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| Obama is right to be cautious over Syria's possible use of sarin – but then? | Obama is right to be cautious over Syria's possible use of sarin – but then? |
| (14 days later) | |
| The circumstances are familiar. The US is pointing to evidence that a despotic Arab regime has used weapons of mass destruction (WMD). But with the caution and caveats of its letter to Congress, the Obama administration is seeking to demonstrate this is not a repeat of the Iraq debacle. | The circumstances are familiar. The US is pointing to evidence that a despotic Arab regime has used weapons of mass destruction (WMD). But with the caution and caveats of its letter to Congress, the Obama administration is seeking to demonstrate this is not a repeat of the Iraq debacle. |
| In 2003, the Bush White House played down uncertainties and reservations about the strength of the evidence. Ten years on, Washington is playing them up, making a virtue of its uncertainty. In what appears to be a clear reference to the Iraq fiasco, the White House's letter to Senators John McCain and Carl Levin states: "Given the stakes involved, and what we have learned from our own recent experience, intelligence assessments alone are not sufficient – only credible and corroborated facts that provide us with some degree of certainty will guide our decision-making, and strengthen our leadership of the international community." | In 2003, the Bush White House played down uncertainties and reservations about the strength of the evidence. Ten years on, Washington is playing them up, making a virtue of its uncertainty. In what appears to be a clear reference to the Iraq fiasco, the White House's letter to Senators John McCain and Carl Levin states: "Given the stakes involved, and what we have learned from our own recent experience, intelligence assessments alone are not sufficient – only credible and corroborated facts that provide us with some degree of certainty will guide our decision-making, and strengthen our leadership of the international community." |
| Remarkably for public pronouncements about intelligence assessments, the letter goes into detail over the reasons for doubt, most importantly that the "chain of custody" of the chemical samples is unclear. In other words, American officials did not collect the samples – whether soil or hair or other tissue from victims – and so cannot guarantee their provenance, other than reason that since the government alone is believed to have stockpiled sarin, a nerve agent, in Syria, it was the government which "very likely" was behind its use. | Remarkably for public pronouncements about intelligence assessments, the letter goes into detail over the reasons for doubt, most importantly that the "chain of custody" of the chemical samples is unclear. In other words, American officials did not collect the samples – whether soil or hair or other tissue from victims – and so cannot guarantee their provenance, other than reason that since the government alone is believed to have stockpiled sarin, a nerve agent, in Syria, it was the government which "very likely" was behind its use. |
| But such reasoning falls well short of proof. In the Iraqi case, much of the bogus WMD evidence came from defectors chaperoned by exile opposition groups with a vested interest in Saddam Hussein's overthrow. On this occasion, the White House is explicitly conceding it "cannot confirm how the exposure occurred and under what conditions". | But such reasoning falls well short of proof. In the Iraqi case, much of the bogus WMD evidence came from defectors chaperoned by exile opposition groups with a vested interest in Saddam Hussein's overthrow. On this occasion, the White House is explicitly conceding it "cannot confirm how the exposure occurred and under what conditions". |
| Another striking phrase in the White House letter refers to the "varying degrees of confidence" the US intelligence community is said to have in the evidence. The variation reflects disagreements among the 16 agencies that make up that community, whose sharp differences of opinion were papered over by the Bush administration in the rush to war in 2003. | Another striking phrase in the White House letter refers to the "varying degrees of confidence" the US intelligence community is said to have in the evidence. The variation reflects disagreements among the 16 agencies that make up that community, whose sharp differences of opinion were papered over by the Bush administration in the rush to war in 2003. |
| Another deliberate divergence from the Bush-era methods is the administration's explicit deferral to a UN investigation to adjudicate the claims and counter-claims surrounding chemical weapons use, together with its emphasis on maintaining international consensus on its judgements and actions. All of that would have been anathema to George W Bush, Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, who saw any such deferral as a dilution of sovereignty. | Another deliberate divergence from the Bush-era methods is the administration's explicit deferral to a UN investigation to adjudicate the claims and counter-claims surrounding chemical weapons use, together with its emphasis on maintaining international consensus on its judgements and actions. All of that would have been anathema to George W Bush, Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, who saw any such deferral as a dilution of sovereignty. |
| The caution is not just explained by the inherent uncertainty in assessing forensic evidence that comes from a third party, and which is subject to rapid decay with each passing day. It also reflects the Obama administration's quandary having declared a "red line" over chemical weapons, without being entirely clear how to enforce it. | The caution is not just explained by the inherent uncertainty in assessing forensic evidence that comes from a third party, and which is subject to rapid decay with each passing day. It also reflects the Obama administration's quandary having declared a "red line" over chemical weapons, without being entirely clear how to enforce it. |
| Bombing Assad's chemical arsenal risks dispersing the agents over a wide area and causing a humanitarian catastrophe. The suspected stockpile is so large it cannot be shipped out, and any special forces sent in to secure it would quickly become a target not just for the regime but some of the jihadist groups now fighting it. | Bombing Assad's chemical arsenal risks dispersing the agents over a wide area and causing a humanitarian catastrophe. The suspected stockpile is so large it cannot be shipped out, and any special forces sent in to secure it would quickly become a target not just for the regime but some of the jihadist groups now fighting it. |
| Alternatively, the US could unleash punitive strikes aimed at decapitating or at least weakening the regime, but that would draw it into an open-ended war it has so far sought to avoid, potentially involving direct lethal exchanges with Russian military advisers. | Alternatively, the US could unleash punitive strikes aimed at decapitating or at least weakening the regime, but that would draw it into an open-ended war it has so far sought to avoid, potentially involving direct lethal exchanges with Russian military advisers. |
| Yet the taboo built up around the use of chemical weapons since Saddam Hussein's use of them against his own people in Halabja in 1988, is arguably one of the achievements of international diplomacy of the quarter-century since then. To allow their use once more without a decisive international response would imperil those gains. | Yet the taboo built up around the use of chemical weapons since Saddam Hussein's use of them against his own people in Halabja in 1988, is arguably one of the achievements of international diplomacy of the quarter-century since then. To allow their use once more without a decisive international response would imperil those gains. |
| There are no easy options and no road maps. Iraq showed what not to do in the absence of proof. It provides no lessons on what to do if the evidence does eventually become overwhelming. | There are no easy options and no road maps. Iraq showed what not to do in the absence of proof. It provides no lessons on what to do if the evidence does eventually become overwhelming. |
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