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45-minute claim 'a bit of colour' 45-minute claim 'a bit of colour'
(about 1 hour later)
Including the 45-minute claim in an intelligence dossier on Iraq's weapons was "asking for trouble", Tony Blair's former security coordinator has said.Including the 45-minute claim in an intelligence dossier on Iraq's weapons was "asking for trouble", Tony Blair's former security coordinator has said.
Sir David Omand told the Iraq inquiry some intelligence figures were "queasy" about publishing intelligence details.Sir David Omand told the Iraq inquiry some intelligence figures were "queasy" about publishing intelligence details.
The 45-minute claim was put in late and was a "bit of local colour" the secret service would allow to be used.The 45-minute claim was put in late and was a "bit of local colour" the secret service would allow to be used.
And he said it was a "big mistake" to combine the 2002 intelligence dossier with the government's case for action. And he said the government was warned that action in Iraq could draw "large numbers" to Islamic extremism.
Sir David, who was security and intelligence co-ordinator from 2002 to 2005 - was asked about the September 2002 dossier on Iraq's weapons. Sir David, who was security and intelligence co-ordinator from 2002 to 2005, was asked about the September 2002 dossier on Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction.
'Natural queasiness''Natural queasiness'
It included the claim that Iraq could use weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes - which was at the centre of a row between the BBC and the government. It included the controversial claim that they could be used within 45 minutes which was at the centre of a row between the BBC and the government.
Sir David said statements in the dossier had not been tightened up and said joint intelligence committee chairman John Scarlett would have told him if he was being put under undue pressure.
The risk was we would end up with a document that was simply a series of assertions Sir David OmandThe risk was we would end up with a document that was simply a series of assertions Sir David Omand
On the 45-minute claim he said it was a piece of intelligence that was circulated "quite late in the day". Sir David said it was a piece of intelligence that was circulated "quite late in the day".
He said there was a "natural queasiness" among some in the intelligence community at putting details into the public domain. He said there was a "natural queasiness" among some in the intelligence community at putting details into the public domain and there was a risk "we would end up with a document that was simply a series of assertions".
"The [intelligence] agencies were quite happy for generalised statements to be made but were not very happy about any of the detail of the reporting being used. The risk was we would end up with a document that was simply a series of assertions."
'Beyond doubt''Beyond doubt'
There was a concern that it would not look more convincing without more detail, he said. "That is my personal explanation of why, as it were, people fell on the 45 minutes - at least that was something the secret service would allow to be used," Sir David said.
"That is my personal explanation of why as it were people fell on the 45 minutes, at least that was something the secret service would allow to be used, and with hindsight one can see that adding a bit of local colour like that is asking for trouble but we didn't really spot that at the time." "And, with hindsight, one can see that adding a bit of local colour like that is asking for trouble but we didn't really spot that at the time."
He was asked about Tony Blair's foreword to the dossier, in which he wrote that he believed the intelligence had established "beyond doubt" that Saddam Hussein had continued to produce chemical and biological weapons. He said statements in the dossier had not been tightened up and Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) chairman John Scarlett would have told him if he was being put under undue pressure.
'Not spotted' The committee has been looking at Tony Blair's foreword to the dossier, in which the former PM wrote that he believed the intelligence had established "beyond doubt" that Saddam Hussein had continued to produce chemical and biological weapons.
Sir David said the foreword was not discussed as part of meetings of the joint intelligence committee but was circulated separately "late in the day". AT THE INQUIRY Peter Biles, BBC World Affairs correspondent
"My memory is that I didn't pay that much attention to this bit of it, which was a mistake... I totally failed to spot the potential problem that would arise through this disjunction between statement of case directly associated with the text of the dossier." The controversy surrounding the September 2002 dossier on Iraq just will not go away.
He said it was a document produced by the PM under his own name, adding: "If we all had more time and perhaps had thought about it more perhaps we would have been suggesting different things." Sir David Omand revealed the detail about how the dossier was drafted by the JIC, and the consequences of the foreword written by Downing Street.
Sir David also said it had been a "big mistake" to combine "the making of the case by government... with the presentation of the summary and what the JIC had found". The JIC chairman, Sir John Scarlett, had been determined to retain "ownership" of the text of the dossier.
"We didn't spot the potential problems that would get us into. I certainly wouldn't recommend doing it again." The faults had come to rebound on the JIC, but Sir David said the overall approach had been vindicated when the later "dodgy dossier" was published in February 2003 under the eye of No 10's spin-doctor, Alastair Campbell.
Sir David recalled how he had marched into Mr Campbell's office to ask what was going on, and had been given an apology.
Tomorrow, some of these issues will no doubt be raised with the former Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, when he gives evidence to the inquiry.
Sir David said he thought he had not paid much attention to the foreword - as it was a document produced by the prime minister under his own name - but that had been a "mistake".
It had also been a "big mistake" to combine "the making of the case by government... with the presentation of the summary and what the JIC had found".
"I certainly wouldn't recommend doing it again," he said.
Asked about suggestions that al-Qaeda had links with Saddam Hussein, he said British intelligence did not support that conclusion and "in the end" the CIA came to the same view.
But he said: "There was a clear difference within Washington between the CIA and its own analysts and those inside the Pentagon."
There had been warnings that invading Iraq would increase the probability of UK interests becoming a "higher priority target" for international terrorists, he said.
"On 13 December 02 we warned that US-led action could draw large numbers to the Islamist extremism ideology over the following five years," Sir David said.
In 2004 they knew there were up to 50 individuals from the UK who had tried to get Iraq to join "the jihadist faction".
But Sir David pointed out the threat to the UK from al-Qaeda had "long preceded" Iraq - with a bomb plot disrupted in Birmingham in 2000 - and that the level of threat was already "high".
He said the threat had to be balanced by the "overwhelming wish" in ministers' minds to deal with Saddam Hussein - and he thought Mr Blair would say it was "a risk we took on the chin".
"It doesn't create the danger it enhanced the radicalisation element," he said.