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| The food aid debate is a distraction | The food aid debate is a distraction |
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| Since the global food price spikes of 2008-09 and the widespread riots that ensued, the world has begun to pay more attention to food security. The link between food and security is no longer a question. | Since the global food price spikes of 2008-09 and the widespread riots that ensued, the world has begun to pay more attention to food security. The link between food and security is no longer a question. |
| There's been a lot of debate recently in the US about food aid reform, especially since the US Agency for International Development (USAid) proposed a shift toward more cash programmes and increased local and regional purchase of food aid. But what's lost in the lively discussion on the hows and whys of food aid is a sense of long-term focus. | There's been a lot of debate recently in the US about food aid reform, especially since the US Agency for International Development (USAid) proposed a shift toward more cash programmes and increased local and regional purchase of food aid. But what's lost in the lively discussion on the hows and whys of food aid is a sense of long-term focus. |
| While emergency intervention is all too often necessary, focusing on building capacity at the farm level offers long-term sustainability in addressing the root causes of food insecurity. Granted, this kind of market development work is difficult – it's a slog. It requires coaxing industry stakeholders – from the smallholder farmer to the government standards bureau, from financial service providers to input suppliers – into behaviour change. It can't be done in a mere 18 months as if it were a food aid programme, and capacity building get less air time than food aid, which often unfolds as compelling drama. | While emergency intervention is all too often necessary, focusing on building capacity at the farm level offers long-term sustainability in addressing the root causes of food insecurity. Granted, this kind of market development work is difficult – it's a slog. It requires coaxing industry stakeholders – from the smallholder farmer to the government standards bureau, from financial service providers to input suppliers – into behaviour change. It can't be done in a mere 18 months as if it were a food aid programme, and capacity building get less air time than food aid, which often unfolds as compelling drama. |
| But building the capacity of smallholders and strengthening markets to sustain them is pivotal and sustainable, and can render food aid unnecessary in many, if not most, cases. We don't read about the food crisis that doesn't happen. | But building the capacity of smallholders and strengthening markets to sustain them is pivotal and sustainable, and can render food aid unnecessary in many, if not most, cases. We don't read about the food crisis that doesn't happen. |
| The recent debates on food aid remind me of two illuminating visits to the Horn of Africa. One was to Ethiopia about ten years ago in the midst of a drought that served to punctuate what had been practically perennial food crises. The EU had recently moved to an all-cash programme to allow for local purchases of emergency food aid and had been bemoaning the American reliance on US commodities for food aid that had to be shipped in. But at that moment, in the midst of the famine, there was no local food to be had on the local market, or even in nearby Uganda or Kenya. Externally sourced food aid was needed – in fact, it was the only option available. When the US ships docked and unloaded white bags of food – aid "from the American people" – it wasn't rejected but was acknowledged as lifesaving and very welcome. | The recent debates on food aid remind me of two illuminating visits to the Horn of Africa. One was to Ethiopia about ten years ago in the midst of a drought that served to punctuate what had been practically perennial food crises. The EU had recently moved to an all-cash programme to allow for local purchases of emergency food aid and had been bemoaning the American reliance on US commodities for food aid that had to be shipped in. But at that moment, in the midst of the famine, there was no local food to be had on the local market, or even in nearby Uganda or Kenya. Externally sourced food aid was needed – in fact, it was the only option available. When the US ships docked and unloaded white bags of food – aid "from the American people" – it wasn't rejected but was acknowledged as lifesaving and very welcome. |
| Fast forward to 2011. I found myself in East Africa again. The next big drought had hit the Horn, and the aid and development community was bracing itself for the worst. But the drought didn't create famine in Ethiopia that year, nor in Kenya. When the crisis hit, rural economies were able to respond, and food moved from surplus areas to food-deficit areas. Drought-resistant seed and climate-smart farming techniques had helped to build smallholder farmers' resilience. | Fast forward to 2011. I found myself in East Africa again. The next big drought had hit the Horn, and the aid and development community was bracing itself for the worst. But the drought didn't create famine in Ethiopia that year, nor in Kenya. When the crisis hit, rural economies were able to respond, and food moved from surplus areas to food-deficit areas. Drought-resistant seed and climate-smart farming techniques had helped to build smallholder farmers' resilience. |
