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Mr Putin, Operative in the Kremlin by Fiona Hill and Clifford G Gaddy – review Mr Putin, Operative in the Kremlin by Fiona Hill and Clifford G Gaddy – review
(5 months later)
The emergence of Vladimir Putin can only be understood as the second chapter of a story that began with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The problem is that there is still little agreement about what happened in chapter one. Most western analysts cling to the notion that Gorbachev and Yeltsin were brave, if misguided, reformers, but democrats at heart. The Russians who lived through the chaos and collapse of their reforms view them through a different lens, generally a cracked one.The emergence of Vladimir Putin can only be understood as the second chapter of a story that began with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The problem is that there is still little agreement about what happened in chapter one. Most western analysts cling to the notion that Gorbachev and Yeltsin were brave, if misguided, reformers, but democrats at heart. The Russians who lived through the chaos and collapse of their reforms view them through a different lens, generally a cracked one.
Putin's most famous line about the Soviet Union is, in fact, a misquote. When he declared its demise was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century, he was not bemoaning the loss of communism. He was talking about the collapse of the Russian state, which in Russian eyes was synonymous with the Soviet one. A collective sense of bemusement greeted the first declaration of the Russian Federation's independence day. "Independence from whom? Ourselves?"Putin's most famous line about the Soviet Union is, in fact, a misquote. When he declared its demise was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century, he was not bemoaning the loss of communism. He was talking about the collapse of the Russian state, which in Russian eyes was synonymous with the Soviet one. A collective sense of bemusement greeted the first declaration of the Russian Federation's independence day. "Independence from whom? Ourselves?"
Gleb Pavlovsky, a former adviser who has now fallen out with Putin, put this point best in an interview with this newspaper last year: "My people and my friends … couldn't accept what happened … there were hundreds, thousands of people like that in the elite, who were not communists – I was never a member of the Communist party. They … just did not like how things were done in 1991. Putin was one of the people who until the end of the 1990s was passively waiting for the moment of revanche. By revanche I mean the resurrection of the great state … Not a totalitarian one, but a state that could be respected."Gleb Pavlovsky, a former adviser who has now fallen out with Putin, put this point best in an interview with this newspaper last year: "My people and my friends … couldn't accept what happened … there were hundreds, thousands of people like that in the elite, who were not communists – I was never a member of the Communist party. They … just did not like how things were done in 1991. Putin was one of the people who until the end of the 1990s was passively waiting for the moment of revanche. By revanche I mean the resurrection of the great state … Not a totalitarian one, but a state that could be respected."
We were looking in the wrong direction for the emergence of a threat to the limited democratic gains of the early Yeltsin years. Everyone thought it would come from Zyuganov and the communists. In fact, for human rights defenders such as those in Memorial (who are now being branded "foreign agents" by the Russian state) it came from the ranks of the regime they supported.We were looking in the wrong direction for the emergence of a threat to the limited democratic gains of the early Yeltsin years. Everyone thought it would come from Zyuganov and the communists. In fact, for human rights defenders such as those in Memorial (who are now being branded "foreign agents" by the Russian state) it came from the ranks of the regime they supported.
The self-limiting, inward-turning, chippy, self-righteous, Russian Orthodox-blessed and deeply illiberal nationalism that now holds sway is a not just a byproduct of oligarch misrule. It is the monster these oligarchs created to keep the Russian state from falling apart.The self-limiting, inward-turning, chippy, self-righteous, Russian Orthodox-blessed and deeply illiberal nationalism that now holds sway is a not just a byproduct of oligarch misrule. It is the monster these oligarchs created to keep the Russian state from falling apart.
This point is still a contentious one. Many are more comfortable seeing Putin as little more than the resurrection of a lost KGB empire. Would that it were that simple. The many sources of the system he has created are amply and brilliantly clarified in this book. Mr Putin, Operative in the Kremlin (note the mister, not comrade) is a readable and informed portrait painted by two students of Russian history who had, at various times in their careers, a front-row view. Fiona Hill, a Brookings Institution academic, spent 2006-9 as national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the US National Intelligence Council. The economist Clifford Gaddy once advised the Russian finance ministry on regional tax and has investigated how Putin's financial dealings relate to his KGB past.This point is still a contentious one. Many are more comfortable seeing Putin as little more than the resurrection of a lost KGB empire. Would that it were that simple. The many sources of the system he has created are amply and brilliantly clarified in this book. Mr Putin, Operative in the Kremlin (note the mister, not comrade) is a readable and informed portrait painted by two students of Russian history who had, at various times in their careers, a front-row view. Fiona Hill, a Brookings Institution academic, spent 2006-9 as national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the US National Intelligence Council. The economist Clifford Gaddy once advised the Russian finance ministry on regional tax and has investigated how Putin's financial dealings relate to his KGB past.
