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| Algeria's bloody history forged brutal response to Saharan camp raid | Algeria's bloody history forged brutal response to Saharan camp raid |
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| The slaughter in the Sahara has been a terrible shock for the foreign countries whose unfortunate nationals were involved. But no-one should have been surprised that the Algerian government adopted such an aggressive, take-no-prisoners approach to the deadly drama at In Amenas. As one macabre joke put it: "What's worse then being kidnapped by al-Qaida? Answer: being rescued by the Algerian army." | The slaughter in the Sahara has been a terrible shock for the foreign countries whose unfortunate nationals were involved. But no-one should have been surprised that the Algerian government adopted such an aggressive, take-no-prisoners approach to the deadly drama at In Amenas. As one macabre joke put it: "What's worse then being kidnapped by al-Qaida? Answer: being rescued by the Algerian army." |
| Algeria's modern history is steeped in blood. In nationalist historiography the long struggle for independence against the French colonial power came at the price of a "million martyrs." Even if that figure is exaggerated it added to the aura of mythical sacrifice led by the FLN. The Kiplingesque title of the best history of the liberation war in English – "A Savage War of Peace" (by Alistair Horne) - captured that brilliantly. | Algeria's modern history is steeped in blood. In nationalist historiography the long struggle for independence against the French colonial power came at the price of a "million martyrs." Even if that figure is exaggerated it added to the aura of mythical sacrifice led by the FLN. The Kiplingesque title of the best history of the liberation war in English – "A Savage War of Peace" (by Alistair Horne) - captured that brilliantly. |
| Thirty years after winning its independence from France Algeria was plunged into another terrible conflict. That began in 1991 when the army stepped in to cancel the second round of parliamentary elections which an Islamist party was poised to win. Victory for the FIS, went the famous warning at the time – and which was accepted by western governments - would have meant "one man, one vote – once." The awful result was years of carnage that saw another 100,000 dead. Brutal massacres by terrorists were matched by brutal massacres by the Algerian security forces, sometimes disguised as the terrorists they were fighting. | Thirty years after winning its independence from France Algeria was plunged into another terrible conflict. That began in 1991 when the army stepped in to cancel the second round of parliamentary elections which an Islamist party was poised to win. Victory for the FIS, went the famous warning at the time – and which was accepted by western governments - would have meant "one man, one vote – once." The awful result was years of carnage that saw another 100,000 dead. Brutal massacres by terrorists were matched by brutal massacres by the Algerian security forces, sometimes disguised as the terrorists they were fighting. |
| It was that notorious "dirty war" that saw the emergence of fanatical groupuscules like the Salafist GSPC which later morphed into al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb - a classic local "franchise" of Osama bin Laden's global movement. Hardened by their combat experience fighting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Algerian jihadis came home to carry on the war against "Le Pouvoir." The biography of Mokhtar Belmokhtar, head of the shadowy criminal/terrorist outfit which mounted the In Amenas raid, encapsulates that experience. | It was that notorious "dirty war" that saw the emergence of fanatical groupuscules like the Salafist GSPC which later morphed into al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb - a classic local "franchise" of Osama bin Laden's global movement. Hardened by their combat experience fighting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Algerian jihadis came home to carry on the war against "Le Pouvoir." The biography of Mokhtar Belmokhtar, head of the shadowy criminal/terrorist outfit which mounted the In Amenas raid, encapsulates that experience. |
| Over recent years many of the country's hardline military leaders – known unsentimentally as "les eradicateurs" - have died or retired. But at the heart of the Algerian state there is a still a coterie of powerful generals with decades of experience in the dark arts of counter-terrorism. | Over recent years many of the country's hardline military leaders – known unsentimentally as "les eradicateurs" - have died or retired. But at the heart of the Algerian state there is a still a coterie of powerful generals with decades of experience in the dark arts of counter-terrorism. |
| Its intelligence and security services learned valuable lessons from the experience of Syria, where Bashar al-Assad's father Hafez crushed an Islamist insurgency in Hama in 1982. It is no coincidence that relatively secular Algeria remains one of the Arab states that is most instinctively sympathetic to Assad junior's war against an uprising which he claims consists solely of "armed terrorist" gangs" or simply "al-Qaida." | Its intelligence and security services learned valuable lessons from the experience of Syria, where Bashar al-Assad's father Hafez crushed an Islamist insurgency in Hama in 1982. It is no coincidence that relatively secular Algeria remains one of the Arab states that is most instinctively sympathetic to Assad junior's war against an uprising which he claims consists solely of "armed terrorist" gangs" or simply "al-Qaida." |
| Algeria was deeply unhappy with the fall of Tunisia's Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and then the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi by Nato-backed rebels. It still discreetly shelters the Libyan leader's closest relatives. Its response to the unrest of the Arab spring has been to throw money at social problems and to hope that the regional weather changes. | Algeria was deeply unhappy with the fall of Tunisia's Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and then the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi by Nato-backed rebels. It still discreetly shelters the Libyan leader's closest relatives. Its response to the unrest of the Arab spring has been to throw money at social problems and to hope that the regional weather changes. |
| Algeria has the strongest and most professional military and security forces in the Maghreb, but as this week's attack showed, determined enemies can exploit the huge distances and difficult terrain of the Sahara to offset the challenge of operating under pressure from those forces. The escalation of the Mali crisis has turned the battle into a regional one. | Algeria has the strongest and most professional military and security forces in the Maghreb, but as this week's attack showed, determined enemies can exploit the huge distances and difficult terrain of the Sahara to offset the challenge of operating under pressure from those forces. The escalation of the Mali crisis has turned the battle into a regional one. |
| Stratfor, the international strategy consultancy, commented before the bloody denouement at In Amenas that "western and Algerian intelligence and security officials planning the hostage rescue mission must …determine whether they are preventing a suicide mission or engaging in a business deal." The Algerian authorities appear to have quickly assumed that it was the former, or something similar. It may make no sense to angry and grieving foreigners, but refusing to negotiate with the terrorists who struck at the beating heart of Algeria's economically vital hydrocarbon industry looks like nothing less than an instinctive response conditioned by a brutal history. | Stratfor, the international strategy consultancy, commented before the bloody denouement at In Amenas that "western and Algerian intelligence and security officials planning the hostage rescue mission must …determine whether they are preventing a suicide mission or engaging in a business deal." The Algerian authorities appear to have quickly assumed that it was the former, or something similar. It may make no sense to angry and grieving foreigners, but refusing to negotiate with the terrorists who struck at the beating heart of Algeria's economically vital hydrocarbon industry looks like nothing less than an instinctive response conditioned by a brutal history. |
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