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| The dangers of intervention in Mali | The dangers of intervention in Mali |
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| The British government should not be talking about sending any amount of troops to Mali (British troops to join French in Mali mission, 29 January). What David Cameron should be talking about is support for political dialogue and political solutions. | The British government should not be talking about sending any amount of troops to Mali (British troops to join French in Mali mission, 29 January). What David Cameron should be talking about is support for political dialogue and political solutions. |
| First, by focusing on military support, Cameron is closing the little space there is for a political solution to the crisis. British support should focus on strengthening the structures of Malian governance. It should support creating spaces that will allow for crises to be resolved through dialogue. | First, by focusing on military support, Cameron is closing the little space there is for a political solution to the crisis. British support should focus on strengthening the structures of Malian governance. It should support creating spaces that will allow for crises to be resolved through dialogue. |
| Second, one should not be misled into believing French advances equate to the success of a military intervention. The military suppression of rebel groups fails to address the underlying causes of the instability in the north. British support will not solve these problems either. | Second, one should not be misled into believing French advances equate to the success of a military intervention. The military suppression of rebel groups fails to address the underlying causes of the instability in the north. British support will not solve these problems either. |
| Third, the crisis in Mali needs to be looked at in the regional context. This means going beyond the provision of military support to the regional body of ECOWAS. It means understanding the regional dynamics that feed the violent transformation of political crises. Military intervention in one country will lead to spillover into the next. The situation in northern Mali itself in part resulted from this. If the British, the French and all others wish to promote stability, they will do well to invest in more than just the military. | Third, the crisis in Mali needs to be looked at in the regional context. This means going beyond the provision of military support to the regional body of ECOWAS. It means understanding the regional dynamics that feed the violent transformation of political crises. Military intervention in one country will lead to spillover into the next. The situation in northern Mali itself in part resulted from this. If the British, the French and all others wish to promote stability, they will do well to invest in more than just the military. |
| Unless Britain is willing to support political stability, it should stay out. Shireen Lau Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, The Hague, Netherlands | Unless Britain is willing to support political stability, it should stay out. Shireen Lau Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, The Hague, Netherlands |
| • In his otherwise excellent article on al-Qaida (The war on fear, 29 January), I fear that Jason Burke gives David Cameron the benefit of too much doubt when he refers to his comments simply as "dated". Cameron knows exactly what he is doing. As a consummate PR man, he is appealing to the fear of the Other in a bid to try to ensure he is re-elected in 2015. He is doing the same in relation to the in-out EU referendum. As George Monbiot (Comment, 29 January) suggests, Cameron thinks he has a divine right to govern but even he realises he must win the next election first. | • In his otherwise excellent article on al-Qaida (The war on fear, 29 January), I fear that Jason Burke gives David Cameron the benefit of too much doubt when he refers to his comments simply as "dated". Cameron knows exactly what he is doing. As a consummate PR man, he is appealing to the fear of the Other in a bid to try to ensure he is re-elected in 2015. He is doing the same in relation to the in-out EU referendum. As George Monbiot (Comment, 29 January) suggests, Cameron thinks he has a divine right to govern but even he realises he must win the next election first. |
| Articles in the same edition on the destruction of manuscripts and Sufi shrines in Mali (and even the obituary of Stanley Cohen) show why such issues are important and why appeals to xenophobia for short-term political expediency must not be allowed to pass unchallenged. Martin Pick London | Articles in the same edition on the destruction of manuscripts and Sufi shrines in Mali (and even the obituary of Stanley Cohen) show why such issues are important and why appeals to xenophobia for short-term political expediency must not be allowed to pass unchallenged. Martin Pick London |
| • Simon Jenkins is right when he says Cameron's claim that the situation in Mali "poses an existential threat to Britain" passes belief (The road from Helmand to Mali is too well trodden, 30 January). | • Simon Jenkins is right when he says Cameron's claim that the situation in Mali "poses an existential threat to Britain" passes belief (The road from Helmand to Mali is too well trodden, 30 January). |
| History frequently shows us that politicians, when facing domestic problems, look for enemies abroad as a means of diverting attention. Thatcher did it with the Falklands, and Cameron is doing it now. But short interventions "to stabilise things on the ground", as called for by defence secretary Philip Hammond, have a nasty habit, as Vietnam and Afghanistan show, of developing into long and costly wars, usually because government propaganda insists that, in Cameron's words, the enemy must be "beaten militarily". | History frequently shows us that politicians, when facing domestic problems, look for enemies abroad as a means of diverting attention. Thatcher did it with the Falklands, and Cameron is doing it now. But short interventions "to stabilise things on the ground", as called for by defence secretary Philip Hammond, have a nasty habit, as Vietnam and Afghanistan show, of developing into long and costly wars, usually because government propaganda insists that, in Cameron's words, the enemy must be "beaten militarily". |
| The Viet Cong were not beaten militarily, nor the IRA, nor the Taliban. Talks and diplomacy end modern wars, but it's still the gung-ho, jingoism of politicians that prolongs them. | The Viet Cong were not beaten militarily, nor the IRA, nor the Taliban. Talks and diplomacy end modern wars, but it's still the gung-ho, jingoism of politicians that prolongs them. |
| If Cameron wants to wage a populist war, there's an "ungoverned space" called the City, where bonuses for Libor fixing is the norm (Hourican's departure does not fix Libor mess, 30 January), where tax avoidance is a business, and where measures like windfall taxes on bonuses and a Tobin tax can actually win battles, without lives being lost. Bernie Evans Liverpool | If Cameron wants to wage a populist war, there's an "ungoverned space" called the City, where bonuses for Libor fixing is the norm (Hourican's departure does not fix Libor mess, 30 January), where tax avoidance is a business, and where measures like windfall taxes on bonuses and a Tobin tax can actually win battles, without lives being lost. Bernie Evans Liverpool |
| • Simon Jenkins' piece was captivating but I fear it lacks the balance of two important considerations. Firstly, mission creep is a fact of as many military successes as failures – simply because a plan rarely survives first contact with the enemy. Secondly, was he equally keen to appease the Rwandan massacres? William Simpson Helensburgh, Argyll and Bute | • Simon Jenkins' piece was captivating but I fear it lacks the balance of two important considerations. Firstly, mission creep is a fact of as many military successes as failures – simply because a plan rarely survives first contact with the enemy. Secondly, was he equally keen to appease the Rwandan massacres? William Simpson Helensburgh, Argyll and Bute |
| • The apparent enigma of the French government's military opposition to armed Islamists in Mali and French logistic support for violent Islamists in Syria was resolved once it was known that Mali is Africa's third largest gold producer. To misquote Thomas Gray: "What Gallic heart could gold despise, What cat's averse to fish." Paul Hewitson Berlin | • The apparent enigma of the French government's military opposition to armed Islamists in Mali and French logistic support for violent Islamists in Syria was resolved once it was known that Mali is Africa's third largest gold producer. To misquote Thomas Gray: "What Gallic heart could gold despise, What cat's averse to fish." Paul Hewitson Berlin |
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