We are familiar with the costumes Putin, the deliberately faceless political actor, has donned to appeal to his people – the fire-fighting airplane pilot, the shirtless big-game hunter, the scuba diver, the easy-rider biker, the nightclub crooner. Putting the Kremlin special props department to one side, Hill and Gaddy have identified six more revealing faces: the statist, the man who rifles Russian history for inspiration, the survivalist, the outsider, the capitalist and the KGB case officer. Even for those intent on seeing Putin only as a KGB man, Hill and Gaddy have something new to say.We are familiar with the costumes Putin, the deliberately faceless political actor, has donned to appeal to his people – the fire-fighting airplane pilot, the shirtless big-game hunter, the scuba diver, the easy-rider biker, the nightclub crooner. Putting the Kremlin special props department to one side, Hill and Gaddy have identified six more revealing faces: the statist, the man who rifles Russian history for inspiration, the survivalist, the outsider, the capitalist and the KGB case officer. Even for those intent on seeing Putin only as a KGB man, Hill and Gaddy have something new to say.
Putin has obscured much of what he did as a KGB officer in Dresden. But he did let one thing slip. Asked what his talent was, he replied: "I am a specialist in communicating with people." Working with people has a dual meaning in KGB jargon. It also means working on people. Filipp Bobkov, head of the 5th directorate under Yuri Andropov, described the approach as used on the dissident historian Roy Medvedev. When Medvedev began to slander Leonid Brezhnev, the KGB was pushed to act. Bobkov invited himself to Medvedev's flat and had a long talk with the dissident over tea.Putin has obscured much of what he did as a KGB officer in Dresden. But he did let one thing slip. Asked what his talent was, he replied: "I am a specialist in communicating with people." Working with people has a dual meaning in KGB jargon. It also means working on people. Filipp Bobkov, head of the 5th directorate under Yuri Andropov, described the approach as used on the dissident historian Roy Medvedev. When Medvedev began to slander Leonid Brezhnev, the KGB was pushed to act. Bobkov invited himself to Medvedev's flat and had a long talk with the dissident over tea.
"I saw both the weaknesses and strengths of my interlocutor's logic. I understood where he was right and where he was mistaken. For me it was very useful to know that. I was very happy with the results of the meeting … the most important thing of all was that Medvedev began working with western Communists. Now we had other channels through which we could influence his undesirable attacks." Medvedev had been turned, not by the threat of the gulag, but by a friendly chat over a cup of tea."I saw both the weaknesses and strengths of my interlocutor's logic. I understood where he was right and where he was mistaken. For me it was very useful to know that. I was very happy with the results of the meeting … the most important thing of all was that Medvedev began working with western Communists. Now we had other channels through which we could influence his undesirable attacks." Medvedev had been turned, not by the threat of the gulag, but by a friendly chat over a cup of tea.
Putin worked on the oligarchs using something even more persuasive than a cup of tea – a complete list of their commercial secrets and indiscretions. He runs what amounts to a daily protection racket, and orchestrates a group of no more than 2,000 businessmen and top officials who control things. Yet all of Putin's six identities, which were strengths at the start of his rule, have become rather large vulnerabilities in the 13th year of that rule.Putin worked on the oligarchs using something even more persuasive than a cup of tea – a complete list of their commercial secrets and indiscretions. He runs what amounts to a daily protection racket, and orchestrates a group of no more than 2,000 businessmen and top officials who control things. Yet all of Putin's six identities, which were strengths at the start of his rule, have become rather large vulnerabilities in the 13th year of that rule.
How does the man at the fulcrum of a highly personalised system, a system he controls manually, leave office without triggering a gigantic power struggle? To whom can he hand over the levers of state (and that famous suitcase full of everyone's secrets, including his own) other than to another autocrat?How does the man at the fulcrum of a highly personalised system, a system he controls manually, leave office without triggering a gigantic power struggle? To whom can he hand over the levers of state (and that famous suitcase full of everyone's secrets, including his own) other than to another autocrat?
If Putin does not find a way to open up the system of thieves and swindlers – even to other thieves and swindlers – and if the pressure on him continues to build, there are broadly two alternatives: a tap on the shoulder from someone in his inner circle, or mass protest on the streets that could lead to regime change. Neither are peaceful or bloodless. Putin's stability could herald its opposite.If Putin does not find a way to open up the system of thieves and swindlers – even to other thieves and swindlers – and if the pressure on him continues to build, there are broadly two alternatives: a tap on the shoulder from someone in his inner circle, or mass protest on the streets that could lead to regime change. Neither are peaceful or bloodless. Putin's stability could herald its opposite.
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