'Fact-checking Ray Kelly: is the NYPD's stop-and-frisk policy fair and effective?' diff viewer (1/2)

This article is from the source 'guardian' and was first published or seen on July 24, 2013 17:00 (UTC). It last changed over 40 days ago and won't be checked again for changes.

You can find the current article at its original source at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/jul/24/factchecking-ray-kelly-nypd-wsj

The article has changed 3 times. There is an RSS feed of changes available.

Previous version 1 2 Next version

Previous version 1 2 Next version

Version 1	Version 2
Fact-checking Ray Kelly: is the NYPD's stop-and-frisk policy fair and effective?	Fact-checking Ray Kelly: is the NYPD's stop-and-frisk policy fair and effective?
2013-07-24 18:20:08 UTC	2013-09-24 06:15:55 UTC (2 months later)
New York's police commissioner Ray Kelly wrote a blistering op-ed in the Wall Street Journal this week defending the New York Police Department's "proactive policing strategies" as legal, constitutional and, most of all, successful in combating crime. As not everyone agrees with this stance, we thought we'd take a closer look at what the commissioner had to say in the NYPD's defense.	New York's police commissioner Ray Kelly wrote a blistering op-ed in the Wall Street Journal this week defending the New York Police Department's "proactive policing strategies" as legal, constitutional and, most of all, successful in combating crime. As not everyone agrees with this stance, we thought we'd take a closer look at what the commissioner had to say in the NYPD's defense.
Since 2002, the New York Police Department has taken tens of thousands of weapons off the street through proactive policing strategies. The effect this has had on the murder rate is staggering. In the 11 years before Mayor Michael Bloomberg took office, there were 13,212 murders in New York City. During the 11 years of his administration, there have been 5,849. That's 7,383 lives saved – and if history is a guide, they are largely the lives of young men of color.	Since 2002, the New York Police Department has taken tens of thousands of weapons off the street through proactive policing strategies. The effect this has had on the murder rate is staggering. In the 11 years before Mayor Michael Bloomberg took office, there were 13,212 murders in New York City. During the 11 years of his administration, there have been 5,849. That's 7,383 lives saved – and if history is a guide, they are largely the lives of young men of color.
Murder rates in New York City have fallen, as Kelly notes, and this is a cause for celebration, but his claim that this decline is due to the "proactive policing strategies" that have been in place since the beginning of his and Bloomberg's periods in office is a stretch at best. In 1990, there were 2,245 homicides in New York City. By 2002, when Kelly took over, that number had already dropped nearly 75%, to 587.	Murder rates in New York City have fallen, as Kelly notes, and this is a cause for celebration, but his claim that this decline is due to the "proactive policing strategies" that have been in place since the beginning of his and Bloomberg's periods in office is a stretch at best. In 1990, there were 2,245 homicides in New York City. By 2002, when Kelly took over, that number had already dropped nearly 75%, to 587.
For the next seven years or so, until 2009, the homicide rate declined slightly – but nothing like it had over the previous decade; and it did not fall below 500 until 2009. Interestingly, the murder rate increased again in 2010 and 2011, the very years that Kelly's signature proactive policing strategy, "stop-and-frisk", was at its peak.	For the next seven years or so, until 2009, the homicide rate declined slightly – but nothing like it had over the previous decade; and it did not fall below 500 until 2009. Interestingly, the murder rate increased again in 2010 and 2011, the very years that Kelly's signature proactive policing strategy, "stop-and-frisk", was at its peak.
Kelly's claim that his proactive policing policies were responsible for the removal of tens of thousands of weapons from the streets is also questionable. Less than 2% of stop and frisk searches have resulted in the seizure of illegal weapons, and guns are recovered in only 0.14% of stops.	Kelly's claim that his proactive policing policies were responsible for the removal of tens of thousands of weapons from the streets is also questionable. Less than 2% of stop and frisk searches have resulted in the seizure of illegal weapons, and guns are recovered in only 0.14% of stops.
So far this year, murders are down 29% from the 50-year low achieved in 2012, and we've seen the fewest shootings in two decades.	So far this year, murders are down 29% from the 50-year low achieved in 2012, and we've seen the fewest shootings in two decades.
