This article is from the source 'guardian' and was first published or seen on . It last changed over 40 days ago and won't be checked again for changes.
You can find the current article at its original source at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/29/afghanistan-web-intrigue-rebuild-nation
The article has changed 5 times. There is an RSS feed of changes available.
| Version 0 | Version 1 |
|---|---|
| Afghanistan's web of intrigue is a poor basis on which to rebuild a nation | Afghanistan's web of intrigue is a poor basis on which to rebuild a nation |
| (10 days later) | |
| Spies are meant to do things in secret. Their job is to deal with characters too unsavoury for governments to do business with openly, in the search for life-saving information. By the nature of their business, spies pay for such services in untraceable cash rather than numbered bank accounts. | Spies are meant to do things in secret. Their job is to deal with characters too unsavoury for governments to do business with openly, in the search for life-saving information. By the nature of their business, spies pay for such services in untraceable cash rather than numbered bank accounts. |
| What is alleged to exist in Afghanistan is something else, however – a shadow nation built up over more than a decade based on under-the-counter payments to unacknowledged partners, warlords and narco-traffickers. | What is alleged to exist in Afghanistan is something else, however – a shadow nation built up over more than a decade based on under-the-counter payments to unacknowledged partners, warlords and narco-traffickers. |
| Those connections were first formed in 2001 with the aim of destroying al-Qaida, by ousting its hosts, the Taliban, and then by tracking down its leadership. | Those connections were first formed in 2001 with the aim of destroying al-Qaida, by ousting its hosts, the Taliban, and then by tracking down its leadership. |
| The same aim drives a host of militias the CIA partners and manages across the country, such as the Kandahar Strike Force, formerly led by the Afghan president's late brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, and the Counterterrorism Pursuit Team within the National Directorate of Security in Kabul. It is also behind the CIA drone campaign against al-Qaida suspects and their alleged protectors in Pakistan. | The same aim drives a host of militias the CIA partners and manages across the country, such as the Kandahar Strike Force, formerly led by the Afghan president's late brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, and the Counterterrorism Pursuit Team within the National Directorate of Security in Kabul. It is also behind the CIA drone campaign against al-Qaida suspects and their alleged protectors in Pakistan. |
| According to the New York Times, the CIA's cash payments to its allies were rerouted through Hamid Karzai's office after he insisted they be used to strengthen his power of patronage over Afghanistan's barons, and when it became clear Iran had no qualms about driving carloads of loot straight into the palace to buy its own officials. | According to the New York Times, the CIA's cash payments to its allies were rerouted through Hamid Karzai's office after he insisted they be used to strengthen his power of patronage over Afghanistan's barons, and when it became clear Iran had no qualms about driving carloads of loot straight into the palace to buy its own officials. |
| British intelligence has struggled to keep up on a smaller scale, using cash to help maintain the UK's seat at the table in making policy in Afghanistan and keeping channels open even during President Karzai's frequent fits of pique with London. | British intelligence has struggled to keep up on a smaller scale, using cash to help maintain the UK's seat at the table in making policy in Afghanistan and keeping channels open even during President Karzai's frequent fits of pique with London. |
| The trouble in Afghanistan is that this web of largely improvised measures has solidified over the years into a system which is arguably self-defeating. | The trouble in Afghanistan is that this web of largely improvised measures has solidified over the years into a system which is arguably self-defeating. |
| The corruption, drug-running and brutality associated by many of the Afghan people with the Kabul government has become a major driver of the insurgency, helping the Taliban to recruit young Afghan men to fight against US, British and Afghan army troops. | The corruption, drug-running and brutality associated by many of the Afghan people with the Kabul government has become a major driver of the insurgency, helping the Taliban to recruit young Afghan men to fight against US, British and Afghan army troops. |
| Furthermore, it is a system of governance based on informal networks of personal relationships focused on Karzai, which is likely to implode once he steps down next year. | Furthermore, it is a system of governance based on informal networks of personal relationships focused on Karzai, which is likely to implode once he steps down next year. |
| More pernicious still, the long-term control the spy agencies acquired over the levers of power has meant this shadow state has been created beyond the reach of the rule of law and accountability in both Afghanistan and the US. | More pernicious still, the long-term control the spy agencies acquired over the levers of power has meant this shadow state has been created beyond the reach of the rule of law and accountability in both Afghanistan and the US. |
| Much of the British covert aid has apparently gone towards creating connections between Kabul and the Taliban in the search for a political settlement, but the secrecy in this case has served to heighten suspicions between the leaderships of both camps and their supporters, contributing to their brittle nature and their failure so far to make progress. | Much of the British covert aid has apparently gone towards creating connections between Kabul and the Taliban in the search for a political settlement, but the secrecy in this case has served to heighten suspicions between the leaderships of both camps and their supporters, contributing to their brittle nature and their failure so far to make progress. |
| The dark arts of espionage may well be indispensable in the case of deadly threats to security, but they make a poor foundation on which to build a nation. | The dark arts of espionage may well be indispensable in the case of deadly threats to security, but they make a poor foundation on which to build a nation. |
| Our editors' picks for the day's top news and commentary delivered to your inbox each morning. | |
| Our editors' picks for the day's top news and commentary delivered to your inbox each morning. Enter your email address to subscribe. |