| Well-conceived 21st century food aid programmes had helped create market systems that worked. Not for all though as, tragically, the drought still caused hunger. But in Ethiopia and Kenya conditions that year didn't spiral out of control as they had before. Unfortunately, in Somalia, where the dysfunctional government had prevented agriculture and development initiatives, the result was a famine that killed more than 250,000 Somalis, half of them children. | Well-conceived 21st century food aid programmes had helped create market systems that worked. Not for all though as, tragically, the drought still caused hunger. But in Ethiopia and Kenya conditions that year didn't spiral out of control as they had before. Unfortunately, in Somalia, where the dysfunctional government had prevented agriculture and development initiatives, the result was a famine that killed more than 250,000 Somalis, half of them children. |
| What did it take to build such resilience in Kenya and Ethiopia? It took government policymakers buying into the best practices outlined in the Comprehensive African Agricultural Plan and allowing private sector incentive-driven market development. It took 10 years of donor-supported strengthening of farmer and industry groups to make them able to articulate demands for services and accountability and to train their members in improved cultivation, handling, storage and marketing techniques. It took industry partners, telecommunications firms devising cellphone-based market information systems, and fertilizer and seed companies co-operating to distribute smaller-sized bags of inputs. It took improved relationships with traders and truckers who linked smallholder farmer groups to mills that were willing to pay for improved volumes and quality product. It was difficult, but lasting, holistic market development work. | What did it take to build such resilience in Kenya and Ethiopia? It took government policymakers buying into the best practices outlined in the Comprehensive African Agricultural Plan and allowing private sector incentive-driven market development. It took 10 years of donor-supported strengthening of farmer and industry groups to make them able to articulate demands for services and accountability and to train their members in improved cultivation, handling, storage and marketing techniques. It took industry partners, telecommunications firms devising cellphone-based market information systems, and fertilizer and seed companies co-operating to distribute smaller-sized bags of inputs. It took improved relationships with traders and truckers who linked smallholder farmer groups to mills that were willing to pay for improved volumes and quality product. It was difficult, but lasting, holistic market development work. |
| Necessary food aid and deliberate long-term agricultural development aren't an either-or proposition. We will likely, unfortunately, always have urgent crises that require food aid. Having all tools available – more cash, increased local and regional purchase as well as donor country-sourced food aid – will enable smart and successful emergency interventions. | Necessary food aid and deliberate long-term agricultural development aren't an either-or proposition. We will likely, unfortunately, always have urgent crises that require food aid. Having all tools available – more cash, increased local and regional purchase as well as donor country-sourced food aid – will enable smart and successful emergency interventions. |
| The reason food aid debates are so contentious are the implications for the agriculture sector in the donor country, but US agriculture, a strong constituency of current food aid, need not be wary of long-term development strategies. In fact, there's good data that international agricultural development helps our domestic agriculture. For an example, one need look no further than sub-Saharan Africa's rising incomes and growing urbanisation spiking imports of US soy for their budding animal feed industries. These growing economies are America's growing food markets. | The reason food aid debates are so contentious are the implications for the agriculture sector in the donor country, but US agriculture, a strong constituency of current food aid, need not be wary of long-term development strategies. In fact, there's good data that international agricultural development helps our domestic agriculture. For an example, one need look no further than sub-Saharan Africa's rising incomes and growing urbanisation spiking imports of US soy for their budding animal feed industries. These growing economies are America's growing food markets. |
| I'm impatient with the tedious debate on emergency food aid reform. We'll always have another food crisis, and responding effectively will save lives. But the much more serious job, the most important and too often out-of-the-headlines job, is building the ability of those small African farmers to produce nutritious food in a sustained manner – so that when the next drought hits, and we know it will, they don't become the next food aid emergency. | I'm impatient with the tedious debate on emergency food aid reform. We'll always have another food crisis, and responding effectively will save lives. But the much more serious job, the most important and too often out-of-the-headlines job, is building the ability of those small African farmers to produce nutritious food in a sustained manner – so that when the next drought hits, and we know it will, they don't become the next food aid emergency. |
| Paul Guenette is senior vice-president at the US NGO ACDI/VOCA. Follow its tweets: @acdivoca | Paul Guenette is senior vice-president at the US NGO ACDI/VOCA. Follow its tweets: @acdivoca |
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