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Al-Qaida's 'number two' was key target for west Al-Qaida's 'number two' was key target for west
(39 minutes later)
He is variously described as a propagandist, a theologian, an ideologue and an operations chief. None of these descriptions may be entirely accurate and he has been reported killed several times before.He is variously described as a propagandist, a theologian, an ideologue and an operations chief. None of these descriptions may be entirely accurate and he has been reported killed several times before.
Despite the fog of covert war around him, it is at least certain that Abu Yahya al-Libi – who may have been killed in drone strikes in Pakistan on Monday – became one of the key targets for western intelligence services after the death of Osama bin Laden a year ago.Despite the fog of covert war around him, it is at least certain that Abu Yahya al-Libi – who may have been killed in drone strikes in Pakistan on Monday – became one of the key targets for western intelligence services after the death of Osama bin Laden a year ago.
A Libyan whose real name is Mohamed Hassan Qaid, he came relatively late to al-Qaida. Early years of activism appear to have been spent with the now largely defunct Libyan Islamic Fighting Group in, first, his native land, then in various north African countries and finally as one of the many and varied self-styled international "mujahideen" who fought as auxiliaries alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001. Captured in the aftermath of the defeat of the hardline Islamist movement, Libi became known in militant circles when he escaped from Bagram Air Force Base north of Kabul after three years of imprisonment in 2005. It is then that he is thought to have sworn the bayat, the oath of personal allegiance to Bin Laden, and thus effectively joined al-Qaida. A Libyan, whose real name is Mohamed Hassan Qaid, Libi came relatively late to al-Qaida. His early years of activism appear to have been spent with the now largely defunct Libyan Islamic Fighting Group in his native land and then in various north African countries. He then travelled to Afghanistan where he became one of the many and varied self-styled international "mujahideen" who fought alongside the Taliban in 2001.
Libi, who was born in the mid-1960s, is thus younger by more than a decade than the current leader of al-Qaida, Ayman al-Zawahiri. As such, some analysts have described the militant, who trained as cleric in the western African state of Mauretania, as a relatively youthful face for the increasingly elderly senior command of the battered organisation. Captured in the aftermath of the hardline Islamist movement's defeat, Libi became famous in militant circles when he escaped from Bagram Air Force Base north of Kabul in 2005 after three years of imprisonment. It is then that he is thought to have sworn the bayat, the oath of personal allegiance to Bin Laden, and thus effectively joined al-Qaida.
Certainly the group have made sure to boost his profile with numerous appearances in al-Qaida propaganda videos. A firebrand rhetorical style was apparently seen as effective, especially when backed by the kudos of his escape from captivity. Libi's other duties within the group have been less clear however and some analysts within Western security services have suggested that his role has been limited by relatively limited intelligence, at least compared to intellectual capable if dogmatic men like Bin Laden and Zawahiri. Libi was born in the mid-1960s and is more than a decade younger than al-Qaida's current leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. As such, some analysts have described the militant, who trained as cleric in the west-African state of Mauretania, as a relatively youthful face for the increasingly elderly senior command of the battered organisation.
As ever in these situations, the possible deceased man is now being assigned a number. He was, we are being told by US sources quoted by Reuters, al-Qaida's number two. Certainly al-Qaida has made sure to boost his profile with numerous appearances in its propaganda videos. His firebrand rhetorical style was apparently seen as effective, especially when backed by the kudos of his escape. Libi's other duties within the group have been less clear, however, and some Western security analysts have suggested that his role has been restricted by his relatively limited intelligence, at least compared with intellectually capable if dogmatic men such as Bin Laden and Zawahiri.
The logic behind this is that Libi is thought to have replaced Atiyah Abdal Rahman, the extremely capable veteran militant who was acting as chief of staff for Bin Laden in the months before he was killed and then for Zawahiri. Rahman was killed, also by a drone strike, in August last year. As ever in these situations, the possibly deceased man has been assigned a number. He was, US sources quoted by Reuters say, al-Qaida's number two.
But with al-Qaida's structure increasingly fragmented through the loss of so many senior and middle-ranking figures, it is difficult to assign any individual a clear position in a hierarchy. This is particularly the case with someone like Libi whose exact role is understood so poorly. The logic behind this is that Libi is thought to have replaced Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, the extremely capable veteran militant who was acting as chief of staff for Bin Laden in the months before the al-Qaida leader was killed, and then for Zawahiri. Rahman was killed by a drone strike last August.
One important point is the clear difference between Libi and Rahman, the man he is supposed to have replaced. The latter was a hardened operative who had seen at first hand the violent militant struggle in Algeria in the 1990s and travelled widely during the following decade as a personal envoy of Bin Laden. He was known and respected as a very serious operator. Libi, despite his high-profile, is not of the same calibre. His death would be another blow to a battered organisation – but perhaps not of the magnitude some might like to claim. But with al-Qaida's structure increasingly fragmented through the loss of so many senior and middle-ranking figures, it is difficult to assign any individual a clear position in a hierarchy. This is particularly the case with someone such as Libi whose exact role is understood so poorly.
One important point is the clear difference between Libi and Rahman, the man he is supposed to have replaced. The latter was a hardened operative who had seen at first hand the violent militant struggle in Algeria in the 1990s and travelled widely during the following decade as a personal envoy of Bin Laden. He was known and respected as a very serious operator.
Libi, despite his high profile, is not of the same calibre. His death would be another blow to a battered organisation – but perhaps not of the magnitude some might like to claim.