This is true. There were only 414 homicides in 2012 and it is a 50-year low. Interestingly, stop-and-frisk searches also declined in 2012, which doesn't help Kelly's case that the proactive policing policies are directly linked to lower homicide rates. In fact, criminologists everywhere have not reached any consensus regarding the declining crime rates nationwide since the 1990s; they point to a complex set of socioeconomic factors, including a decline in birth rates, the gentrification of inner cities, and an end to the crack epidemic – as well as changes in policing methods.	This is true. There were only 414 homicides in 2012 and it is a 50-year low. Interestingly, stop-and-frisk searches also declined in 2012, which doesn't help Kelly's case that the proactive policing policies are directly linked to lower homicide rates. In fact, criminologists everywhere have not reached any consensus regarding the declining crime rates nationwide since the 1990s; they point to a complex set of socioeconomic factors, including a decline in birth rates, the gentrification of inner cities, and an end to the crack epidemic – as well as changes in policing methods.
To critics, none of this seems to much matter. Sidestepping the fact that these policies work, they continue to allege that massive numbers of minorities are stopped and questioned by police for no reason other than their race.	To critics, none of this seems to much matter. Sidestepping the fact that these policies work, they continue to allege that massive numbers of minorities are stopped and questioned by police for no reason other than their race.
Uh, well, yes. People do tend to get kind of touchy when "massive numbers of minorities are stopped and questioned by police" and nearly nine out of 10 of them turn out to be completely innocent.	Uh, well, yes. People do tend to get kind of touchy when "massive numbers of minorities are stopped and questioned by police" and nearly nine out of 10 of them turn out to be completely innocent.
Never mind that in each of the city's 76 police precincts, the race of those stopped highly correlates to descriptions provided by victims or witnesses to crimes.	Never mind that in each of the city's 76 police precincts, the race of those stopped highly correlates to descriptions provided by victims or witnesses to crimes.
Perhaps we should take Kelly's word for it when he says the "race of those stopped highly correlates to descriptions by victims or witnesses", but in that case, there are two conclusions to be drawn. On the one hand, it speaks very highly of the NYPD that Kelly's officers have had the capacity, during the Bloomberg administration, to make street identifications of more than 4 million crime suspects for stopping, questioning and frisking. On the other hand, the fact that more than 90% of the time, these identifications turn out to be random and wrong speaks less highly of the NYPD's effectiveness.	Perhaps we should take Kelly's word for it when he says the "race of those stopped highly correlates to descriptions by victims or witnesses", but in that case, there are two conclusions to be drawn. On the one hand, it speaks very highly of the NYPD that Kelly's officers have had the capacity, during the Bloomberg administration, to make street identifications of more than 4 million crime suspects for stopping, questioning and frisking. On the other hand, the fact that more than 90% of the time, these identifications turn out to be random and wrong speaks less highly of the NYPD's effectiveness.
Or that in a city of 8.5m people, protected by 19,600 officers on patrol (out of a total uniformed staff of 35,000), the average number of stops we conduct is less than one per officer per week.	Or that in a city of 8.5m people, protected by 19,600 officers on patrol (out of a total uniformed staff of 35,000), the average number of stops we conduct is less than one per officer per week.
According to an analysis of NYPD data by the Center for Constitutional Rights, the average number of stops per month (pdf) since 2002 is 43,400. The issue is not the absolute number of stops, however, but where they occur and whether racial profiling is involved: for instance, while black and Latino males between the ages of 14-24 account for only 4.7% of New York's population, they accounted for 41.6% of stops in 2011. Despite this, Kelly's most loyal backer, Mayor Michael Bloomberg, recently opined:	According to an analysis of NYPD data by the Center for Constitutional Rights, the average number of stops per month (pdf) since 2002 is 43,400. The issue is not the absolute number of stops, however, but where they occur and whether racial profiling is involved: for instance, while black and Latino males between the ages of 14-24 account for only 4.7% of New York's population, they accounted for 41.6% of stops in 2011. Despite this, Kelly's most loyal backer, Mayor Michael Bloomberg, recently opined:
I think we disproportionately stop whites too much and minorities too little.	I think we disproportionately stop whites too much and minorities too little.
According to the New York Civil Liberties Union, from 2002 to 2011, close to 90% of those stopped and frisked were black or Latino. That's certainly a alternative definition of "minorities" the mayor is using there. But back to Kelly:	According to the New York Civil Liberties Union, from 2002 to 2011, close to 90% of those stopped and frisked were black or Latino. That's certainly a alternative definition of "minorities" the mayor is using there. But back to Kelly:
Racial profiling is a disingenuous charge at best and an incendiary one at worst, particularly in the wake of the tragic death of Trayvon Martin. The effect is to obscure the rock-solid legal and constitutional foundation underpinning the police department's tactics and the painstaking analysis that determines how we employ them."	Racial profiling is a disingenuous charge at best and an incendiary one at worst, particularly in the wake of the tragic death of Trayvon Martin. The effect is to obscure the rock-solid legal and constitutional foundation underpinning the police department's tactics and the painstaking analysis that determines how we employ them."
