'Battle inside Afghanistan's most violent corner' diff viewer (4/5)

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Battle inside Afghanistan's most violent corner	Battle inside Afghanistan's most violent corner
2013-05-09 20:20:41 UTC	2013-05-21 17:47:30 UTC (12 days later)
The meeting took place on Monday last week in building 101 on the main road just outside the town of Gereshk. At one end of a long table was an oversized portrait of Hamid Karzai, and sitting opposite it was Saleem Rodi, the quietly spoken district governor. Rodi was chairing this gathering, huddled around him were the most senior security officials in the area – Afghan and British – and they were in conspiratorial mood.	The meeting took place on Monday last week in building 101 on the main road just outside the town of Gereshk. At one end of a long table was an oversized portrait of Hamid Karzai, and sitting opposite it was Saleem Rodi, the quietly spoken district governor. Rodi was chairing this gathering, huddled around him were the most senior security officials in the area – Afghan and British – and they were in conspiratorial mood.
The subject was the insurgency, their aim was surprise, and their plans had a name: Operation Qalb (Heart).	The subject was the insurgency, their aim was surprise, and their plans had a name: Operation Qalb (Heart).
Rodi said only the people in the room knew the details of the forthcoming attack, and secrecy was paramount if the Taliban were to be caught unawares; other missions had been hindered by leaks. He wanted to hear from everyone around the table about how civilian casualties could be minimised if and when the shooting started. "We have sacrificed a lot of blood already," he said.	Rodi said only the people in the room knew the details of the forthcoming attack, and secrecy was paramount if the Taliban were to be caught unawares; other missions had been hindered by leaks. He wanted to hear from everyone around the table about how civilian casualties could be minimised if and when the shooting started. "We have sacrificed a lot of blood already," he said.
Helmand province has been the fiercest battleground in Nato's fight with the Taliban over the last 11 years, and its central district of Nahr-e Saraj has become the most violent area within it. There is no place quite like it.	Helmand province has been the fiercest battleground in Nato's fight with the Taliban over the last 11 years, and its central district of Nahr-e Saraj has become the most violent area within it. There is no place quite like it.
Eighteen British soldiers have died there since the beginning of the year, nine in the last 10 weeks. Afghan soldiers have perished in even greater numbers, 25 since April. Hours before this security meeting, a government official was assassinated less than a mile away.	Eighteen British soldiers have died there since the beginning of the year, nine in the last 10 weeks. Afghan soldiers have perished in even greater numbers, 25 since April. Hours before this security meeting, a government official was assassinated less than a mile away.
The violence here has polarised opinions about the state of the country. No other place in Afghanistan better reflects the competing views about the future – the claims and counter claims about what can and cannot be achieved in the two years before combat troops from Nato's International Security and Assistance Force (Isaf) leave Afghanistan for good. This urgency prompted British and Afghan commanders to undertake another big heave during this summer's fighting season, co-ordinating three major operations in an attempt to drive the insurgents into sparsely populated desert areas where, it is hoped, they will struggle to mount meaningful attacks against the main towns.	The violence here has polarised opinions about the state of the country. No other place in Afghanistan better reflects the competing views about the future – the claims and counter claims about what can and cannot be achieved in the two years before combat troops from Nato's International Security and Assistance Force (Isaf) leave Afghanistan for good. This urgency prompted British and Afghan commanders to undertake another big heave during this summer's fighting season, co-ordinating three major operations in an attempt to drive the insurgents into sparsely populated desert areas where, it is hoped, they will struggle to mount meaningful attacks against the main towns.
Two of these assignments have been in Nahr-e Saraj, where Afghan and British troops have pushed into badlands that have been a haven for the Taliban for nearly 20 years, and even longer for the narco-gangs they are often aligned with.	Two of these assignments have been in Nahr-e Saraj, where Afghan and British troops have pushed into badlands that have been a haven for the Taliban for nearly 20 years, and even longer for the narco-gangs they are often aligned with.
British commanders say this is the main reason why casualties have been so high: because the fight is being taken to the insurgents, not the other way around.	British commanders say this is the main reason why casualties have been so high: because the fight is being taken to the insurgents, not the other way around.
