This article is from the source 'guardian' and was first published or seen on . It last changed over 40 days ago and won't be checked again for changes.
You can find the current article at its original source at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/shortcuts/2013/may/29/al-qaida-terrorist-letter-mokhtar-belmokhtar
The article has changed 2 times. There is an RSS feed of changes available.
Previous version
1
Next version
| Version 0 | Version 1 |
|---|---|
| The al-Qaida terrorist who was told he must do better | The al-Qaida terrorist who was told he must do better |
| (4 months later) | |
| After 15 years as one of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb's top commanders, it became clear that the Algerian terrorist Mokhtar Belmokhtar was simply not a team player. In a long letter just discovered by the Associated Press in Mali, but dated 3 October last year, AQIM's leadership make clear how exasperated they had become by Belmokhtar's constant insubordination. And when he floated the idea of becoming his own boss, they had had enough. | After 15 years as one of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb's top commanders, it became clear that the Algerian terrorist Mokhtar Belmokhtar was simply not a team player. In a long letter just discovered by the Associated Press in Mali, but dated 3 October last year, AQIM's leadership make clear how exasperated they had become by Belmokhtar's constant insubordination. And when he floated the idea of becoming his own boss, they had had enough. |
| "We refrained from wading into this battle in the past out of a hope that the crooked could be straightened," the council said, "… until your last letter arrived, ending any hope of stanching the wound and healing it." In 30 bullet points, they castigate their man for a succession of failures. He dodged meetings, they say; he did not file expenses; he was never available for phone calls; he shared internal matters publicly on jihadist forums; one group of reinforcements spent three years wandering the desert trying to find him. Worse still, he had not pulled off one "spectacular operation" against "the crusader alliance". That last point aside, he was, in short, being rebuked for failings readily found in any office. | "We refrained from wading into this battle in the past out of a hope that the crooked could be straightened," the council said, "… until your last letter arrived, ending any hope of stanching the wound and healing it." In 30 bullet points, they castigate their man for a succession of failures. He dodged meetings, they say; he did not file expenses; he was never available for phone calls; he shared internal matters publicly on jihadist forums; one group of reinforcements spent three years wandering the desert trying to find him. Worse still, he had not pulled off one "spectacular operation" against "the crusader alliance". That last point aside, he was, in short, being rebuked for failings readily found in any office. |
| At the same time, AQIM's Shura Council is hardly showing itself to be the greatest line-manager in the Islamic Maghreb. "In general terms, the worst way to manage people is by fault-finding," says Professor Cary Cooper from Lancaster University's Management School. "Obviously you need to give people constructive feedback when they do something wrong, but the best way to manage is by praise and reward." | At the same time, AQIM's Shura Council is hardly showing itself to be the greatest line-manager in the Islamic Maghreb. "In general terms, the worst way to manage people is by fault-finding," says Professor Cary Cooper from Lancaster University's Management School. "Obviously you need to give people constructive feedback when they do something wrong, but the best way to manage is by praise and reward." |
| Still worse, however, the council has a sarcastic streak. At one point, they claim that Belmokhtar failed to buy any weapons with the money they sent him. "So whose performance deserves to be called poor in this case, I wonder?" Even as a parting shot, this is a long way from best practice. "Talking in general terms, not about this specific organisation, when people are going to leave, you never alienate them," he says. "They could come back as a client one day or somebody you need." | Still worse, however, the council has a sarcastic streak. At one point, they claim that Belmokhtar failed to buy any weapons with the money they sent him. "So whose performance deserves to be called poor in this case, I wonder?" Even as a parting shot, this is a long way from best practice. "Talking in general terms, not about this specific organisation, when people are going to leave, you never alienate them," he says. "They could come back as a client one day or somebody you need." |
| Sadly, within months of receiving the letter, Belmokhtar did launch a "spectacular operation" of his own– the mass hostage-taking at the In Amenas gas facility in January, during which 40 workers died. In light of AQIM's letter, the raid looks less like religious extremism, and more like a way of making a point to his former bosses. | Sadly, within months of receiving the letter, Belmokhtar did launch a "spectacular operation" of his own– the mass hostage-taking at the In Amenas gas facility in January, during which 40 workers died. In light of AQIM's letter, the raid looks less like religious extremism, and more like a way of making a point to his former bosses. |
| Our editors' picks for the day's top news and commentary delivered to your inbox each morning. | Our editors' picks for the day's top news and commentary delivered to your inbox each morning. |
Previous version
1
Next version