Oh, cry me a river. This from the man who made the (undisputed in court) statement to Senator Eric Adams, a former police officer, that young black and Latino men were to be targeted under stop-and-frisk because "he wanted to instill fear in them, that every time they leave their home they could be stopped by the police".	Oh, cry me a river. This from the man who made the (undisputed in court) statement to Senator Eric Adams, a former police officer, that young black and Latino men were to be targeted under stop-and-frisk because "he wanted to instill fear in them, that every time they leave their home they could be stopped by the police".
As for that "rock-solid" foundation underpinning the NYPD's tactics, both its legality and constitutionality are being challenged in a federal class action lawsuit brought by the CCR on behalf of minorities who claim their rights were violated when they were stopped without cause by the police.	As for that "rock-solid" foundation underpinning the NYPD's tactics, both its legality and constitutionality are being challenged in a federal class action lawsuit brought by the CCR on behalf of minorities who claim their rights were violated when they were stopped without cause by the police.
In 2003, when the NYPD recognized that 96% of the individuals who were shot and 90% of those murdered were black and Hispanic, we concentrated our officers in those minority neighborhoods that had experienced spikes in crime. This program is called Operation Impact.	In 2003, when the NYPD recognized that 96% of the individuals who were shot and 90% of those murdered were black and Hispanic, we concentrated our officers in those minority neighborhoods that had experienced spikes in crime. This program is called Operation Impact.
Sounds perfectly reasonable.	Sounds perfectly reasonable.
From the beginning, we've combined this strategy with a proactive policy of engagement. We stop and question individuals about whom we have reasonable suspicion. This is a widely utilized and lawful police tactic, upheld by the US Supreme Court in its 1968 decision, Terry v Ohio, and authorized by New York State Criminal Procedure Law and the New York state constitution. Every state in the country has a variant of this statute, as does federal law; it is fundamental to policing.	From the beginning, we've combined this strategy with a proactive policy of engagement. We stop and question individuals about whom we have reasonable suspicion. This is a widely utilized and lawful police tactic, upheld by the US Supreme Court in its 1968 decision, Terry v Ohio, and authorized by New York State Criminal Procedure Law and the New York state constitution. Every state in the country has a variant of this statute, as does federal law; it is fundamental to policing.
That all sounds perfectly reasonable, too, and I'm sure Kelly would find that most people have no objection to the police stopping someone they reasonably suspect has committed a crime. It's just that when 90% of the people who are stopped turn out to be completely innocent, you can't blame us for thinking that the police are either incompetent or that any suspicion they may have had was not reasonable at all.	That all sounds perfectly reasonable, too, and I'm sure Kelly would find that most people have no objection to the police stopping someone they reasonably suspect has committed a crime. It's just that when 90% of the people who are stopped turn out to be completely innocent, you can't blame us for thinking that the police are either incompetent or that any suspicion they may have had was not reasonable at all.
Also, Kelly should view this short video of a young Latino male victim of a stop-and-frisk, as it might help him to understand the public's anger over this "proactive" police strategy. The police involved offer no legally valid reason for the stop, threatened the kid (who was simply walking home) with a night in jail "for being a fucking mutt", then threatened to break his "fucking arm" and punch him in the "fucking face".	Also, Kelly should view this short video of a young Latino male victim of a stop-and-frisk, as it might help him to understand the public's anger over this "proactive" police strategy. The police involved offer no legally valid reason for the stop, threatened the kid (who was simply walking home) with a night in jail "for being a fucking mutt", then threatened to break his "fucking arm" and punch him in the "fucking face".
It's understandable that someone who has done nothing wrong will be angry if he is stopped.	It's understandable that someone who has done nothing wrong will be angry if he is stopped.
Yes, it is.	Yes, it is.
Last year, the NYPD announced a series of steps to strengthen the oversight and training involved in this tactic. The number of civilian complaints in 2012 was the lowest in the past five years. That's progress – and we always strive to do better.	Last year, the NYPD announced a series of steps to strengthen the oversight and training involved in this tactic. The number of civilian complaints in 2012 was the lowest in the past five years. That's progress – and we always strive to do better.
That sounds good – but it hasn't convinced US Attorney General Eric Holder that there is nearly enough oversight of the NYPD's tactic. Holder, who recently labeled the policy "outrageous", wants the Department of Justice to exercise federal monitoring of New York police commissioner's favorite policing method. Most of the candidates running to succeed Bloomberg as mayor also support tougher oversight.	That sounds good – but it hasn't convinced US Attorney General Eric Holder that there is nearly enough oversight of the NYPD's tactic. Holder, who recently labeled the policy "outrageous", wants the Department of Justice to exercise federal monitoring of New York police commissioner's favorite policing method. Most of the candidates running to succeed Bloomberg as mayor also support tougher oversight.
