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| Cuba 50 years on - and the lessons for Iran | Cuba 50 years on - and the lessons for Iran |
| (30 days later) | |
| A half-century ago this month, on October 22 1962, President John F Kennedy went on television to reveal the presence of Soviet missiles on Cuba and his decision to impose a blockade on the island to stop more Soviet deliveries getting through. | A half-century ago this month, on October 22 1962, President John F Kennedy went on television to reveal the presence of Soviet missiles on Cuba and his decision to impose a blockade on the island to stop more Soviet deliveries getting through. |
| The more we find out about this perilous face-off, the closer it appears we were to a nuclear catastrophe. New research by Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, found that there were 158 Soviet nuclear warheads of five types already in Cuba by the time the military blockade was imposed on October 24. The crisis, they conclude, was "even more serious and dangerous than previously thought". | The more we find out about this perilous face-off, the closer it appears we were to a nuclear catastrophe. New research by Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, found that there were 158 Soviet nuclear warheads of five types already in Cuba by the time the military blockade was imposed on October 24. The crisis, they conclude, was "even more serious and dangerous than previously thought". |
| The Bulletin has published another article to mark the fiftieth anniversary, lauding the largely unsung role of the UN secretary general at the time, U Thant, in finding a compromise between the US and Soviet Union. | The Bulletin has published another article to mark the fiftieth anniversary, lauding the largely unsung role of the UN secretary general at the time, U Thant, in finding a compromise between the US and Soviet Union. |
| Thant's role was better recognised at the time, but has since been buried in American histories of the stand-off. Authors Walter Dorn and Robert Pauk write: | Thant's role was better recognised at the time, but has since been buried in American histories of the stand-off. Authors Walter Dorn and Robert Pauk write: |
| Certainly Kennedy's resolve played a role in this conflict, but his appreciation of the need to give his opponent an honourable way out was crucial. He wisely used an internationally prominent and skilled mediator to do so. Thant was the consummate diplomat, humble and self-effacing. Less than a year in office, he had already gained Khrushchev's trust on a visit to the Soviet Union that included a friendly swim with the Soviet leader at his Crimean dacha. Kennedy also trusted Thant and later praised his efforts to end the Cuban Missile Crisis. But Thant did not seek recognition; rather he practised quiet diplomacy and wanted the parties to take the credit. | Certainly Kennedy's resolve played a role in this conflict, but his appreciation of the need to give his opponent an honourable way out was crucial. He wisely used an internationally prominent and skilled mediator to do so. Thant was the consummate diplomat, humble and self-effacing. Less than a year in office, he had already gained Khrushchev's trust on a visit to the Soviet Union that included a friendly swim with the Soviet leader at his Crimean dacha. Kennedy also trusted Thant and later praised his efforts to end the Cuban Missile Crisis. But Thant did not seek recognition; rather he practised quiet diplomacy and wanted the parties to take the credit. |
| What would U Thant do now? Graham Allison, author of Essence of Decision, calls the Iran situation "the Cuban missile crisis in slow-motion". | What would U Thant do now? Graham Allison, author of Essence of Decision, calls the Iran situation "the Cuban missile crisis in slow-motion". |
| This same process is looming on the current trajectory, inexorably, toward a confrontation at which an American president is going to have to choose between attacking Iran to prevent it becoming a nuclear weapons state or acquiescing and then confronting a nuclear weapons state. | This same process is looming on the current trajectory, inexorably, toward a confrontation at which an American president is going to have to choose between attacking Iran to prevent it becoming a nuclear weapons state or acquiescing and then confronting a nuclear weapons state. |
| The best course, Allison argues, is not to get to that point of confrontation in the first place. Easier said, of course. It would be interesting to perform a comparison between Nikita Kruschev and Ali Khamenei, as an adversary at nuclear chess. One obvious difference is that Iran's Supreme Leader doesn't actually have any real pieces, just stocks of black and white wood, so to speak, which could be turned into pieces. | The best course, Allison argues, is not to get to that point of confrontation in the first place. Easier said, of course. It would be interesting to perform a comparison between Nikita Kruschev and Ali Khamenei, as an adversary at nuclear chess. One obvious difference is that Iran's Supreme Leader doesn't actually have any real pieces, just stocks of black and white wood, so to speak, which could be turned into pieces. |
| What the Cuban and Iranian crises have in common is that, now as then, it is reasonable to assume that both sides would like to find a way out of the impasse, as the CIA veteran, Paul Pillar, recently argued in the National Interest. The US and Iran (and it is ultimately about these two nations coming to an agreement) have both signalled at various times that they would be open to a compromise which left Iran able to enrich uranium below 5% purity in return for stricter international controls. Israel, Saudi Arabia and possibly France would have problems with such an outcome, but they would presumably be ready to live with it with suitable US assurances and cajoling. | What the Cuban and Iranian crises have in common is that, now as then, it is reasonable to assume that both sides would like to find a way out of the impasse, as the CIA veteran, Paul Pillar, recently argued in the National Interest. The US and Iran (and it is ultimately about these two nations coming to an agreement) have both signalled at various times that they would be open to a compromise which left Iran able to enrich uranium below 5% purity in return for stricter international controls. Israel, Saudi Arabia and possibly France would have problems with such an outcome, but they would presumably be ready to live with it with suitable US assurances and cajoling. |
| The problem is how to get from here to there. That is the goal of the next diplomatic push after the US elections. But there are questions over whether it will take off at all. Would a Mitt Romney victory lead to a long pause in real negotiations while the incoming administration worked out what its real (as opposed to its campaign) position is? And does the aged, ailing, chronically indecisive Khamenei, have what it takes to make such a far-ranging strategic decision? | The problem is how to get from here to there. That is the goal of the next diplomatic push after the US elections. But there are questions over whether it will take off at all. Would a Mitt Romney victory lead to a long pause in real negotiations while the incoming administration worked out what its real (as opposed to its campaign) position is? And does the aged, ailing, chronically indecisive Khamenei, have what it takes to make such a far-ranging strategic decision? |
| The right answer to both questions is: Who knows? But even if Obama gets a second bite of the cherry after November 6, and it turns out that the Supreme Leader has indeed been waiting all this time to find out who will be in charge in the Oval Office next year before getting into serious negotiations, there is still a lot of diplomacy to be done. | The right answer to both questions is: Who knows? But even if Obama gets a second bite of the cherry after November 6, and it turns out that the Supreme Leader has indeed been waiting all this time to find out who will be in charge in the Oval Office next year before getting into serious negotiations, there is still a lot of diplomacy to be done. |
| The impact of sanctions, undeniable though it is, may not work in favour of a compromise, if the West puts off a deal from a position of strength because it believes it will get a better one if it waits another week or month, while Tehran puts off a deal on the grounds you should never agree a price at your weakest moment. It will take an awful lot of vision all round to land this crisis safely. And, just as in Cuba, a good deal of luck. | The impact of sanctions, undeniable though it is, may not work in favour of a compromise, if the West puts off a deal from a position of strength because it believes it will get a better one if it waits another week or month, while Tehran puts off a deal on the grounds you should never agree a price at your weakest moment. It will take an awful lot of vision all round to land this crisis safely. And, just as in Cuba, a good deal of luck. |
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