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| Basra security 'was non-existent' | Basra security 'was non-existent' |
| (31 minutes later) | |
| The British Army was effectively providing "no security at all" in the southern Iraqi city of Basra by mid-2006, a senior soldier has said. | The British Army was effectively providing "no security at all" in the southern Iraqi city of Basra by mid-2006, a senior soldier has said. |
| Lieutenant General Sir Richard Shirreff said that 200 troops were attempting to control a city of 1.3 million people, with militias "filling the gap". | Lieutenant General Sir Richard Shirreff said that 200 troops were attempting to control a city of 1.3 million people, with militias "filling the gap". |
| He told the Iraq Inquiry the British Army had reached "stalemate". | He told the Iraq Inquiry the British Army had reached "stalemate". |
| It has also emerged that Jack Straw and Geoff Hoon will be the first members of Tony Blair's cabinet to give evidence. | It has also emerged that Jack Straw and Geoff Hoon will be the first members of Tony Blair's cabinet to give evidence. |
| Mr Hoon, who was defence secretary at the time of the invasion in 2003, will appear for two three-hour sessions on Tuesday 19 January. | Mr Hoon, who was defence secretary at the time of the invasion in 2003, will appear for two three-hour sessions on Tuesday 19 January. |
| Justice Secretary Mr Straw, who was foreign secretary at the time, will give evidence in a single three-hour session on 21 January. | |
| 'Unexpected' | 'Unexpected' |
| During Monday's hearing, the panel heard from Sir Richard, who was commanding officer of the multi-national division in south-east Iraq from July 2006 until Jan 2007. | During Monday's hearing, the panel heard from Sir Richard, who was commanding officer of the multi-national division in south-east Iraq from July 2006 until Jan 2007. |
| On Basra, he told the inquiry: "What I found when I arrived was effectively no security at all." | On Basra, he told the inquiry: "What I found when I arrived was effectively no security at all." |
| Sir Richard said that, for a city of 1.3 million people, only 200 troops could be sent out on patrol at one time. | Sir Richard said that, for a city of 1.3 million people, only 200 troops could be sent out on patrol at one time. |
| I got what was possible, as far as possible Lieutenant General Sir Richard Shirreff | I got what was possible, as far as possible Lieutenant General Sir Richard Shirreff |
| He said: "There was a significant lack of troops on the ground." | He said: "There was a significant lack of troops on the ground." |
| Once British forces moved on, "the militia filled the gap and effectively the militia controlled the city", he added. | Once British forces moved on, "the militia filled the gap and effectively the militia controlled the city", he added. |
| Sir Richard said: "It was not what I expected. It was clear to me that the intention, from a British perspective, was to progress to Iraqi control as far as possible. | Sir Richard said: "It was not what I expected. It was clear to me that the intention, from a British perspective, was to progress to Iraqi control as far as possible. |
| "Equally, it was clear to me that there could be no transition to Iraqi control without security." | "Equally, it was clear to me that there could be no transition to Iraqi control without security." |
| Sir Richard organised more training of Iraqi forces during his time in charge, he told the inquiry. | Sir Richard organised more training of Iraqi forces during his time in charge, he told the inquiry. |
| 'Downhill momentum' | 'Downhill momentum' |
| Beforehand, he said: "I don't think the [UK's] troops were deployed as effectively as the needed to be deployed... Troops that could have been used on the ground perhaps were tied up with guarding security convoys... | Beforehand, he said: "I don't think the [UK's] troops were deployed as effectively as the needed to be deployed... Troops that could have been used on the ground perhaps were tied up with guarding security convoys... |
| "What we had reached was a position of stalemate and the momentum was going downhill... | "What we had reached was a position of stalemate and the momentum was going downhill... |
| "It was pretty clear to me... that we had a strategy that involved extraction rather than achieving mission success. It was about an exit strategy rather than a winning strategy... A winning strategy was going to require significant extra resources." | "It was pretty clear to me... that we had a strategy that involved extraction rather than achieving mission success. It was about an exit strategy rather than a winning strategy... A winning strategy was going to require significant extra resources." |
| Sir Richard was critical of the level of equipment available to the mission in the south of Iraq. | Sir Richard was critical of the level of equipment available to the mission in the south of Iraq. |
| He said: "We had no UAV [unmanned aerial vehicles] capable of flying over Basra." | He said: "We had no UAV [unmanned aerial vehicles] capable of flying over Basra." |
| He added: "I was told that no more [resources] could be used to putting UAVs into southern Iraq... I think the Ministry of Defence was incapable of creating the drive." | He added: "I was told that no more [resources] could be used to putting UAVs into southern Iraq... I think the Ministry of Defence was incapable of creating the drive." |
| Sir Richard said defence spending cuts in 2003/04 had meant a cut in the Army's infantry numbers. | Sir Richard said defence spending cuts in 2003/04 had meant a cut in the Army's infantry numbers. |
| Describing his efforts to procure greater resources, he said: "I got what was possible, as far as possible... But I would stress, though, that what was possible was not going to be enough." | Describing his efforts to procure greater resources, he said: "I got what was possible, as far as possible... But I would stress, though, that what was possible was not going to be enough." |
| On troop deployment, Sir Richard said: "Clearly the risk was that, once we moved away from one area [of Basra], we would lose it to the militia..." | On troop deployment, Sir Richard said: "Clearly the risk was that, once we moved away from one area [of Basra], we would lose it to the militia..." |
| He said: "'Good enough' was the motto, not 'perfection'." | He said: "'Good enough' was the motto, not 'perfection'." |
| Sir Richard spoke of a "a difference of opinion" between himself and London, adding that he felt "the gravity of the situation was not fully appreciated. The focus was on exit rather than achieving relevant success". | Sir Richard spoke of a "a difference of opinion" between himself and London, adding that he felt "the gravity of the situation was not fully appreciated. The focus was on exit rather than achieving relevant success". |
| But he also said: "I say again that there was a lot of hard work and a lot of hard work went into improving capability." | But he also said: "I say again that there was a lot of hard work and a lot of hard work went into improving capability." |
| The Iraq Inquiry is looking into UK policy on the country between 2001 and 2009, when British troops left the country. A report is due to be published late this year or in early 2011. | The Iraq Inquiry is looking into UK policy on the country between 2001 and 2009, when British troops left the country. A report is due to be published late this year or in early 2011. |