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Mandarin attacks Iraq 'consensus' Campbell's Short criticism 'poor'
(about 11 hours later)
An ex-head of the Civil Service has said there was a "consensus" over Iraq policy which was hard to challenge. Ex-No 10 spokesman Alastair Campbell has been attacked for suggesting Clare Short was barred from key Iraq meetings because she could not be trusted.
Former Cabinet Secretary Lord Turnbull said policy was "settled" by September 2002 - with the UK seeking a diplomatic solution but planning for war. Former head of the Civil Service, Lord Turnbull, said his remarks were "very poor" and Ms Short's critical stance on the war should have been respected.
He criticised former No 10 spokesman Alastair Campbell for remarks he made to the inquiry about Clare Short. He said Tony Blair must explain claims that he would have backed the war even if he had known Iraq had no WMD.
Suggestions the former Cabinet minister could not be trusted with sensitive information were "very poor", he said. Mr Blair is due to give evidence to the inquiry in the next few weeks.
And he said the late Robin Cook was the only minister willing to argue in cabinet that containment of Saddam Hussein was working. 'Patronising'
"I am sorry he's not around to take the credit for that," Lord Turnbull said.
Key decisions
Lord Turnbull is the latest senior figure to give evidence to the Chilcot inquiry, which is looking into the controversial invasion in March 2003 and the aftermath of the war.Lord Turnbull is the latest senior figure to give evidence to the Chilcot inquiry, which is looking into the controversial invasion in March 2003 and the aftermath of the war.
As Cabinet Secretary from September 2002, he was in Downing Street playing a key role in the run-up to the war and afterwards.As Cabinet Secretary from September 2002, he was in Downing Street playing a key role in the run-up to the war and afterwards.
Lord Turnbull, who retired in 2005, suggested vital policy decisions were taken in the summer and autumn of 2002. My hypothesis is he starts as a regime changer Lord Turnbull on Tony Blair class="" href="/2/hi/uk_news/politics/8456321.stm">PM 'must face Iraq inquiry soon'
In July, he said he believed British commanders agreed, that should military action be necessary, the UK would provide the maximum number of troops sought by Washington. He defended the conduct of Clare Short, the International Development Secretary, who resigned from the cabinet two months after the war in protest at post-war planning.
Once ministers had coalesced, I think people said there is a settled policy and you are not encouraged to go on arguing you should not have done this Lord Turnbull Ms Short has been criticised by several senior military figures while Mr Campbell said she was "difficult to handle" and suggested that she was barred from key meetings amid fears sensitive information would leak.
In September, he said the UK "settled" on a policy of trying to exert UN pressure on Saddam Hussein to disarm but also began military planning in the event that he did not. Lord Turnbull said such criticism of Ms Short was "patronising".
From this point on, he said other strategic options were largely ignored and there was a consensus in Whitehall about policy which civil servants found it difficult to challenge. While she could be "troublesome and strong-minded", he believed Ms Short had been marginalised as she had a "distinct view" on Iraq which did not conform with No 10 policy.
"I don't think the culture encourages challenge enough," he said. "Tony Blair wanted things to move quickly," he said. "He did not want to spend time on 'conflict resolution' between colleagues."
"Getting drawn into a prematurely achieved consensus is a danger of Whitehall political life and I think this is one of them. Consensus
"Once ministers had coalesced, I think people said there is a settled policy and you are not encouraged to go on arguing you should not have done this." Lord Turnbull spoke of a policy "consensus" from September 2002 onwards - at which point he said the UK was seeking to disarm Saddam Hussein through the UN but was also planning for military action.
Short role Alternative options were ignored, he suggested, while civil servants found it hard to challenge the prevailing view.
Lord Turnbull defended the conduct of Clare Short, the International Development Secretary, who resigned two months after the war in protest at post-war planning. AT THE INQUIRY BBC World Affairs correspondent Peter Biles The inner workings of government might be considered "boring", to quote Sir John Chilcot today. But the Inquiry is showing how important they can be.
In his evidence, Alastair Campbell said Ms Short was "difficult to handle" and suggested that she was not included in key meetings on post-war construction because of fears information might be leaked. Clare Short's concern over her exclusion from key meetings in 2003 has been highlighted by the release of declassified government letters.
