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Past crises shed light on the present Past crises shed light on the present
(7 months later)
The late Margaret Gowing, that excellent historian of the history of Britain's nuclear weapons, used to scold government ministers for not going to the archives, thus repeating the mistakes of their predecessors, or "reinventing the wheel" as she put it.The late Margaret Gowing, that excellent historian of the history of Britain's nuclear weapons, used to scold government ministers for not going to the archives, thus repeating the mistakes of their predecessors, or "reinventing the wheel" as she put it.
Gill Bennett is also an excellent illuminator of the archives, a former chief historian at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, whose previous work includes a biography of Desmond Morton, Churchill's confidant on intelligence matters, and a book on the "most extraordinary and mysterious business" of the 1924 Zinoviev Letter.Gill Bennett is also an excellent illuminator of the archives, a former chief historian at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, whose previous work includes a biography of Desmond Morton, Churchill's confidant on intelligence matters, and a book on the "most extraordinary and mysterious business" of the 1924 Zinoviev Letter.
She has now written a refreshing account of crises that Britain's leaders have faced since the second world war. (Six Moments of Crisis, Inside British Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press). Bennett has chosen: the cabinet's decision to send troops to the Korean War in 1950; the 1956 Suez crisis; Harold Macmillan's decision to apply to join the EEC in 1961; the decision by the Labour government in 1968 to withdraw forces from east of Suez; the decision by the Conservative government in 1971 to expel more than 100 suspected KGB agents resident in Britain; and the response to the invasion of the Falklands in 1982.She has now written a refreshing account of crises that Britain's leaders have faced since the second world war. (Six Moments of Crisis, Inside British Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press). Bennett has chosen: the cabinet's decision to send troops to the Korean War in 1950; the 1956 Suez crisis; Harold Macmillan's decision to apply to join the EEC in 1961; the decision by the Labour government in 1968 to withdraw forces from east of Suez; the decision by the Conservative government in 1971 to expel more than 100 suspected KGB agents resident in Britain; and the response to the invasion of the Falklands in 1982.
They all draw out recurring themes of British policy, preoccupations, and dilemmas. They are also full of contemporary resonances, of questions that have returned to haunt cabinet ministers.They all draw out recurring themes of British policy, preoccupations, and dilemmas. They are also full of contemporary resonances, of questions that have returned to haunt cabinet ministers.
Take the decision by Macmillan, then pursued more energetically by Edward Heath - both Conservative prime ministers - to apply for membership of what is now the EU. Bennett shows that the US wanted Britain to join.Take the decision by Macmillan, then pursued more energetically by Edward Heath - both Conservative prime ministers - to apply for membership of what is now the EU. Bennett shows that the US wanted Britain to join.
She notes that "the official historian of the UK's policy towards the European Community was convinced that his real motive was 'to retain the level of influence in Washington which exclusion from the Common Market threatened to reduce'".She notes that "the official historian of the UK's policy towards the European Community was convinced that his real motive was 'to retain the level of influence in Washington which exclusion from the Common Market threatened to reduce'".
Membership would also be good for the British economy, it was argued. Issues of sovereignty and moves towards federalism were deliberately played down - but they kept on returning to the surface, as we see now as David Cameron promises a referendum on Britain's membership, 40 years after Britain joined.Membership would also be good for the British economy, it was argued. Issues of sovereignty and moves towards federalism were deliberately played down - but they kept on returning to the surface, as we see now as David Cameron promises a referendum on Britain's membership, 40 years after Britain joined.
A recurring theme through the crises, as now, was pressure on the defence budget, brought on by the gap between commitments and available expenditure.A recurring theme through the crises, as now, was pressure on the defence budget, brought on by the gap between commitments and available expenditure.
Bennett notes, in her chapter on the invasion of the Falklands, that in the first few months of 1982 "it was the Trident programme, not the threat to the Falklands, that preoccupied the defence secretary".Bennett notes, in her chapter on the invasion of the Falklands, that in the first few months of 1982 "it was the Trident programme, not the threat to the Falklands, that preoccupied the defence secretary".
The Thatcher government's 1981 defence review was strongly criticised partly on the grounds that the navy's fleet of conventional ships was neglected in favour of the Trident nuclear missile submarine programme...The Thatcher government's 1981 defence review was strongly criticised partly on the grounds that the navy's fleet of conventional ships was neglected in favour of the Trident nuclear missile submarine programme...
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