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Westgate mall attacks: Urban areas are the battleground of the 21st century Westgate mall attacks: urban areas are the battleground of the 21st century
(about 1 hour later)
Things aren't where we left them when we headed off into the mountains after 9/11. When the hangover clears, and the generation that fought in Afghanistan and Iraq comes home from these wars, we'll find that much of what we thought we understood has changed. The future (crowded, coastal, urban, connected) will be so different from Afghanistan (remote, landlocked, rural) that we'll have to reconsider much of what we think we know about 21st-century conflict.Things aren't where we left them when we headed off into the mountains after 9/11. When the hangover clears, and the generation that fought in Afghanistan and Iraq comes home from these wars, we'll find that much of what we thought we understood has changed. The future (crowded, coastal, urban, connected) will be so different from Afghanistan (remote, landlocked, rural) that we'll have to reconsider much of what we think we know about 21st-century conflict.
Attacks like this week's siege in Nairobi reinforce what we've already seen in places like Mumbai and Karachi: that urban environments, including complex pieces of urban terrain like shopping centres, hotels and industrial facilities, are the battlegrounds of the future. And the urban siege, with its commando-style tactics and guerrilla infiltration of a big city's ebb and flow, is increasingly the tactic of choice for a wide range of adversaries.Attacks like this week's siege in Nairobi reinforce what we've already seen in places like Mumbai and Karachi: that urban environments, including complex pieces of urban terrain like shopping centres, hotels and industrial facilities, are the battlegrounds of the future. And the urban siege, with its commando-style tactics and guerrilla infiltration of a big city's ebb and flow, is increasingly the tactic of choice for a wide range of adversaries.
Western countries will almost certainly still do counterinsurgency operations in the future. But these will happen in a different environment: wars in remote, mountainous, landlocked places such as Afghanistan are getting rarer by comparison to urban littoral conflicts, simply because wars happen where people live, and in the future people will be overwhelmingly concentrated in coastal cities.Western countries will almost certainly still do counterinsurgency operations in the future. But these will happen in a different environment: wars in remote, mountainous, landlocked places such as Afghanistan are getting rarer by comparison to urban littoral conflicts, simply because wars happen where people live, and in the future people will be overwhelmingly concentrated in coastal cities.
To understand this, we need to treat cities (not nation states) as the primary unit of analysis. We need to bring that analysis down to the city and sub-city level, understanding communities and cities as systems in their own right. We need to understand how a city's subsystems and subdistricts fit together, as well as how that city nests within regional and transnational flows. Taking the time to observe a city for long enough to see the rhythms of its metabolism turns out to be critical in understanding it. In Kenya, it seems al-Shabaab conducted meticulous, intensive surveillance on the Westgate Mall while planning their attack. Similarly, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) spent more than a year scoping Mumbai before the 2008 attacks, studying the city and its flow.To understand this, we need to treat cities (not nation states) as the primary unit of analysis. We need to bring that analysis down to the city and sub-city level, understanding communities and cities as systems in their own right. We need to understand how a city's subsystems and subdistricts fit together, as well as how that city nests within regional and transnational flows. Taking the time to observe a city for long enough to see the rhythms of its metabolism turns out to be critical in understanding it. In Kenya, it seems al-Shabaab conducted meticulous, intensive surveillance on the Westgate Mall while planning their attack. Similarly, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) spent more than a year scoping Mumbai before the 2008 attacks, studying the city and its flow.
As the smoke cleared after 60 hours of violence in Mumbai, it emerged that 172 people had been killed and 304 injured. The vast majority of these were civilians randomly caught up in the attacks, especially in the railway terminus, where the greatest carnage took place among commuters trapped in a tight space, unable to escape. Property damage from the raid was estimated at over $18m (£11m) – not counting the broader cost to the Indian economy.As the smoke cleared after 60 hours of violence in Mumbai, it emerged that 172 people had been killed and 304 injured. The vast majority of these were civilians randomly caught up in the attacks, especially in the railway terminus, where the greatest carnage took place among commuters trapped in a tight space, unable to escape. Property damage from the raid was estimated at over $18m (£11m) – not counting the broader cost to the Indian economy.