In a similar vein, our detractors contend that the NYPD engages in widespread, unwarranted spying on Muslim New Yorkers. Again, this is a sensational charge belied by the facts.	In a similar vein, our detractors contend that the NYPD engages in widespread, unwarranted spying on Muslim New Yorkers. Again, this is a sensational charge belied by the facts.
In its Pulitzer Prize-winning investigation, the Associated Press determined that the NYPD has been sending undercover agents into Muslim communities to gather information about all aspects of their lives (where they eat, sleep, work and pray) – usually with no evidence of criminal activity whatsoever.	In its Pulitzer Prize-winning investigation, the Associated Press determined that the NYPD has been sending undercover agents into Muslim communities to gather information about all aspects of their lives (where they eat, sleep, work and pray) – usually with no evidence of criminal activity whatsoever.
Since 1985, the police department has been subject to a set of rules known as the Handschu Guidelines, which were developed to protect people engaged in political protest. After the 11 September 2001 attacks, we were concerned that elements of the guidelines could interfere with our ability to investigate terrorism. In 2002, we proposed to the federal court that monitors the agreement that it be modified. The court agreed.	Since 1985, the police department has been subject to a set of rules known as the Handschu Guidelines, which were developed to protect people engaged in political protest. After the 11 September 2001 attacks, we were concerned that elements of the guidelines could interfere with our ability to investigate terrorism. In 2002, we proposed to the federal court that monitors the agreement that it be modified. The court agreed.
This is correct: the NYPD is obliged to abide by the Handschu Guidelines that restrict warrantless surveillance.	This is correct: the NYPD is obliged to abide by the Handschu Guidelines that restrict warrantless surveillance.
Handschu entitles police officers to attend any event that is open to the public, to view online activity that is publicly accessible and to prepare reports and assessments to help us understand the nature of the threat.	Handschu entitles police officers to attend any event that is open to the public, to view online activity that is publicly accessible and to prepare reports and assessments to help us understand the nature of the threat.
True. But it does not entitle officers to put an entire community under surveillance when there is little or no evidence of a threat.	True. But it does not entitle officers to put an entire community under surveillance when there is little or no evidence of a threat.
As a matter of department policy, undercover officers and confidential informants do not enter a mosque unless they are following up on a lead vetted under Handschu. Similarly, when we have attended a private event organized by a student group, we've done so on the basis of a lead or investigation reviewed and authorized in writing at the highest levels of the department, in keeping with Handschu protocol.	As a matter of department policy, undercover officers and confidential informants do not enter a mosque unless they are following up on a lead vetted under Handschu. Similarly, when we have attended a private event organized by a student group, we've done so on the basis of a lead or investigation reviewed and authorized in writing at the highest levels of the department, in keeping with Handschu protocol.
According to the AP investigation, the NYPD sent paid informants into Muslim communities, routinely in the absence of any criminal threat and under orders to "bait" community leaders to say inflammatory things.	According to the AP investigation, the NYPD sent paid informants into Muslim communities, routinely in the absence of any criminal threat and under orders to "bait" community leaders to say inflammatory things.
Anyone who implies that it is unlawful for the police department to search online, visit public places or map neighborhoods has either not read, misunderstood or intentionally obfuscated the meaning of the Handschu Guidelines.	Anyone who implies that it is unlawful for the police department to search online, visit public places or map neighborhoods has either not read, misunderstood or intentionally obfuscated the meaning of the Handschu Guidelines.
I'm sure Kelly would be the first to acknowledge that Handschu does not permit discriminatory surveillance that targets specific ethnicities or religious groups. A lawsuit filed last month by the ACLU and other civil rights groups alleges that this is exactly what the NYPD has been doing to Muslim communities in and around New York.	I'm sure Kelly would be the first to acknowledge that Handschu does not permit discriminatory surveillance that targets specific ethnicities or religious groups. A lawsuit filed last month by the ACLU and other civil rights groups alleges that this is exactly what the NYPD has been doing to Muslim communities in and around New York.
The NYPD has too urgent a mission and too few officers for us to waste time and resources on broad, unfocused surveillance. We have a responsibility to protect New Yorkers from violent crime or another terrorist attack – and we uphold the law in doing so.	The NYPD has too urgent a mission and too few officers for us to waste time and resources on broad, unfocused surveillance. We have a responsibility to protect New Yorkers from violent crime or another terrorist attack – and we uphold the law in doing so.