But despite having overwhelming military superiority, these gains are gradual and sometimes come at a terrible cost. Whether the areas can be held in the long term is a question nobody can answer.	But despite having overwhelming military superiority, these gains are gradual and sometimes come at a terrible cost. Whether the areas can be held in the long term is a question nobody can answer.
One British officer involved in both operations in Nahr-e Saraj conceded he was surprised by the insurgents' resilience. "I am constantly amazed by them," he said. "They are completely over-matched by us and the Afghan army. We keep killing them, but they keep coming back for more."	One British officer involved in both operations in Nahr-e Saraj conceded he was surprised by the insurgents' resilience. "I am constantly amazed by them," he said. "They are completely over-matched by us and the Afghan army. We keep killing them, but they keep coming back for more."
Unable to fight face to face, the insurgents have been attempting to derail the clearance strategy with a mix of roadside bombs and sniper fire. But another tactic has proved much more successful. Their ability to "turn" members of the Afghan security forces to attack Isaf soldiers prompted Nato's hasty decision to reduce some joint patrols with Afghan troops. The so-called green on blue killings have not all been engineered by the insurgents, but they now know how to hurt the western alliance – and will try harder.	Unable to fight face to face, the insurgents have been attempting to derail the clearance strategy with a mix of roadside bombs and sniper fire. But another tactic has proved much more successful. Their ability to "turn" members of the Afghan security forces to attack Isaf soldiers prompted Nato's hasty decision to reduce some joint patrols with Afghan troops. The so-called green on blue killings have not all been engineered by the insurgents, but they now know how to hurt the western alliance – and will try harder.
For the British, one of the main aims of Operation Qalb is to reinforce security around Gereshk, the busy town that accounts for more than half of the people in Nahr-e Saraj. Having driven the insurgents out of Gereshk, street by street, building by building, this is one of the military's showpiece legacies.	For the British, one of the main aims of Operation Qalb is to reinforce security around Gereshk, the busy town that accounts for more than half of the people in Nahr-e Saraj. Having driven the insurgents out of Gereshk, street by street, building by building, this is one of the military's showpiece legacies.
The bazaar here used to look like a bomb had hit it, or several probably. Now that it is vibrant and comparatively calm, business has begun to take root. In the last two years, 500 shops have been built in the town, and all have been bought.	The bazaar here used to look like a bomb had hit it, or several probably. Now that it is vibrant and comparatively calm, business has begun to take root. In the last two years, 500 shops have been built in the town, and all have been bought.
Talking to Afghans who live there, it is obvious they are grateful for being in the security bubble. They also admit feeling apprehensive about what will happen when Isaf leaves.	Talking to Afghans who live there, it is obvious they are grateful for being in the security bubble. They also admit feeling apprehensive about what will happen when Isaf leaves.
Bahlool Khan, who has just been re-elected as chair of the Gereshk local council, said: "In the past there was a lot of fighting. There was a lot of bloodshed and people were killing each other. There was no education, no health. People were hiding behind walls. Nobody trusts the insurgents. People have not forgotten."	Bahlool Khan, who has just been re-elected as chair of the Gereshk local council, said: "In the past there was a lot of fighting. There was a lot of bloodshed and people were killing each other. There was no education, no health. People were hiding behind walls. Nobody trusts the insurgents. People have not forgotten."
One woman living in Gereshk added: "The women living here are quite happy to have Isaf around. The girls are going to school again. We don't want the old tribal wars to come back. It has become more peaceful, especially in the bazaar. We don't want to go back to the Taliban days when Isaf goes."	One woman living in Gereshk added: "The women living here are quite happy to have Isaf around. The girls are going to school again. We don't want the old tribal wars to come back. It has become more peaceful, especially in the bazaar. We don't want to go back to the Taliban days when Isaf goes."
The best way to protect them, Afghan and Nato commanders have decided, is to push the insurgents further away from the town, deeper into Helmand.	The best way to protect them, Afghan and Nato commanders have decided, is to push the insurgents further away from the town, deeper into Helmand.