The raiders consciously exploited the urbanised, connected, coastal environment of Mumbai and Karachi, from which they sailed. Mumbai, a megacity of just over 20 million, is India's second-largest city, and is one of the most densely populated urban centres on the planet, with almost 33,000 people per square kilometre. The attackers skillfully exploited the complexity of this urban environment, landing from the sea in coastal slums only a few hundred yards from the high-rise luxury hotels and office blocks that were their targets.The raiders consciously exploited the urbanised, connected, coastal environment of Mumbai and Karachi, from which they sailed. Mumbai, a megacity of just over 20 million, is India's second-largest city, and is one of the most densely populated urban centres on the planet, with almost 33,000 people per square kilometre. The attackers skillfully exploited the complexity of this urban environment, landing from the sea in coastal slums only a few hundred yards from the high-rise luxury hotels and office blocks that were their targets.
Once ashore, the raiders exploited the connected, networked nature of the urban environment. They used Skype, cellphones, and satellite phones to connect with their handlers in Pakistan, who in turn monitored Twitter, news blogs, international and local satellite news and cable television in real time, which allowed them to control the attacks and react as the Indian response developed. The Mumbai attack was thus, in effect, directed by remote control.Once ashore, the raiders exploited the connected, networked nature of the urban environment. They used Skype, cellphones, and satellite phones to connect with their handlers in Pakistan, who in turn monitored Twitter, news blogs, international and local satellite news and cable television in real time, which allowed them to control the attacks and react as the Indian response developed. The Mumbai attack was thus, in effect, directed by remote control.
As in Nairobi, the attack team's focus on foreigners seems to have been calculated to maximise international attention, creating an extremely high level of news coverage – and resulting in an unusually large number of foreigners (including citizens of 22 countries) being killed. The attacks didn't involve weapons of mass destruction or hi-tech equipment. The raiders used small arms (rifles and pistols), improvised explosive devices, and grenades; they didn't even use rocket-propelled grenades. Small arms, however – because they involve intimate contact between attackers and victims, because their use implies the presence of an enemy on the spot, and because gun battles last longer than bombings – can have a greater terror effect than a bombing or hostage situation, something we have just witnessed in Nairobi. Like the Nairobi attackers, the Mumbai raiders used no unusually sophisticated or specialised communications devices: they employed commercially available phones and off-the-shelf GPS devices, and pulled much of their reconnaissance data from open-source, online tools such as Google Earth.As in Nairobi, the attack team's focus on foreigners seems to have been calculated to maximise international attention, creating an extremely high level of news coverage – and resulting in an unusually large number of foreigners (including citizens of 22 countries) being killed. The attacks didn't involve weapons of mass destruction or hi-tech equipment. The raiders used small arms (rifles and pistols), improvised explosive devices, and grenades; they didn't even use rocket-propelled grenades. Small arms, however – because they involve intimate contact between attackers and victims, because their use implies the presence of an enemy on the spot, and because gun battles last longer than bombings – can have a greater terror effect than a bombing or hostage situation, something we have just witnessed in Nairobi. Like the Nairobi attackers, the Mumbai raiders used no unusually sophisticated or specialised communications devices: they employed commercially available phones and off-the-shelf GPS devices, and pulled much of their reconnaissance data from open-source, online tools such as Google Earth.
What does all this say about the future environment? Mumbai and Nairobi represent only one kind of threat that will exist in the urban, networked littoral of the future. Crime researchers John P Sullivan and Adam Elkus describe this as an evolved 21st-century form of "urban siege".What does all this say about the future environment? Mumbai and Nairobi represent only one kind of threat that will exist in the urban, networked littoral of the future. Crime researchers John P Sullivan and Adam Elkus describe this as an evolved 21st-century form of "urban siege".
