity in the appearance of Sir John Scarlett, the former MI6 chief and former chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee.
The camera crews waited outside for a glimpse of him arriving. But no less a figure than Prime Minister Gordon Brown became the unsuspecting decoy, sweeping into the QEII Centre to attend a separate event, while Sir John was simultaneously whisked into the underground car park.The camera crews waited outside for a glimpse of him arriving. But no less a figure than Prime Minister Gordon Brown became the unsuspecting decoy, sweeping into the QEII Centre to attend a separate event, while Sir John was simultaneously whisked into the underground car park.
Inside the packed inquiry room, it was all quite cosy. Sir John welcomed Sir John.Inside the packed inquiry room, it was all quite cosy. Sir John welcomed Sir John.
The committee chairman, Sir John Chilcot, remarking to Sir John Scarlet in an understated manner: "A fuller house than we have been having."The committee chairman, Sir John Chilcot, remarking to Sir John Scarlet in an understated manner: "A fuller house than we have been having."
Two previous inquiries, the Hutton Inquiry in 2003 and the Butler Inquiry in 2004, had looked at aspects of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).Two previous inquiries, the Hutton Inquiry in 2003 and the Butler Inquiry in 2004, had looked at aspects of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).
But this was another chance to hear from Sir John Scarlett about the controversial 2002 dossier, for which Tony Blair wrote the foreword.But this was another chance to hear from Sir John Scarlett about the controversial 2002 dossier, for which Tony Blair wrote the foreword.
Warmed up?Warmed up?
This was the dossier that contained the claim that Saddam Hussein could deploy WMDs within 45 minutes.This was the dossier that contained the claim that Saddam Hussein could deploy WMDs within 45 minutes.
Sir John Scarlett reminded the inquiry that the dossier had its roots in a document that was first drafted six months earlier, in March 2002, but it had been decided not to use it at the time, and it was kept under review.Sir John Scarlett reminded the inquiry that the dossier had its roots in a document that was first drafted six months earlier, in March 2002, but it had been decided not to use it at the time, and it was kept under review.
Committee member Sir Roderic Lyne wanted to know about the decision to make the dossier public.Committee member Sir Roderic Lyne wanted to know about the decision to make the dossier public.
"It was still somewhere in the fridge or the freezer. When were you told to take it out of the freezer and warm it up?", he asked."It was still somewhere in the fridge or the freezer. When were you told to take it out of the freezer and warm it up?", he asked.
Scarlett replied: "Well, I suppose the person who opened the freezer was the prime minister."Scarlett replied: "Well, I suppose the person who opened the freezer was the prime minister."
Scarlett insisted that he had not come under pressure "to firm up the language" in the dossier.Scarlett insisted that he had not come under pressure "to firm up the language" in the dossier.
He said he had made "one, two or maybe three" corrections to Mr Blair's foreword, but Scarlett made it clear that this was "something which was the prime minister's and it was going out under his signature".He said he had made "one, two or maybe three" corrections to Mr Blair's foreword, but Scarlett made it clear that this was "something which was the prime minister's and it was going out under his signature".
'Gentleman's club''Gentleman's club'
Scarlett looked completely at ease throughout the 90-minute session.Scarlett looked completely at ease throughout the 90-minute session.
In some quarters, there was a feeling that the questioning had again been too genteel. Ed Davey of the Liberal Democrats said: "The questioners lack that killer punch…..it's like a gentleman's club in the inquiry."In some quarters, there was a feeling that the questioning had again been too genteel. Ed Davey of the Liberal Democrats said: "The questioners lack that killer punch…..it's like a gentleman's club in the inquiry."
On Thursday, another "Sir John" came to give evidence.On Thursday, another "Sir John" came to give evidence.
