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Syria is a potent mix of popular uprising and religious animosity Syria is a potent mix of popular uprising and religious animosity
(4 months later)
Syria's war is driven by disparate factors – a popular uprising against a dictatorial regime, Islamists fighting a secular tyranny, rivalry between regional and global powers – and sectarian animosity between Sunni and Shia Muslims.Syria's war is driven by disparate factors – a popular uprising against a dictatorial regime, Islamists fighting a secular tyranny, rivalry between regional and global powers – and sectarian animosity between Sunni and Shia Muslims.
No single factor can explain the whole crisis – all interact with each other. But prejudices that date back to the great schism in Islam in the seventh century are being exploited by elements on both sides to mobilise support in a vicious conflict.No single factor can explain the whole crisis – all interact with each other. But prejudices that date back to the great schism in Islam in the seventh century are being exploited by elements on both sides to mobilise support in a vicious conflict.
Bashar al-Assad's Alawite sect, an offshoot of Shiism, does rule over a Sunni majority, though Assad's alliance with Iran, the self-appointed standard bearer of the Shia world since the 1979 Islamic revolution, matters more. Both states portray themselves as part of an "axis of resistance" against the US and Israel, as does their Lebanese Shia partner, Hezbollah, now fighting openly with them.Bashar al-Assad's Alawite sect, an offshoot of Shiism, does rule over a Sunni majority, though Assad's alliance with Iran, the self-appointed standard bearer of the Shia world since the 1979 Islamic revolution, matters more. Both states portray themselves as part of an "axis of resistance" against the US and Israel, as does their Lebanese Shia partner, Hezbollah, now fighting openly with them.
Assad's main enemies are the conservative Sunni monarchies of the Gulf – Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates – though they, and a more reluctant Jordan, fear an Afghan-style "blowback" from jihadists returning from Syria. Constitutionally secular but Sunni Turkey also supports the opposition.Assad's main enemies are the conservative Sunni monarchies of the Gulf – Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates – though they, and a more reluctant Jordan, fear an Afghan-style "blowback" from jihadists returning from Syria. Constitutionally secular but Sunni Turkey also supports the opposition.
Shia fighters pouring into Syria from Iraq – still riven by its own violent sectarian conflicts under Nouri al-Maliki – wish to defend religious shrines such as the Sayyida Zeinab shrine near Damascus – burial place of the eponymous granddaughter of the Prophet Muhammad. Abu Fadl al-Abbas, the multinational brigade that guards it, is redolently named after a Shia hero who was killed at the battle of Karbala in AD680 – the centrepiece of the Shia narrative of suffering, oppression, mourning and martyrdom.Shia fighters pouring into Syria from Iraq – still riven by its own violent sectarian conflicts under Nouri al-Maliki – wish to defend religious shrines such as the Sayyida Zeinab shrine near Damascus – burial place of the eponymous granddaughter of the Prophet Muhammad. Abu Fadl al-Abbas, the multinational brigade that guards it, is redolently named after a Shia hero who was killed at the battle of Karbala in AD680 – the centrepiece of the Shia narrative of suffering, oppression, mourning and martyrdom.
Sunnis who join Jabhat al-Nusra, affiliated to al-Qaida in Iraq, are rallying to a fanatical religious cause as much as a political one – under the doctrine of takfir, which encourages the killing of non-believers, Shias included, and which "justified" multiple atrocities in Iraq in the dark years after the 2003 war. Al-Qaida in Iraq is evidently trying to capitalise on anti-Shia and anti-Iran sentiments caused by mass Sunni deaths in Syria.Sunnis who join Jabhat al-Nusra, affiliated to al-Qaida in Iraq, are rallying to a fanatical religious cause as much as a political one – under the doctrine of takfir, which encourages the killing of non-believers, Shias included, and which "justified" multiple atrocities in Iraq in the dark years after the 2003 war. Al-Qaida in Iraq is evidently trying to capitalise on anti-Shia and anti-Iran sentiments caused by mass Sunni deaths in Syria.