The Afghan army has taken the lead in the two most recent operations, supported by Danish and British forces, including the Grenadier Guards, who are stationed at Main Operating Base Price, a short drive from Gereshk.	The Afghan army has taken the lead in the two most recent operations, supported by Danish and British forces, including the Grenadier Guards, who are stationed at Main Operating Base Price, a short drive from Gereshk.
The tactic is simple, but requires feats of co-ordination to get right.	The tactic is simple, but requires feats of co-ordination to get right.
On Monday and Tuesday nights last week, 1,200 Afghan troops from the 3rd Kandak (battalion), along with 200 British soldiers and advisers, left their neighbouring camps to take up discreet positions in the insurgent-filled region of Pulpazay.Forming a steel ring around villages and compounds, the Afghan National Army (ANA) began a series of house to house searches, gradually sweeping its way through the area, flushing out insurgents. Commanders who have been on previous operations say few insurgents stand and fight, and those who try do not come out alive.	On Monday and Tuesday nights last week, 1,200 Afghan troops from the 3rd Kandak (battalion), along with 200 British soldiers and advisers, left their neighbouring camps to take up discreet positions in the insurgent-filled region of Pulpazay.Forming a steel ring around villages and compounds, the Afghan National Army (ANA) began a series of house to house searches, gradually sweeping its way through the area, flushing out insurgents. Commanders who have been on previous operations say few insurgents stand and fight, and those who try do not come out alive.
The ones who run are caught in the net around the village and are handed over to the police. All the details of this latest operation have not been disclosed yet because it is not over. But the early days of the mission suggest at least some success. Forty-four improvised explosive devices were discovered, as well as "a significant weapons cache, radio equipment and hundreds of rounds of ammunition".	The ones who run are caught in the net around the village and are handed over to the police. All the details of this latest operation have not been disclosed yet because it is not over. But the early days of the mission suggest at least some success. Forty-four improvised explosive devices were discovered, as well as "a significant weapons cache, radio equipment and hundreds of rounds of ammunition".
It will be another week before this mission finishes, by which time the ANA hopes to have built permanent checkpoints to deter the insurgents from coming back again. Locally elected councillors have been preaching there too, offering modest gestures – such as repairing a roof or well – to help persuade those who might be sceptical about whether their "liberation" will last, or do them any good.	It will be another week before this mission finishes, by which time the ANA hopes to have built permanent checkpoints to deter the insurgents from coming back again. Locally elected councillors have been preaching there too, offering modest gestures – such as repairing a roof or well – to help persuade those who might be sceptical about whether their "liberation" will last, or do them any good.
The facts that the ANA is taking the lead in these exercises and that Nahr-e Saraj has elected officials are regarded by the British as a measure of the progress that has been made in this district over the last three years. But can the Afghan army, which has basic equipment and is still evolving as a fighting force, continue to protect the safer areas, let alone take on the insurgents in places where the Taliban appear to remain strong?	The facts that the ANA is taking the lead in these exercises and that Nahr-e Saraj has elected officials are regarded by the British as a measure of the progress that has been made in this district over the last three years. But can the Afghan army, which has basic equipment and is still evolving as a fighting force, continue to protect the safer areas, let alone take on the insurgents in places where the Taliban appear to remain strong?
British commanders believe they can do the former but are more hesitant about the latter. "Last year there was violence inside populated areas; this year, the violence is still at the same level, but it has been displaced," said Brigadier Doug Chalmers, commander of Task Force Helmand.	British commanders believe they can do the former but are more hesitant about the latter. "Last year there was violence inside populated areas; this year, the violence is still at the same level, but it has been displaced," said Brigadier Doug Chalmers, commander of Task Force Helmand.
"Everyone talks about Nahr-e Saraj as if it is toxic. There is a northern part of the district that has a lot of insurgency activity inside rural villages. But the actual city of Gereshk is growing. It is not a city under siege, otherwise it would be withering. Gereshk gives me confidence we are providing the environment for the Afghans to regain a bit of control.	"Everyone talks about Nahr-e Saraj as if it is toxic. There is a northern part of the district that has a lot of insurgency activity inside rural villages. But the actual city of Gereshk is growing. It is not a city under siege, otherwise it would be withering. Gereshk gives me confidence we are providing the environment for the Afghans to regain a bit of control.
