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| Prospects for a two-state solution | Prospects for a two-state solution |
| (4 months later) | |
| The opening sentence in Rachel Shabi's article (The death of the two-state solution gives fresh hope, 24 October) underlines its central weakness. We are told: "We could argue who killed it but what's the point." But exaggeration aside, this is precisely what we should do, since it immediately highlights the principal cause: a complete absence of a sustainable high-powered Palestinian resistance movement on the ground for over two decades and counting. | The opening sentence in Rachel Shabi's article (The death of the two-state solution gives fresh hope, 24 October) underlines its central weakness. We are told: "We could argue who killed it but what's the point." But exaggeration aside, this is precisely what we should do, since it immediately highlights the principal cause: a complete absence of a sustainable high-powered Palestinian resistance movement on the ground for over two decades and counting. |
| The literature on resistance in asymmetric conflicts over the last 100 years shows that, for the weaker protagonist, up to 50% of such conflicts are successful, not so much in the classical Castro sense, but more with respect to a meaningful and substantive reconfiguration of the power between the parties. Then and only then can negotiations become "realistic", as the stronger party, succumbing to the cost factor, inevitably becomes attuned to the reality of a robust protagonist. A classical paradigm is the Vietnam war, but Palestinian resistance, especially in the late 1980s, is even more pertinent, since it effectively drove Rabin to the negotiating table, as he himself admitted. The great pity was that Arafat threw away all the advantages of this initial success by disbanding the very resistance that prompted the Palestinian breakthrough in the first place. | The literature on resistance in asymmetric conflicts over the last 100 years shows that, for the weaker protagonist, up to 50% of such conflicts are successful, not so much in the classical Castro sense, but more with respect to a meaningful and substantive reconfiguration of the power between the parties. Then and only then can negotiations become "realistic", as the stronger party, succumbing to the cost factor, inevitably becomes attuned to the reality of a robust protagonist. A classical paradigm is the Vietnam war, but Palestinian resistance, especially in the late 1980s, is even more pertinent, since it effectively drove Rabin to the negotiating table, as he himself admitted. The great pity was that Arafat threw away all the advantages of this initial success by disbanding the very resistance that prompted the Palestinian breakthrough in the first place. |
| In my view, a comprehensive, robust, nonviolent core resistance on the ground in Palestine, coupled with an international campaign akin to the boycott movement, in conjunction with an equally robust negotiating strategy will lead to an independent Palestinian state. All three components of the strategy are essential; individually they are ineffective. Such a state will at least constitute the first steps on the way back for the Palestinians. Palestinians can then concentrate on real issues, such as building up a social and economic base and tackling the enormity of the refugees' plight, revisiting the notion of the one-state option when the likely Arab majority in Israel itself materialises at a later date. Dr John Jennings Leamington Spa, Warwickshire | In my view, a comprehensive, robust, nonviolent core resistance on the ground in Palestine, coupled with an international campaign akin to the boycott movement, in conjunction with an equally robust negotiating strategy will lead to an independent Palestinian state. All three components of the strategy are essential; individually they are ineffective. Such a state will at least constitute the first steps on the way back for the Palestinians. Palestinians can then concentrate on real issues, such as building up a social and economic base and tackling the enormity of the refugees' plight, revisiting the notion of the one-state option when the likely Arab majority in Israel itself materialises at a later date. Dr John Jennings Leamington Spa, Warwickshire |
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