But sectarianism – fitna in Arabic – is neither new nor one-sided. Saudi Arabia's puritanical and intolerant Wahhabi doctrine has always vilified the Shia (who live in the kingdom's eastern province), with Alawites condemned as "worse" than Christians or Jews. Sheikh Adnan Arour, a Saudi-based Syrian Salafi cleric notoriously warned in a satellite TV broadcast that Alawites who helped defend the Assad regime would be put into a meat grinder and their flesh fed to dogs.But sectarianism – fitna in Arabic – is neither new nor one-sided. Saudi Arabia's puritanical and intolerant Wahhabi doctrine has always vilified the Shia (who live in the kingdom's eastern province), with Alawites condemned as "worse" than Christians or Jews. Sheikh Adnan Arour, a Saudi-based Syrian Salafi cleric notoriously warned in a satellite TV broadcast that Alawites who helped defend the Assad regime would be put into a meat grinder and their flesh fed to dogs.
In modern times, sectarian language was used by both sides in the war between Iraq and Iran in the 1980s. Saddam Hussein, a Sunni who – in a mirror image of Assad's Syria – ruled over a Shia majority, portrayed the conflict as a replay of the Arab-Persian war of the seventh century and enlisted the support of a frightened Sunni Arab world against rising Shia power after the Islamic revolution in Iran.In modern times, sectarian language was used by both sides in the war between Iraq and Iran in the 1980s. Saddam Hussein, a Sunni who – in a mirror image of Assad's Syria – ruled over a Shia majority, portrayed the conflict as a replay of the Arab-Persian war of the seventh century and enlisted the support of a frightened Sunni Arab world against rising Shia power after the Islamic revolution in Iran.
"The Sunni-Shia conflict," in the words of the historian Vali Nasr, "is not just a hoary religious dispute, a fossilised setpiece from the early years of Islam's unfolding, but a contemporary clash of identities. Theological and historical disagreements fuel it, but so do today's concerns with power, subjugation, freedom and equality, not to mention regional conflicts and foreign intrigues.""The Sunni-Shia conflict," in the words of the historian Vali Nasr, "is not just a hoary religious dispute, a fossilised setpiece from the early years of Islam's unfolding, but a contemporary clash of identities. Theological and historical disagreements fuel it, but so do today's concerns with power, subjugation, freedom and equality, not to mention regional conflicts and foreign intrigues."
Two influential Shia and Sunni figures have amplified the twin sectarian and political nature of the Syrian war in recent days. In Lebanon it was Hezbollah's leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, who came out in open support of Assad, pledging to stay with him "until the end of the road". Then, last Friday, came a counter-blast from Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the influential Egyptian preacher and Muslim Brotherhood supporter who cast the conflict in explicitly sectarian terms – while also clearly demonstrating its fundamental strategic, national and regional character. "How could 100 million Shia defeat 1.7 billion Sunnis?" he asked. "Only because Sunnis are weak. Every Muslim trained to fight and capable of doing that [must] make himself available" to support the anti-Assad rebels, the cleric said.Two influential Shia and Sunni figures have amplified the twin sectarian and political nature of the Syrian war in recent days. In Lebanon it was Hezbollah's leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, who came out in open support of Assad, pledging to stay with him "until the end of the road". Then, last Friday, came a counter-blast from Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the influential Egyptian preacher and Muslim Brotherhood supporter who cast the conflict in explicitly sectarian terms – while also clearly demonstrating its fundamental strategic, national and regional character. "How could 100 million Shia defeat 1.7 billion Sunnis?" he asked. "Only because Sunnis are weak. Every Muslim trained to fight and capable of doing that [must] make himself available" to support the anti-Assad rebels, the cleric said.
"Iran is pushing forward arms and men [to back the Syrian regime], so why do we stand idle?" he asked. But reverting to theology, Qaradawi called Hezbollah [the "party of God" in Arabic] the "party of Satan"."Iran is pushing forward arms and men [to back the Syrian regime], so why do we stand idle?" he asked. But reverting to theology, Qaradawi called Hezbollah [the "party of God" in Arabic] the "party of Satan".
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