"If people weren't bothering to invest, I would be nervous that what we are doing here might be a bit transitory. But if you go there, it is a bustling regional town. How much better could it be? External investors are oblivious to the violence."	"If people weren't bothering to invest, I would be nervous that what we are doing here might be a bit transitory. But if you go there, it is a bustling regional town. How much better could it be? External investors are oblivious to the violence."
There are big caveats, as Chalmers acknowledges. "Is it going to continue to move forward? I think it will, but I can't guarantee that it will. Will there be the same level of change that we have seen over the last two years? The answer is, I am not sure there will be. The Afghans will do things differently, and as they take responsibility, it will change the dynamic in a way that we don't really know yet."	There are big caveats, as Chalmers acknowledges. "Is it going to continue to move forward? I think it will, but I can't guarantee that it will. Will there be the same level of change that we have seen over the last two years? The answer is, I am not sure there will be. The Afghans will do things differently, and as they take responsibility, it will change the dynamic in a way that we don't really know yet."
Chalmers said it may be more important to the Afghan security forces to hold what they already have. "The fact that there may still be an insurgency when we have gone, is that going to affect the city of Gereshk, or will Afghans be prepared to tolerate that? My feeling is that they are slightly more pragmatic than the west. They know what matters."	Chalmers said it may be more important to the Afghan security forces to hold what they already have. "The fact that there may still be an insurgency when we have gone, is that going to affect the city of Gereshk, or will Afghans be prepared to tolerate that? My feeling is that they are slightly more pragmatic than the west. They know what matters."
The local security forces were already reaching out to the insurgents, he said, and local accommodations and agreements could follow. This could lead to deals that leave the Afghan government in control of some areas, and the Taliban free to live in others.	The local security forces were already reaching out to the insurgents, he said, and local accommodations and agreements could follow. This could lead to deals that leave the Afghan government in control of some areas, and the Taliban free to live in others.
That is not what the UK had once hoped for, but it might be Helmand's best hope now. "Our job is to enable the Afghans to enter the conversation from a position of strength," said Chalmers. "It is very difficult to have those conversations with people if you are the weakling in the room. And it is very difficult for us as genuine outsiders to do that level of negotiation. A lot of it is quite local, village to village. It is very difficult for us to do, and I don't think it is right for us to do."	That is not what the UK had once hoped for, but it might be Helmand's best hope now. "Our job is to enable the Afghans to enter the conversation from a position of strength," said Chalmers. "It is very difficult to have those conversations with people if you are the weakling in the room. And it is very difficult for us as genuine outsiders to do that level of negotiation. A lot of it is quite local, village to village. It is very difficult for us to do, and I don't think it is right for us to do."
Chalmers admitted anxiety about relinquishing all control to the Afghans, as Nato is gradually doing as part of its withdrawal strategy. He likened it to a parent watching a child going to university, and becoming truly independent. "I have to force myself to accept that the only way for this to work is to let go."	Chalmers admitted anxiety about relinquishing all control to the Afghans, as Nato is gradually doing as part of its withdrawal strategy. He likened it to a parent watching a child going to university, and becoming truly independent. "I have to force myself to accept that the only way for this to work is to let go."
General Adrian Bradshaw, commander of British forces in Afghanistan, and deputy to Isaf 's commander, General John Allen,said the high levels of violence this year in places such as Nahr-e Saraj were symptomatic of something else. He believes the Taliban are pushing back as hard as they can because their leaders are preparing to enter the political and reconciliation process.	General Adrian Bradshaw, commander of British forces in Afghanistan, and deputy to Isaf 's commander, General John Allen,said the high levels of violence this year in places such as Nahr-e Saraj were symptomatic of something else. He believes the Taliban are pushing back as hard as they can because their leaders are preparing to enter the political and reconciliation process.
"What we would expect from an insurgency entering the political arena is to seek to maximise the bargaining position. It is often suggested that the Taliban will simply wait us out until 2015 and scale down their effort, and what we are seeing now does not represent the maximum effort. I don't think that is credible at all.	"What we would expect from an insurgency entering the political arena is to seek to maximise the bargaining position. It is often suggested that the Taliban will simply wait us out until 2015 and scale down their effort, and what we are seeing now does not represent the maximum effort. I don't think that is credible at all.