Sir John Sawers is the current MI6 chief, although he testified in his capacity as Mr Blair's private secretary for foreign affairs in 2001 and as Britain's special envoy in Baghdad in 2003.Sir John Sawers is the current MI6 chief, although he testified in his capacity as Mr Blair's private secretary for foreign affairs in 2001 and as Britain's special envoy in Baghdad in 2003.
Sawers told the inquiry that Mr Blair had believed the intelligence, adding: "Why shouldn't he believe the intelligence?"Sawers told the inquiry that Mr Blair had believed the intelligence, adding: "Why shouldn't he believe the intelligence?"
He was asked whether there were voices calling for a radical change of policy towards Iraq in 2001, when the British approach was "containment", not "regime change".He was asked whether there were voices calling for a radical change of policy towards Iraq in 2001, when the British approach was "containment", not "regime change".
Sawers' answer was ambiguous: "I think there are a lot of countries around the world where we would like to see a change of regime. That doesn't mean that one pursues active policies in that direction."Sawers' answer was ambiguous: "I think there are a lot of countries around the world where we would like to see a change of regime. That doesn't mean that one pursues active policies in that direction."
'Not related''Not related'
Apart from the "Sir John" moments this week, the presence of Dominic Chilcott, of the government's 2003 Iraq Planning Unit, offered the possibility of further misunderstanding.Apart from the "Sir John" moments this week, the presence of Dominic Chilcott, of the government's 2003 Iraq Planning Unit, offered the possibility of further misunderstanding.
"He's absolutely not related to Sir John Chilcot," insisted a Foreign Office aide. "The spelling's not the same," she warned."He's absolutely not related to Sir John Chilcot," insisted a Foreign Office aide. "The spelling's not the same," she warned.
Then came the military representatives whose names must have confused the Iraqis no end in 2003.Then came the military representatives whose names must have confused the Iraqis no end in 2003.
Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Viggers and his successor in Baghdad, Lt Gen Andrew Figgures, gave their evidence jointly.Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Viggers and his successor in Baghdad, Lt Gen Andrew Figgures, gave their evidence jointly.
Their assessment of post-invasion Iraq was refreshingly honest and also alarming to anyone who might have thought the planning had been well thought out in Washington and London.Their assessment of post-invasion Iraq was refreshingly honest and also alarming to anyone who might have thought the planning had been well thought out in Washington and London.
"The lack of a sense of direction from the outset… put us on the back foot from the very start and we were playing catch-up", said Viggers."The lack of a sense of direction from the outset… put us on the back foot from the very start and we were playing catch-up", said Viggers.
The speed of the military victory in March/April 2003 took the Coalition by surprise, as much as it might have shocked the Iraqis. It contributed to the chaos and difficulties of "Phase 4" (the aftermath).The speed of the military victory in March/April 2003 took the Coalition by surprise, as much as it might have shocked the Iraqis. It contributed to the chaos and difficulties of "Phase 4" (the aftermath).
Britain's newly appointed administrator in Basra, Sir Hilary Synott, arrived in Iraq in May 2003 to find himself without any means of communicating with the Foreign Office in London.Britain's newly appointed administrator in Basra, Sir Hilary Synott, arrived in Iraq in May 2003 to find himself without any means of communicating with the Foreign Office in London.
He borrowed a computer from the Americans, and resorted to opening a free Yahoo mail account to send his daily confidential despatches back to Whitehall.He borrowed a computer from the Americans, and resorted to opening a free Yahoo mail account to send his daily confidential despatches back to Whitehall.
The common tread this week has been the lack of understanding of what post-war Iraq would be like in 2003, and the appalling level of under-preparedness. The common thread this week has been the lack of understanding of what post-war Iraq would be like in 2003, and the appalling level of under-preparedness.
Lieutenant General Sir Graeme Lamb, who commanded British forces in southern Iraq, summed up the experience: "A raft of lessons, few of them learned".Lieutenant General Sir Graeme Lamb, who commanded British forces in southern Iraq, summed up the experience: "A raft of lessons, few of them learned".