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| Britain's approach on the Falklands: neglect and hope for the best | Britain's approach on the Falklands: neglect and hope for the best |
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| Britain's approach towards the Falklands was one of neglect, of hoping for the best, and ignored warning signs that the Argentinian junta was adopting an increasingly belligerent attitude towards the disputed islands, documents released on Friday at the National Archives make plain. | Britain's approach towards the Falklands was one of neglect, of hoping for the best, and ignored warning signs that the Argentinian junta was adopting an increasingly belligerent attitude towards the disputed islands, documents released on Friday at the National Archives make plain. |
| The government's policy was eloquently summed up by Lord Carrington, the foreign secretary who fell on his sword after the Argentinian invasion of the islands. He privately told the privy counsellors' committee of inquiry set up to review the events leading up to the invasion: "If I may be very frank and rather rude, you had to keep the ball in the air with the Argentines. That was the object. We did not have any cards in our hands." | The government's policy was eloquently summed up by Lord Carrington, the foreign secretary who fell on his sword after the Argentinian invasion of the islands. He privately told the privy counsellors' committee of inquiry set up to review the events leading up to the invasion: "If I may be very frank and rather rude, you had to keep the ball in the air with the Argentines. That was the object. We did not have any cards in our hands." |
| The islands could not be developed while the Argentinians were threatening to take them over, Carrington told the Franks committee. | The islands could not be developed while the Argentinians were threatening to take them over, Carrington told the Franks committee. |
| He added: "There were all sorts of reasons why a settlement was to the advantage of everybody." | He added: "There were all sorts of reasons why a settlement was to the advantage of everybody." |
| Carrington continued: "If you cannot afford to defend a place … the only conceivable thing that you can do is to keep negotiations going as long as possible whether or not you think they are going to be successful." | Carrington continued: "If you cannot afford to defend a place … the only conceivable thing that you can do is to keep negotiations going as long as possible whether or not you think they are going to be successful." |
| Referring to a lease-back plan suggested by the Foreign Office the previous year, he told the committee: "As I recollect, the Argentine conversations did not go too badly and to begin with the Falklands islanders did not react too strongly, but the House of Commons reacted very strongly." | Referring to a lease-back plan suggested by the Foreign Office the previous year, he told the committee: "As I recollect, the Argentine conversations did not go too badly and to begin with the Falklands islanders did not react too strongly, but the House of Commons reacted very strongly." |
| Referring to a meeting of FCO ministers and officials called to discuss the Falklands on 5 March 1982, less than a month before the invasion, Carrington told the Franks committee: "What we did on March 5 was to see whether we could get another round of negotiations, we could salvage this, because the consequences of not salvaging it, the consequences of not having another round of negotiations were to achieve what successive British governments had sought to avoid, which was a large deterrent force in the Falkland Islands and vast expenditure for 1,800 people and this had been the objective of successive British governments to avoid." | Referring to a meeting of FCO ministers and officials called to discuss the Falklands on 5 March 1982, less than a month before the invasion, Carrington told the Franks committee: "What we did on March 5 was to see whether we could get another round of negotiations, we could salvage this, because the consequences of not salvaging it, the consequences of not having another round of negotiations were to achieve what successive British governments had sought to avoid, which was a large deterrent force in the Falkland Islands and vast expenditure for 1,800 people and this had been the objective of successive British governments to avoid." |
| Carrington, who resigned after the invasion with the two other FCO ministers, Humphrey Atkins and Richard Luce, wrote to John Nott, the defence secretary, three times early in 1982 trying to persuade him to reverse the decision to withdraw the survey ship HMS Endurance from the south Atlantic. "There was nobody in the cabinet … who was prepared to support me," he told the Franks committee, the papers reveal. | Carrington, who resigned after the invasion with the two other FCO ministers, Humphrey Atkins and Richard Luce, wrote to John Nott, the defence secretary, three times early in 1982 trying to persuade him to reverse the decision to withdraw the survey ship HMS Endurance from the south Atlantic. "There was nobody in the cabinet … who was prepared to support me," he told the Franks committee, the papers reveal. |