"What they will be doing now, and what they have been doing all of this summer, is absolutely maximising their effort to full capacity because they have to maximise their bargaining position when entering the negotiating arena. All the indications we get from intelligence suggest there is a real push on their junior commanders, from their senior commanders sitting outside the country, to keep up the fight."	"What they will be doing now, and what they have been doing all of this summer, is absolutely maximising their effort to full capacity because they have to maximise their bargaining position when entering the negotiating arena. All the indications we get from intelligence suggest there is a real push on their junior commanders, from their senior commanders sitting outside the country, to keep up the fight."
Bradshaw said he believed the Taliban had been struggling with funding because they made no money out of opium poppies last year. The insurgents were also short of weapons, he added. "[They] are now coming to the realisation that keeping on and keeping on, pounding themselves against us and our Afghan partners, is not delivering. This is the beginning of an understanding by their higher command that they have to find an alternative approach. And there are signs that some of them are looking to do just that. We are seeing it to a certain degree at all levels. We see signs from mid-level fighters of dissatisfaction.	Bradshaw said he believed the Taliban had been struggling with funding because they made no money out of opium poppies last year. The insurgents were also short of weapons, he added. "[They] are now coming to the realisation that keeping on and keeping on, pounding themselves against us and our Afghan partners, is not delivering. This is the beginning of an understanding by their higher command that they have to find an alternative approach. And there are signs that some of them are looking to do just that. We are seeing it to a certain degree at all levels. We see signs from mid-level fighters of dissatisfaction.
"Some of them leave the organisation and weare aware that at higher level there also people interested in a political path, or at least concluding that they will not achieve their political ends by military means alone." However, Bradshaw admitted it would be wrong to suggest the insurgency was in any way spent. "I don't want to paint too rosy a picture of the situation. The fact remains that the insurgency is still a significant threat to peace and stability."	"Some of them leave the organisation and weare aware that at higher level there also people interested in a political path, or at least concluding that they will not achieve their political ends by military means alone." However, Bradshaw admitted it would be wrong to suggest the insurgency was in any way spent. "I don't want to paint too rosy a picture of the situation. The fact remains that the insurgency is still a significant threat to peace and stability."
And nowhere more so than in Nahr-e Saraj. The area has always been a hotbed of tribal and gang rivalry, quite separate from the insurgency. The assassination of a government official in the district last week was not claimed by the Taliban. That kind of murder is not uncommon in Helmand; such attacks happened before UK troops arrived, and they will continue once they have gone. British commanders accept that and understand better than perhaps ever before that their forces have probably done as much as they can, or were ever likely to be able to do, in a society as complex and feudal as Afghanistan. Now it is up to the Afghans themselves.	And nowhere more so than in Nahr-e Saraj. The area has always been a hotbed of tribal and gang rivalry, quite separate from the insurgency. The assassination of a government official in the district last week was not claimed by the Taliban. That kind of murder is not uncommon in Helmand; such attacks happened before UK troops arrived, and they will continue once they have gone. British commanders accept that and understand better than perhaps ever before that their forces have probably done as much as they can, or were ever likely to be able to do, in a society as complex and feudal as Afghanistan. Now it is up to the Afghans themselves.
One of the men who will have most responsibility for the security of Nahr-e Saraj in the coming years is Colonel Hamayoon, the 36-year-old commander of the ANA's 3rd Kandak. The officer has been working with the British over the last two years, and says he has learned a great deal from them. Like all commanders in every military, he wants better equipment and more of it. But there is a greater need: he wants to go it alone, without Isaf.	One of the men who will have most responsibility for the security of Nahr-e Saraj in the coming years is Colonel Hamayoon, the 36-year-old commander of the ANA's 3rd Kandak. The officer has been working with the British over the last two years, and says he has learned a great deal from them. Like all commanders in every military, he wants better equipment and more of it. But there is a greater need: he wants to go it alone, without Isaf.