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Judge imposes reporting restrictions in Dale Cregan case Reporting restrictions in the Dale Cregan case
(about 20 hours later)
An order was made in Manchester crown court this morning preventing reporting of any proceedings in the Dale Cregan case until after the conclusion of the trial; it excludes the trial from its scope which means that, unless further restrictions are imposed, once the jury is sworn in it will be business as usual as far as court reporting of the case is concerned. Nevertheless, the decision is worth more than a second glance.An order was made in Manchester crown court this morning preventing reporting of any proceedings in the Dale Cregan case until after the conclusion of the trial; it excludes the trial from its scope which means that, unless further restrictions are imposed, once the jury is sworn in it will be business as usual as far as court reporting of the case is concerned. Nevertheless, the decision is worth more than a second glance.
When a criminal case begins legal limitations on public discussion kick in automatically: reports of preparatory hearings are limited to basic facts such as the name of the accused and the offences; pre-trial hearings cannot be reported until the conclusion of the trial; and anything likely to cause a substantial risk of serious prejudice to the proceedings is prohibited by the Contempt of Court Act 1981 from the point of arrest.When a criminal case begins legal limitations on public discussion kick in automatically: reports of preparatory hearings are limited to basic facts such as the name of the accused and the offences; pre-trial hearings cannot be reported until the conclusion of the trial; and anything likely to cause a substantial risk of serious prejudice to the proceedings is prohibited by the Contempt of Court Act 1981 from the point of arrest.
His Honour Judge Gilbart QC imposed additional reporting restrictions in Cregan's case on the ground of "the very real risk of prejudice". He was not concerned, he said, about the "very proper expressions of loss" from the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police, but about other information including "press conference answers" and "accounts", which have been "widely disseminated on the internet, in broadcasts, and in newspapers." Talking about "extensive material" published about Cregan, which may be relevant to cases against other defendants, the judge said: "the time has come for that flow of material and comment to cease." His Honour Judge Gilbart QC imposed additional reporting restrictions in Cregan's case on the ground of "very real risk of prejudice". He was not concerned, he said, about the "very proper expressions of loss" from the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police, but about other information including "press conference answers" and "accounts", which have been "widely disseminated on the internet, in broadcasts, and in newspapers." Talking about the "extensive material" published, which may be relevant to cases against other defendants, the judge said: "the time has come for that flow of material and comment to cease."
Cregan was charged with murder last week following the death of two police officers and the background and circumstances surrounding those events are, as the judge observed, of "intense interest" to the public, then again there is the open justice principle to consider and newsworthiness is not a reason to impose reporting restrictions. Cregan was charged with murder last week following the death of two police officers and the background and circumstances surrounding those events are, as the judge observed, of "intense interest" to the public; then again there is the open justice principle to consider and newsworthiness is not a reason to impose reporting restrictions.
According to guidance published by the Judicial Studies Board (JSB) in 2009 an order postponing publication of court reports can be made under section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act where a court considers it is "necessary to avoid a substantial risk of prejudice to the administration of justice in those or other proceedings". Such orders are most often made where the progress and outcome of one trial may impact on another. While a court may make a section 4 (2) order to prevent potential prejudice to a future trial, the JSB guidance says judges should keep in mind that memories of news reports will fade and that juries can be expected to follow a trial judge's direction to decide cases only on the evidence they see and hear in court. According to guidance published by the Judicial Studies Board (JSB) in 2009 an order postponing publication of court reports can be made under section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act where a court considers it is "necessary to avoid a substantial risk of prejudice to the administration of justice in those or other proceedings". Such orders are most often made where the progress and outcome of one trial may impact on another. While a court may make a section 4(2) order to prevent potential prejudice to a future trial, the JSB guidance says judges should keep in mind that memories of news reports will fade and that juries can be expected to follow a trial judge's direction to decide cases only on the evidence they see and hear in court.
"This court is determined to see that the fairness of any trial is not overborne by the publication of material or comment which could affect the jury," the judge said today, but that stretches the purpose of a section 4(2) order. The JSB guidance, which is jointly published with the Newspaper Society, Society of Editors and Times Newspapers, points out that the section 4(2) gives the court power only to postpone reports of legal proceedings, everything else, including prejudicial comment and information already in the public domain, is a matter of judgment for the publisher who risks liability under the Contempt of Court Act if he or she gets it wrong. "This court is determined to see that the fairness of any trial is not overborne by the publication of material or comment which could affect the jury," the judge said today, but that stretches the purpose of a section 4(2) order. The JSB guidance, which is jointly published with the Newspaper Society, Society of Editors and Times Newspapers, points out that section 4(2) gives the court power only to postpone reports of legal proceedings, everything else, including prejudicial comment and information already in the public domain, is a matter of judgment for the publisher, who risks liability under the Contempt of Court Act if he or she gets it wrong.