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| Algeria hostage crisis may be the undoing of jihadi cause in north Africa | Algeria hostage crisis may be the undoing of jihadi cause in north Africa |
| (2 months later) | |
| How do you judge the success of a terrorist spectacular? A decade ago, it would have been enough for an organisation like al-Qaida to simply carry out an attack like 9/11. | How do you judge the success of a terrorist spectacular? A decade ago, it would have been enough for an organisation like al-Qaida to simply carry out an attack like 9/11. |
| Such an attack would have established not only that they exist, and that they are potent and dangerous, but to present their calling card to would-be recruits. | Such an attack would have established not only that they exist, and that they are potent and dangerous, but to present their calling card to would-be recruits. |
| So how should one regard the attack on the In Amenas gas plant in Algeria – as a success, or as an overwhelming failure? | So how should one regard the attack on the In Amenas gas plant in Algeria – as a success, or as an overwhelming failure? |
| That question is debated in the light of the comments by David Cameron made in the immediate aftermath of the siege, that we face "a generational struggle" against jihadi ideology, not least in north Africa. Remarks – bizarrely – that seem to accept at face value the narrative of al-Qaida in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM). | That question is debated in the light of the comments by David Cameron made in the immediate aftermath of the siege, that we face "a generational struggle" against jihadi ideology, not least in north Africa. Remarks – bizarrely – that seem to accept at face value the narrative of al-Qaida in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM). |
| And while much has been made of the fact that many of the attackers came from other countries – including Canada, it is alleged – that is not necessarily a sign of strength but an indication that such groups are struggling to find local support and have to rely on a tiny minority for whom jihadi extremism is a lifestyle choice. | And while much has been made of the fact that many of the attackers came from other countries – including Canada, it is alleged – that is not necessarily a sign of strength but an indication that such groups are struggling to find local support and have to rely on a tiny minority for whom jihadi extremism is a lifestyle choice. |
| The reality is the operation widely believed to have been ordered by the veteran jihadist Mokhtar Belmokhtar can be framed much more in terms of failure than success. | The reality is the operation widely believed to have been ordered by the veteran jihadist Mokhtar Belmokhtar can be framed much more in terms of failure than success. |
| All the evidence is that it was planned long in advance, perhaps, according to some reports, two months ago, around the time that his group announced its split from AQIM. | All the evidence is that it was planned long in advance, perhaps, according to some reports, two months ago, around the time that his group announced its split from AQIM. |
| It is clear too from the statements made by the kidnappers in the middle of the siege that their intention was to take large numbers of hostages and if possible remove them from the plant to use as a bargaining chip. Instead it ended with the deaths of almost all of the attackers – including some of Belmokhtar's most loyal and experienced lieutenants. While that must raise serious questions about the organisational capability and ultimately its long-term resilience, it is likely to have longer term consequences for the survival not only of his own unit, but AQIM. | It is clear too from the statements made by the kidnappers in the middle of the siege that their intention was to take large numbers of hostages and if possible remove them from the plant to use as a bargaining chip. Instead it ended with the deaths of almost all of the attackers – including some of Belmokhtar's most loyal and experienced lieutenants. While that must raise serious questions about the organisational capability and ultimately its long-term resilience, it is likely to have longer term consequences for the survival not only of his own unit, but AQIM. |
| In regional terms it has been Algeria that has been a stumbling bloc in terms of international co-operation against transnational groups with interests in both crime and terror in the Sahel region of north Africa. | In regional terms it has been Algeria that has been a stumbling bloc in terms of international co-operation against transnational groups with interests in both crime and terror in the Sahel region of north Africa. |
| When the first discussions were launched about an international military mission to reclaim northern Mali, it was Algeria that sought reassurances that there would be no spill over across in borders. | When the first discussions were launched about an international military mission to reclaim northern Mali, it was Algeria that sought reassurances that there would be no spill over across in borders. |
| The escalation by Belmokhtar's group is also likely to have other consequences. While the aggressive pursuit of him and his followers by different agencies of different countries is now a given, In Amenas may quickly come to be seen as a serious strategic misstep for a figure who has long-survived in the Sahel's lawless margins through the joint tactics of building alliances and keeping his hostages alive. | The escalation by Belmokhtar's group is also likely to have other consequences. While the aggressive pursuit of him and his followers by different agencies of different countries is now a given, In Amenas may quickly come to be seen as a serious strategic misstep for a figure who has long-survived in the Sahel's lawless margins through the joint tactics of building alliances and keeping his hostages alive. |
| In Mali, where he had interposed his group, the test for Belmokhtar and other allied organisations, is likely to be how many of the Tuaregs who joined the Islamist uprising last year are prepared to stick with al-Qaida affiliates that led the seizure of the country's northern towns or – faced with both a French-led military operation and hostility from many in the local population – peel off and press for negotiation. | In Mali, where he had interposed his group, the test for Belmokhtar and other allied organisations, is likely to be how many of the Tuaregs who joined the Islamist uprising last year are prepared to stick with al-Qaida affiliates that led the seizure of the country's northern towns or – faced with both a French-led military operation and hostility from many in the local population – peel off and press for negotiation. |
| Indeed the history, in the past decade, of jihadi groups is that wherever they have sprung up, the violence of their methods and extremism of their beliefs means that, unlike the Taliban for instance, they have always struggled to seize and hold power. | Indeed the history, in the past decade, of jihadi groups is that wherever they have sprung up, the violence of their methods and extremism of their beliefs means that, unlike the Taliban for instance, they have always struggled to seize and hold power. |
| The biggest unanswered question, however, is likely to be found in the reaction to the raid within the uneasy and loosely allied constellation of jihadi groups in north Africa itself. Whether Belmokhtar's initiative leads to more cohesion, or exacerbates existing disagreements and splits in AQIM over the last few years will take time to emerge. | The biggest unanswered question, however, is likely to be found in the reaction to the raid within the uneasy and loosely allied constellation of jihadi groups in north Africa itself. Whether Belmokhtar's initiative leads to more cohesion, or exacerbates existing disagreements and splits in AQIM over the last few years will take time to emerge. |
| In the final analysis it seems likely that In Amenas will make it more difficult for jihadi groups in the region to operate rather than easier. | In the final analysis it seems likely that In Amenas will make it more difficult for jihadi groups in the region to operate rather than easier. |
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