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| Version 1 | Version 2 |
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| Iraq: guilt by association | Iraq: guilt by association |
| (about 1 month later) | |
| Ten years ago today, thousands of British troops joined the US and invaded Iraq. | Ten years ago today, thousands of British troops joined the US and invaded Iraq. |
| They were unprepared and ill-equipped because their political masters did not want to alert parliament or the public in advance that Britain was about to embark on an unpopular and - as the most senior government lawyers warned, illegal - war. | They were unprepared and ill-equipped because their political masters did not want to alert parliament or the public in advance that Britain was about to embark on an unpopular and - as the most senior government lawyers warned, illegal - war. |
| Thousands of words have been written and spoken to mark the tenth anniversary of the invasion. There are a few essential points. | Thousands of words have been written and spoken to mark the tenth anniversary of the invasion. There are a few essential points. |
| Tony Blair made it clear to George Bush, many months before the invasion, that he would do his utmost to ensure Britain joined the US in military action which became increasingly inevitable. | Tony Blair made it clear to George Bush, many months before the invasion, that he would do his utmost to ensure Britain joined the US in military action which became increasingly inevitable. |
| Ministers, notably Jack Straw, the foreign secretary, should have followed what appeared to be his conviction, or at least his instincts, and argued against war. | Ministers, notably Jack Straw, the foreign secretary, should have followed what appeared to be his conviction, or at least his instincts, and argued against war. |
| Lord Goldsmith, the attorney general, should have insisted on expressing his deep concerns about the legality of an invasion to the cabinet. | Lord Goldsmith, the attorney general, should have insisted on expressing his deep concerns about the legality of an invasion to the cabinet. |
| Officials in Whitehall, in the Cabinet Office, the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence, and elsewhere, including 10 Downing Street, should have shown more courage in expressing their concerns, both principled and pragmatic. | Officials in Whitehall, in the Cabinet Office, the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence, and elsewhere, including 10 Downing Street, should have shown more courage in expressing their concerns, both principled and pragmatic. |
| If Blair brushed them aside, they should have expressed them in public. | If Blair brushed them aside, they should have expressed them in public. |
| Senior members of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, commonly known as MI6) should also have blown the whistle against the wholly unacceptable political manipulation of intelligence. | Senior members of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, commonly known as MI6) should also have blown the whistle against the wholly unacceptable political manipulation of intelligence. |
| Sir Richard Dearlove, SIS Chief at the time, has a lot to answer for. "I think the relationships with Number 10 had become quite personalised", an SIS officer identified as SIS1, told the Chilcot inquiry. "You mean SIS's relationships at the top?, asked Sir Roderic Lyne, a member of the Chilcot panel. "Yes", replied SIS1. | Sir Richard Dearlove, SIS Chief at the time, has a lot to answer for. "I think the relationships with Number 10 had become quite personalised", an SIS officer identified as SIS1, told the Chilcot inquiry. "You mean SIS's relationships at the top?, asked Sir Roderic Lyne, a member of the Chilcot panel. "Yes", replied SIS1. |
| Blair told parliament before the war that intelligence showed that Saddam's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programme was "active", "growing" and "up and running". | Blair told parliament before the war that intelligence showed that Saddam's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programme was "active", "growing" and "up and running". |
| A year before the invasion, on 15 March 2002, the Joint Intelligence Committee, described intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction as "sporadic and patchy". | A year before the invasion, on 15 March 2002, the Joint Intelligence Committee, described intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction as "sporadic and patchy". |
| Mark Huband observes in his book, Trading Secrets,: "Iraq was a very difficult intelligence target; this was in itself nothing new - learning about the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal had been no less challenging. What was new was the direct linkage between intelligence and action: without the use of intelligence...there would have been and could have been no invasion. A "threat" had to be identified. | Mark Huband observes in his book, Trading Secrets,: "Iraq was a very difficult intelligence target; this was in itself nothing new - learning about the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal had been no less challenging. What was new was the direct linkage between intelligence and action: without the use of intelligence...there would have been and could have been no invasion. A "threat" had to be identified. |
| As Huband says : "To replace truths, the power of secrets was used to launch a war". | As Huband says : "To replace truths, the power of secrets was used to launch a war". |
| Or as Lord Butler, the former cabinet secretary who reported on the use of intelligence in the run-up to the invasion, put it to the BBC's Peter Taylor in Monday's Panorama Special, The Spies Who Fooled the World: "There were ways in which people were misled or misled themselves at all stages." | Or as Lord Butler, the former cabinet secretary who reported on the use of intelligence in the run-up to the invasion, put it to the BBC's Peter Taylor in Monday's Panorama Special, The Spies Who Fooled the World: "There were ways in which people were misled or misled themselves at all stages." |
| In the run-up the war, the JIC repeatedly warned Blair that the greatest threat to Britain was not Saddam Hussein's Iraq, but terrorism. It was a view shared by MI5 which made it clear later that the invasion had increased the terrorist threat. | In the run-up the war, the JIC repeatedly warned Blair that the greatest threat to Britain was not Saddam Hussein's Iraq, but terrorism. It was a view shared by MI5 which made it clear later that the invasion had increased the terrorist threat. |
| The late Sir Michael Quinlan, a highly respected former top official at the Ministry of Defence (often called the High Priest of Deterrence because of his exposition of the doctrine of nuclear weapons) opposed the invasion of Iraq. He referred to the "Just War" argument, or tradition, as he put it. "Is this the last resort? Is the damage which this war will do proportional to the ills it is reasonably expected to avoid?" | The late Sir Michael Quinlan, a highly respected former top official at the Ministry of Defence (often called the High Priest of Deterrence because of his exposition of the doctrine of nuclear weapons) opposed the invasion of Iraq. He referred to the "Just War" argument, or tradition, as he put it. "Is this the last resort? Is the damage which this war will do proportional to the ills it is reasonably expected to avoid?" |
| It was not even as though Britain was going to war for humanitarian reasons, or to try and right the wrongs of helping to arm Saddam Hussein in the 1980s at a time he was using chemical weapons against Iraqi Kurds, notably at Halabja. | It was not even as though Britain was going to war for humanitarian reasons, or to try and right the wrongs of helping to arm Saddam Hussein in the 1980s at a time he was using chemical weapons against Iraqi Kurds, notably at Halabja. |
| There is little evidence that lessons have been learned. | There is little evidence that lessons have been learned. |
| Certainly it was not in Afghanistan where military commanders - again worried about telling truth to power - agreed to deploy thousands of troops to Helmand. | Certainly it was not in Afghanistan where military commanders - again worried about telling truth to power - agreed to deploy thousands of troops to Helmand. |
| They may have wanted to make amends for the failures in Basra. | They may have wanted to make amends for the failures in Basra. |
| But they went to Helmand in 2006 as they invaded Iraq three years earlier, ill-equipped, unprepared, and armed with totally inadequate intelligence. | But they went to Helmand in 2006 as they invaded Iraq three years earlier, ill-equipped, unprepared, and armed with totally inadequate intelligence. |
| And now Tony Blair is egging David Cameron on to intervene in Syria. | And now Tony Blair is egging David Cameron on to intervene in Syria. |
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