"There are several methods that terrorists and criminal insurgents use to besiege cities from within – pure terror and systems disruption, although the two are often combined together. Both methods are sustained means of besieging a city with a campaign of protracted urban violence. Pure terror is a form of social systems disruption. It is a spasm of violence intended to demonstrate to the public that the authorities cannot help them, and that they are helpless against the power of the gun."There are several methods that terrorists and criminal insurgents use to besiege cities from within – pure terror and systems disruption, although the two are often combined together. Both methods are sustained means of besieging a city with a campaign of protracted urban violence. Pure terror is a form of social systems disruption. It is a spasm of violence intended to demonstrate to the public that the authorities cannot help them, and that they are helpless against the power of the gun.
"While the success of the Mumbai terrorists came in large part from the tactical and operational inadequacy of Indian law enforcement response, it is easy to imagine a small group of terrorists creating multiple centres of disorder at the same time within a major American city in same manner. An equally terrifying scenario is a Beslan-type siege in school centres with multiple active shooters. Paramilitary terrorists of this kind would aim for maximum violence, target hardening, and area denial – capabilities that many SWAT units would be hard-pressed to counter.""While the success of the Mumbai terrorists came in large part from the tactical and operational inadequacy of Indian law enforcement response, it is easy to imagine a small group of terrorists creating multiple centres of disorder at the same time within a major American city in same manner. An equally terrifying scenario is a Beslan-type siege in school centres with multiple active shooters. Paramilitary terrorists of this kind would aim for maximum violence, target hardening, and area denial – capabilities that many SWAT units would be hard-pressed to counter."
To my mind, Mumbai represents the current state-of-the-art in urban littoral terrorism, while Nairobi (which lies inland) represents the application of urban siege tactics beyond coastlines. The Mumbai attack showed that a non-state armed group can carry out an appallingly effective seaborne raid on a major coastal city, over a three-day period, in several dispersed locations – the type of operation traditionally associated with high-tier special operations forces such as the US Navy SEALs or the Royal Marines' Special Boat Service. Indeed, Mumbai was a further demonstration of a long-standing trend, sometimes called the democratisation of technology, in which non-state armed groups are fielding highly lethal capabilities that were once the preserve of nation-states.To my mind, Mumbai represents the current state-of-the-art in urban littoral terrorism, while Nairobi (which lies inland) represents the application of urban siege tactics beyond coastlines. The Mumbai attack showed that a non-state armed group can carry out an appallingly effective seaborne raid on a major coastal city, over a three-day period, in several dispersed locations – the type of operation traditionally associated with high-tier special operations forces such as the US Navy SEALs or the Royal Marines' Special Boat Service. Indeed, Mumbai was a further demonstration of a long-standing trend, sometimes called the democratisation of technology, in which non-state armed groups are fielding highly lethal capabilities that were once the preserve of nation-states.
Understanding the new, highly connected nature of urban environments like Mumbai or Nairobi is an important first step in preparing to deal with this problem. Big data can sometimes help. Analysts can now track millions upon millions of data points (traffic patterns, say, or cellphone usage, or pedestrian movement, or prices in markets, or internet hits, or bank transactions, or numbers and types of cars in parking lots) to understand, through remote observation, how a city works. But how do we do that in enormous megaslums that are constantly growing and morphing and which don't have the street names and building addresses that allow geo-data to mean something?Understanding the new, highly connected nature of urban environments like Mumbai or Nairobi is an important first step in preparing to deal with this problem. Big data can sometimes help. Analysts can now track millions upon millions of data points (traffic patterns, say, or cellphone usage, or pedestrian movement, or prices in markets, or internet hits, or bank transactions, or numbers and types of cars in parking lots) to understand, through remote observation, how a city works. But how do we do that in enormous megaslums that are constantly growing and morphing and which don't have the street names and building addresses that allow geo-data to mean something?
