The EU: David Cameron should take tips from John Major about Europe

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/jan/12/david-cameron-tips-from-john-major-europe

Version 0 of 1.

He was in many ways a hapless prime minister, whose period in office is often dismissed as a bleakly grey interlude between the eras of Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair, but perhaps it is now time to revise in a gently upwards direction the verdict on Sir John Major. The passing of the years and the enlarging of perspective make the last Conservative prime minister before the present one look rather more impressive than he did when he was in power. Twenty one years ago this April, he was the last leader of his party to win a parliamentary majority. More, he triumphed at the 1992 election with the largest popular vote in British history. He then went on to lose in 1997 by one of the most devastating margins in the existence of his party.

But it is nevertheless a historic feat to be the only leader of this country to secure a fourth consecutive term for his party under universal suffrage. Sir John's 1992 victory looks even more noteworthy today, given that all his successors as Tory leader, up to and including David Cameron, have not been able to emulate it in the two decades since.

Shortly before his election victory, and playing some part in helping him to win it, Mr Major, as he then was, negotiated the Treaty of Maastricht. That agreement is now a dirty word for much of the Conservative party, an infamous entry in the phobes' catalogue of European "betrayals". But at the time it was signed, Maastricht was hailed as a remarkable achievement. The prime minister returned from the summit to a hero's welcome from his party. "It was a copybook triumph for Mr Major, the stuff of Foreign Office dreams," reported the <em>Daily Telegraph</em>'s man in Brussels, one Boris Johnson.

As David Cameron prepares to deliver his long-awaited, much-hyped and supposedly definitive speech on Europe, in which he will tell us how he proposes to set about renegotiating Britain's relationship, he might usefully contemplate the lessons of Maastricht. Sir John arrived in the Dutch city in a position of almost total isolation. Just as David Cameron is today, he appeared trapped between the clamorous demands of his party at home and the unwillingness of other European leaders to concede to them. He wanted two big opt-outs: from the social chapter and from participation in monetary union. None of the top players wanted to grant them. Around the table, it was usually one against 11. Yet he eventually managed to prevail.

Accounts of the negotiations credit his craftiness, his patience and his tenacity. Another important trait was an intense application to detail. David Cameron take particular note. Sir John's other important skill was that he was a keen student of human beings. He was sensitive to the needs of other leaders and adept at making them empathetic towards his political requirements. His foreign secretary, Douglas Hurd, once told Hugo Young: "He is a collector of people. Going into foreign affairs was like enlarging his collection." He used that charm – one of his aides called it his "one-to-one charisma" – to extract key concessions. One of the people left confounded was Ruud Lubbers, the prime architect of Maastricht and one of the wiliest continental politicians of the era. Mr Major prevailed, but without leaving the other man feeling bitter or bullied.

After the summit, Mr Lubbers observed: "There are two models of negotiation. The model of using arguments, trying to convince people, doing that in a good sequence with good timing. And then you have the other model, negotiating emotionally. Most political leaders do it emotionally. They shout at you. But John Major, never. A gentleman, well-briefed, rational, well-informed."

Even more crucially, the prime minister had formed a close bond with the most powerful man at the table, the then German chancellor, Helmut Kohl. As Sir John records in his memoirs: "Personal rapport can humanise diplomacy." At critical stages of the negotiation, Herr Kohl gave the British what they wanted, and persuaded other leaders to come on board, not because he agreed with Sir John, but because he liked and trusted his friend in Number 10 and wanted to help him out.

I take you down this memory lane because, once again, Britain's future in Europe could hinge on the relationship between a Conservative British prime minister and a Christian Democrat German chancellor. Mr Cameron is expected to say that, if he forms a majority Tory government after the next election, he will endeavour to renegotiate Britain's position in Europe and then seek endorsement for the new terms in a referendum. This is loaded with precarious assumptions, among them the dicey premise that the Conservatives will win the next election. But for the sake of argument, let's imagine that a re-elected Mr Cameron is in a position to try to start a renegotiation. Often I ask senior Tories why the rest of Europe should want to reopen all the treaties to suit the interests of its most reluctant member and then leave Britain to decide whether it wants to carry on as an even more semi-detached participant or leave altogether. The answer that I get is always the same: "Angela Merkel." The German chancellor wants Britain to remain inside the European Union and so will therefore accommodate Mr Cameron's demands.

The first part of this statement is clearly true. At the end of last year, Frau Merkel made an unusually dramatic intervention when she publicly declared that it would be bad for both Britain and the EU if we left. But that does not mean that Ms Merkel – or any other German leader for that matter – will pay any price to keep Britain inside. As Michael Heseltine has pointed out: "What is Germany's self-interest? Is it in Germany's self-interest to have an a la carte menu which would challenge the essence of the EU?" Recent experience has shown us that Ms Merkel is extremely stubborn in defence of what Germany regards as its vital national interests. David Cameron has misread her before and the latest signals from Berlin suggests that the Tories are doing so again.

Some in the prime minister's party are putting pressure on him to issue an ultimatum to the rest of Europe – give us what we want or we will leave – and are readying themselves to attack him as a wimp if his speech does not make such a threat. That is what Ruud Lubbers called "the emotional" model of negotiating and at the most screechy end of that model. Why it would be counterproductive has been underlined by several interventions in recent days. A senior official in the Obama administration articulated Washington's mounting concern that its most reliable ally in Europe might be taking a path to international isolation. The Dutch, Irish and Austrian governments, all generally friendly to Britain, have expressed their anxieties. Then there was a very salient warning from one of Angela Merkel's political allies. Gunther Krichbaum, the Christian Democrat chairman of the Bundestag's European affairs committee, remarked: "You cannot create a political future if you are blackmailing other states. That will not help Britain."

Indeed it will not. Pointing a gun and threatening to shoot if the other person doesn't give you what you want is a tactic for muggers. It is not recommended as a way to build international alliances. Especially not when everyone else believes that, if you do pull the trigger, the brains you blow out will be your own. The visceral, parochial response of Tory Europhobes has been to tell all these "foreigners" to "butt out". Perhaps they will pay more heed to the British business leaders who are finally rousing themselves to join the debate with warnings that uncertainty about whether Britain will remain in the EU will damage jobs and investment. Perhaps they will listen to the leader of the Conservative MEPs, Richard Ashworth, who observes that "snarling like a pitbull across the Channel" is making Britain "pretty unattractive and difficult to work with".

Reform of complex international institutions and relationships is usually best achieved not by threatening to flounce out, but by patience and sound arguments. Sir John did not win his negotiation at Maastricht by behaving like a crazed dog. He built relationships. He won his opt-outs not by being loathed and friendless, but by winning respect and making alliances.

The other lesson from Sir John is that it did him a fat lot of good with his party in the end. His triumph turned to ashes after the 1992 election. The treaty was subsequently vilified by the Europhobes and Sir John with it. He went to his political grave with Maastricht engraved on his heart after the backbench revolt played a principal role in ruining his premiership.

So even if David Cameron can win the next election and even if he can convince the rest of Europe to conduct a renegotiation and even if he can make a success of that and even if he can win a subsequent referendum on the new terms – four absolutely enormous ifs – the doleful lesson from history is that his party probably won't thank him for it anyway.