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Seven social classes. Three political parties. It's the mathematics of failure Seven social classes. Three political parties. It's the mathematics of failure
(6 months later)
Maths was never my best subject at school. But I still know enough to understand that seven does not easily divide into three. And I think this simple arithmetical truth has a big bearing on our current political malaise.Maths was never my best subject at school. But I still know enough to understand that seven does not easily divide into three. And I think this simple arithmetical truth has a big bearing on our current political malaise.
The irritatingly named Great British Class Survey which reported today, paints a tendentious but compelling picture of 21st-century British class divisions. Instead of the classic working, middle and upper class stereotypes of the industrial nation of the last century, which together now account for a mere 39% of people in this country – a useful fact, that – the researchers conclude that people in the United Kingdom now divide into seven different social classes.The irritatingly named Great British Class Survey which reported today, paints a tendentious but compelling picture of 21st-century British class divisions. Instead of the classic working, middle and upper class stereotypes of the industrial nation of the last century, which together now account for a mere 39% of people in this country – a useful fact, that – the researchers conclude that people in the United Kingdom now divide into seven different social classes.
Those seven new classes echo the old stereotypes but they are much more three-dimensional and nuanced. The new models of class are no longer rooted in what Marxists used to call a person's relationship to the means of production – and remember that a person in this context invariably meant a man. Instead, the new model assesses three separate measures – of a man or a woman's economic, cultural and social capital – to form the new seven-part class matrix.Those seven new classes echo the old stereotypes but they are much more three-dimensional and nuanced. The new models of class are no longer rooted in what Marxists used to call a person's relationship to the means of production – and remember that a person in this context invariably meant a man. Instead, the new model assesses three separate measures – of a man or a woman's economic, cultural and social capital – to form the new seven-part class matrix.
Out of that, the sociologists Mike Savage from the London School of Economics and Fiona Devine from Manchester University and their colleagues have fashioned their seven class divisions – a wealthy and privileged elite, a large established middle class, a smaller and more isolated technical middle class, a young stratum of new affluent workers, the traditional and older working class, an urban young group high in social and cultural capital but low in wealth, and finally the most deprived group of all, the so-called precarious proletariat.Out of that, the sociologists Mike Savage from the London School of Economics and Fiona Devine from Manchester University and their colleagues have fashioned their seven class divisions – a wealthy and privileged elite, a large established middle class, a smaller and more isolated technical middle class, a young stratum of new affluent workers, the traditional and older working class, an urban young group high in social and cultural capital but low in wealth, and finally the most deprived group of all, the so-called precarious proletariat.
On one level it's all a rather academic exercise that takes a long time to confirm what Noel Coward's song said more clearly long ago – that the upper classes have still the upper hand. Those who still insist that the relationship to the means of production is everything are also likely to insist that the historic tripartite division between owners, managers and workers still means something real. It's impossible to disagree with that entirely.On one level it's all a rather academic exercise that takes a long time to confirm what Noel Coward's song said more clearly long ago – that the upper classes have still the upper hand. Those who still insist that the relationship to the means of production is everything are also likely to insist that the historic tripartite division between owners, managers and workers still means something real. It's impossible to disagree with that entirely.
But it clearly is not the whole story any more, and in some senses it never was. Class divisions have always been less precise than that. Education, social activity and gender all helped to blur the boundaries, even in heavy industry's heyday. Even then, there was a labour aristocracy versus the rest. And employment patterns today are far more varied and jagged than in the industrial era.But it clearly is not the whole story any more, and in some senses it never was. Class divisions have always been less precise than that. Education, social activity and gender all helped to blur the boundaries, even in heavy industry's heyday. Even then, there was a labour aristocracy versus the rest. And employment patterns today are far more varied and jagged than in the industrial era.
So have the sociologists got it right? Their three new measures put much less emphasis on the importance of work than in the past. That's an important thought. It is also an accurate observation. All of us today are defined by what we own, or by the kind of people we mix with and by the things we are interested in, at least as much as we are defined by our day jobs. We are what we eat – as well as what we do. And the days when what we ate or how we spent our leisure were umbilically linked to the kind of work we did are going, going and nearly gone.So have the sociologists got it right? Their three new measures put much less emphasis on the importance of work than in the past. That's an important thought. It is also an accurate observation. All of us today are defined by what we own, or by the kind of people we mix with and by the things we are interested in, at least as much as we are defined by our day jobs. We are what we eat – as well as what we do. And the days when what we ate or how we spent our leisure were umbilically linked to the kind of work we did are going, going and nearly gone.