Many of today's coastal cities, especially those in the developing world, are growing at breakneck speed. In a conflict, people's uncertainty arises from armed groups targeting the population; in a city that's growing exponentially – constantly outgrowing itself – the same terrifying lack of predictability can arise simply from the pace of change. Thus a megacity under stress can offer opportunities for conflict entrepreneurs (gang leaders, crime bosses or militant extremists) to control populations, provided they create a predictable rule set that makes people feel safe in the face of instability. This occurs because of the predictability inherent in the rules, whether people like the group or not, and regardless of the content of those rules. You don't have to like the cops, or agree with the speed limit, for the road rules to make you feel safe. Eventually, provided the group builds consistency and order, through a spectrum of persuasive, administrative and coercive measures, it may gain the loyalty and support of the local population.Many of today's coastal cities, especially those in the developing world, are growing at breakneck speed. In a conflict, people's uncertainty arises from armed groups targeting the population; in a city that's growing exponentially – constantly outgrowing itself – the same terrifying lack of predictability can arise simply from the pace of change. Thus a megacity under stress can offer opportunities for conflict entrepreneurs (gang leaders, crime bosses or militant extremists) to control populations, provided they create a predictable rule set that makes people feel safe in the face of instability. This occurs because of the predictability inherent in the rules, whether people like the group or not, and regardless of the content of those rules. You don't have to like the cops, or agree with the speed limit, for the road rules to make you feel safe. Eventually, provided the group builds consistency and order, through a spectrum of persuasive, administrative and coercive measures, it may gain the loyalty and support of the local population.
This is exactly what has happened in large parts of Nairobi, where gangs like Mungiki have come to dominate the city's informal settlements – slums that account for more than 60% of Nairobi's population, crowded into only 6% of its land area. Kenya's national crime research centre recently identified 46 gangs operating across the country, many at least as violent as al-Shabaab.This is exactly what has happened in large parts of Nairobi, where gangs like Mungiki have come to dominate the city's informal settlements – slums that account for more than 60% of Nairobi's population, crowded into only 6% of its land area. Kenya's national crime research centre recently identified 46 gangs operating across the country, many at least as violent as al-Shabaab.
Groups like al-Shabaab and al-Qaida will be with us for the foreseeable future, and attacks like Nairobi and Mumbai will remain part of the picture. But what the bigger pattern of global change – three billion new urban-dwellers in the developing world's coastal cities by mid-century – shows is that the challenge of urban overstretch may dwarf the threat of terrorism as we've known it since 9/11. As we dust ourselves off after a decade of war, community resilience, public safety and economic opportunity in crowded urban areas may turn out to matter more than counterterrorism or counterinsurgency. Designers and urbanists speak of participative development and human-centred design as key elements of a new approach to city development. Figuring how to co-design solutions in partnership with a local community, when the community is under threat and someone is shooting at you, may be the hardest challenge of all.Groups like al-Shabaab and al-Qaida will be with us for the foreseeable future, and attacks like Nairobi and Mumbai will remain part of the picture. But what the bigger pattern of global change – three billion new urban-dwellers in the developing world's coastal cities by mid-century – shows is that the challenge of urban overstretch may dwarf the threat of terrorism as we've known it since 9/11. As we dust ourselves off after a decade of war, community resilience, public safety and economic opportunity in crowded urban areas may turn out to matter more than counterterrorism or counterinsurgency. Designers and urbanists speak of participative development and human-centred design as key elements of a new approach to city development. Figuring how to co-design solutions in partnership with a local community, when the community is under threat and someone is shooting at you, may be the hardest challenge of all.
This is an edited extract from David Kilcullen's book Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla, publiushed by Hurst and available from the Guardian bookshop for £20. Call 0330 333 6846 or visit guardianbookshop.co.ukThis is an edited extract from David Kilcullen's book Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla, publiushed by Hurst and available from the Guardian bookshop for £20. Call 0330 333 6846 or visit guardianbookshop.co.uk
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