| The decision to withdraw the Endurance was later widely seen as yet another signal to Argentina that Britain was just not interested in the Falklands. When Carrington wrote to Geoffrey Howe, the chancellor, suggesting there should be a contingency plan to provide the islanders with an alternative air service should Argentina cut the existing one as they had threatened to do in early 1982, he was told that if he thought there was money available, he was mistaken. If he thought it so important then the FCO should pay for it, said Howe. That was "the sort of atmosphere at the time", Carrington recalled. | The decision to withdraw the Endurance was later widely seen as yet another signal to Argentina that Britain was just not interested in the Falklands. When Carrington wrote to Geoffrey Howe, the chancellor, suggesting there should be a contingency plan to provide the islanders with an alternative air service should Argentina cut the existing one as they had threatened to do in early 1982, he was told that if he thought there was money available, he was mistaken. If he thought it so important then the FCO should pay for it, said Howe. That was "the sort of atmosphere at the time", Carrington recalled. |
| The documents revealed on Friday reveal striking parallels and contrasts between the British government's attitude, notably on intelligence handling, leading up to the invasion of the Falklands and, 21 years later, leading up to the invasion of Iraq. | The documents revealed on Friday reveal striking parallels and contrasts between the British government's attitude, notably on intelligence handling, leading up to the invasion of the Falklands and, 21 years later, leading up to the invasion of Iraq. |
| Evidence that the Argentinian junta was adopting an increasingly belligerent approach towards the Falklands was ignored or dismissed as mere rhetoric. | Evidence that the Argentinian junta was adopting an increasingly belligerent approach towards the Falklands was ignored or dismissed as mere rhetoric. |
| Asked by the Franks committee whether it was at a hastily-arranged meeting in her office in the Commons on the evening of 31 March, just two days before the event, that she first grasped that an invasion was likely to happen, Thatcher replied: "Yes." | Asked by the Franks committee whether it was at a hastily-arranged meeting in her office in the Commons on the evening of 31 March, just two days before the event, that she first grasped that an invasion was likely to happen, Thatcher replied: "Yes." |
| She added: "That night, no one could tell me whether we could retake the Falklands. No one. We did not know, we did not know." | She added: "That night, no one could tell me whether we could retake the Falklands. No one. We did not know, we did not know." |
| On Iraq, by contrast, MI6 – spurred on by Tony Blair – exaggerated the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programme. | On Iraq, by contrast, MI6 – spurred on by Tony Blair – exaggerated the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programme. |
| The papers released on Friday show that ministers were concerned that parliamentary and public opinion would not accept any deal with Argentina after the invasion of the Falklands. On Iraq, public opinion was much less hawkish than most ministers. | The papers released on Friday show that ministers were concerned that parliamentary and public opinion would not accept any deal with Argentina after the invasion of the Falklands. On Iraq, public opinion was much less hawkish than most ministers. |
| As the Chilcot inquiry and the Butler review into the use of intelligence on Iraq have demonstrated, many key decisions were taken by small groups of ministers and officials, often without any contemporaneous record taken. | As the Chilcot inquiry and the Butler review into the use of intelligence on Iraq have demonstrated, many key decisions were taken by small groups of ministers and officials, often without any contemporaneous record taken. |
| For the Falklands, Thatcher set up a small war cabinet consisting of Willie Whitelaw, the home secretary; John Nott, the defence secretary; Francis Pym, the foreign secretary [after Carrington's resignation in April 1982]; and Cecil Parkinson, her trusted paymaster general. Howe, the chancellor with whom she famously squabbled, was not a member. | For the Falklands, Thatcher set up a small war cabinet consisting of Willie Whitelaw, the home secretary; John Nott, the defence secretary; Francis Pym, the foreign secretary [after Carrington's resignation in April 1982]; and Cecil Parkinson, her trusted paymaster general. Howe, the chancellor with whom she famously squabbled, was not a member. |
| Some decisions, notably that to attack the Argentinian cruiser the Belgrano, were taken informally. The attitude of senior Whitehall officials is reflected in this top secret memo to Thatcher from her cabinet secretary, Sir Robert Armstrong, on 19 May, two days before the British landings on the Falklands. | Some decisions, notably that to attack the Argentinian cruiser the Belgrano, were taken informally. The attitude of senior Whitehall officials is reflected in this top secret memo to Thatcher from her cabinet secretary, Sir Robert Armstrong, on 19 May, two days before the British landings on the Falklands. |
| "The Cabinet have come a long way since their initial wish to be consulted before a landing was authorised," he wrote. "Yesterday, I gather, most members seemed glad not to be in the full military picture. This suggests that you should not tell them tomorrow that the landing is expected tomorrow night. To do so would burden them with too much secret knowledge." | "The Cabinet have come a long way since their initial wish to be consulted before a landing was authorised," he wrote. "Yesterday, I gather, most members seemed glad not to be in the full military picture. This suggests that you should not tell them tomorrow that the landing is expected tomorrow night. To do so would burden them with too much secret knowledge." |
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