The survey measures a person's income, savings and house value to establish a measure of economic capital. It then asks about the kind of people we mix with in order to achieve a measure of a person's social capital. Finally, it asks a series of questions about activities – everything from opera to social media – to construct a cultural measure.The survey measures a person's income, savings and house value to establish a measure of economic capital. It then asks about the kind of people we mix with in order to achieve a measure of a person's social capital. Finally, it asks a series of questions about activities – everything from opera to social media – to construct a cultural measure.
It is hard to do the online survey, as I did yesterday, and not be a bit sceptical, even before Savage and Devine allocate you to one of their seven new classes. (At this point transparency requires that I admit to being classified among the elite. On a Guardian pension? Come off it.) But there are other anomalies. There is no direct question about education, or about one's parents' status, both of which seem significant to me. Meanwhile the basis for assessing social capital – what kinds of people you know socially – rests on the old faithful yardstick of employment, not shared culture. And the jobs it then lists seem pretty arbitrary. Why no industrial worker, or self-employed business person?It is hard to do the online survey, as I did yesterday, and not be a bit sceptical, even before Savage and Devine allocate you to one of their seven new classes. (At this point transparency requires that I admit to being classified among the elite. On a Guardian pension? Come off it.) But there are other anomalies. There is no direct question about education, or about one's parents' status, both of which seem significant to me. Meanwhile the basis for assessing social capital – what kinds of people you know socially – rests on the old faithful yardstick of employment, not shared culture. And the jobs it then lists seem pretty arbitrary. Why no industrial worker, or self-employed business person?
Yet while it is possible to dispute some of the categories into which the researchers now divide the British population, it is not possible to argue with their claim that the old categories no longer accurately describe modern Britain. The old categories cling on in certain ways, of course – as John Prescott's confusion about his class illustrates. But they are in historic decline. And, crucially, they no longer tell us who we are in the way they once did. Whether the academics have got it exactly right in their seven new classes is not, in the end, as important as the fact that they have got that one big thing right.Yet while it is possible to dispute some of the categories into which the researchers now divide the British population, it is not possible to argue with their claim that the old categories no longer accurately describe modern Britain. The old categories cling on in certain ways, of course – as John Prescott's confusion about his class illustrates. But they are in historic decline. And, crucially, they no longer tell us who we are in the way they once did. Whether the academics have got it exactly right in their seven new classes is not, in the end, as important as the fact that they have got that one big thing right.
This is where the impact on party politics kicks in. A century ago, to put it very simply, industrial Britain had three classes and three political parties. With a bit of blurring at the edges, each party essentially represented one of the classes – the Tories the upper classes, the Liberals the middle class and Labour the working class. The rest is the political history of the 20th century.This is where the impact on party politics kicks in. A century ago, to put it very simply, industrial Britain had three classes and three political parties. With a bit of blurring at the edges, each party essentially represented one of the classes – the Tories the upper classes, the Liberals the middle class and Labour the working class. The rest is the political history of the 20th century.
Today we still have essentially the same three parties we had a century ago, and each is recognisably the descendant of those earlier times. Yet Britain has changed. We no longer live in those times. Too often the parties seem to be fighting old class battles without much recognition of the way that context and identities have changed. The Tories and Labour are almost equally at fault in this respect. On this count, the Liberal Democrats are more adaptably of today than either of them.Today we still have essentially the same three parties we had a century ago, and each is recognisably the descendant of those earlier times. Yet Britain has changed. We no longer live in those times. Too often the parties seem to be fighting old class battles without much recognition of the way that context and identities have changed. The Tories and Labour are almost equally at fault in this respect. On this count, the Liberal Democrats are more adaptably of today than either of them.
On reflection it is hardly surprising that the parties struggle as a whole to do an adequate job of representing the new classes which have evolved in partly post-industrial Britain. Since the three old parties are rooted in class identities which together now only account for 39% of the population, they have set themselves up to be unrepresentative, unpopular and ineffective.On reflection it is hardly surprising that the parties struggle as a whole to do an adequate job of representing the new classes which have evolved in partly post-industrial Britain. Since the three old parties are rooted in class identities which together now only account for 39% of the population, they have set themselves up to be unrepresentative, unpopular and ineffective.
Which is precisely how it has now turned out. Unless political parties recognise that they have to adapt and form coalitions across class lines, old and new, they will go on failing. If the sociologists are even nearly right about the kind of Britain we have become, the parties are overwhelmingly stuck in a country that no longer exists. The future belongs to the party that changes. Seven into three doesn't go, either in maths or in politics.Which is precisely how it has now turned out. Unless political parties recognise that they have to adapt and form coalitions across class lines, old and new, they will go on failing. If the sociologists are even nearly right about the kind of Britain we have become, the parties are overwhelmingly stuck in a country that no longer exists. The future belongs to the party that changes. Seven into three doesn't go, either in maths or in politics.
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