Lord Turnbull described those comments as "very poor". On 11 March, the permanent secretary at the Department for International Development (DFID), Sir Suma Chakrabarti, wrote to the cabinet secretary, Lord Turnbull, about the government's communication strategy on Iraq. "More frequent and systematic discussion between senior ministers would be helpful… in addition, Clare Short and the prime minister need to talk more often, probably on a daily basis".
He said Ms Short could be "troublesome and strong-minded" but had a "distinct view" on Iraq which did not conform with No 10 policy. Earlier today, we heard evidence from the first female witness to appear before the Inquiry. Dr Nemat Shafik, who succeeded Sir Suma at DFID in 2005, said the main lesson from Iraq was the need for honesty from political leaders when assessing the timescale for development and reconstruction.
"Tony Blair wanted things to move quickly," he said, adding that critical voices should have been respected. "He did not want to spend time on 'conflict resolution' between colleagues." Throughout the period leading up to war, Tony Blair had been "unambiguous" that disarming Saddam was his primary objective.
So he questioned a recent BBC interview in which Tony Blair said he would still have supported ousting Saddam Hussein even if he had known beforehand that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction.
"The question is what on earth is this statement to Fern Brittan on the television all about? You will have to put this point to him."
And, on reflection, he felt Mr Blair had used language backing regime change ever since meeting President Bush in the US April 2002 and had had to adjust his thinking to win support.
"My hypothesis is he starts as a regime changer," he said.
"Then, it is not just Bush who is put onto the UN route but Blair also. At that point he is either saying I am really a "regime changer" but I will talk the disarmament language or he realises that disarmament...is the only way he thinks of toppling this regime."
Lord Turnbull told the inquiry how decisions were made by a group of key advisers and ministers in the run-up to the war, which he described as "serious players" meeting in an "informal environment".Lord Turnbull told the inquiry how decisions were made by a group of key advisers and ministers in the run-up to the war, which he described as "serious players" meeting in an "informal environment".
He said minutes of these meetings were not taken "with the degree of formality we would normally have". Asked about cabinet discussions on Iraq in the immediate run-up to war, he said there were serious debates in which most members spoke but key decisions were taken elsewhere.
Asked about Cabinet discussions on Iraq in the immediate run-up to war, he said there were serious debates in which most members spoke but key decisions were largely taken elsewhere. He suggested the cabinet never discussed the advice given by Attorney General Lord Goldsmith on the legality of the war.
Cabinet members were supportive of government policy, he said, and Robin Cook - who resigned in protest at the invasion - was alone in arguing the existing policy of containing Iraq through sanctions was working and military action would damage progress in the Middle East. Cabinet members were supportive of government policy and the late Robin Cook was the only minister willing to argue in cabinet that containment of Saddam Hussein was working.
The failure of UN weapons inspectors to find a "smoking gun" in the run-up to the conflict made most Cabinet ministers more convinced Saddam Hussein was concealing weapons and not co-operating, he added. "I am sorry he's not around to take the credit for that," he said.
The failure of UN weapons inspectors to find a "smoking gun" in the run-up to the conflict made Cabinet ministers more convinced Saddam was concealing weapons and not co-operating, he added.
Abuse revelations
Lord Turnbull identified April 2004 as the point in which the coalition realised things were going badly wrong in Iraq.
He said he had felt "sullied" about the disclosure of prisoner abuse by US soldiers at Abu Ghraib prison.
"It was a very distasteful revelation and shocked a lot of people. It made it apparent what an uneasy partnership this was."
He suggested cabinet support for the policy could have "fractured" at this point but ministers showed strong loyalty to Tony Blair.
Despite his misgivings about the policy process, Lord Turnbull said he still believed it had been "worthwhile" to remove Saddam Hussein.
It was clear that Saddam had lied about his intentions in order not to demonstrate weakness to Iran and he planned to rebuild his chemical and biological weapons capacity once sanctions were lifted.
The British people must be apprised of this to counter the prevailing view that the deaths of UK soldiers had been "in vain".