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| Raid on High-Value U.S. Target in Somalia Hindered by ‘Imperfect Intelligence’ | Raid on High-Value U.S. Target in Somalia Hindered by ‘Imperfect Intelligence’ |
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| NAIROBI, Kenya — A commando raid in enemy territory was never going to be easy, particularly not against the well-armed, experienced fighters of the Somali militant group known as the Shabab. But American officials said the operation quickly became even more difficult when Navy SEALs discovered far more civilians than they expected, making for the kind of “imperfect intelligence” that ended up scuttling the mission. | NAIROBI, Kenya — A commando raid in enemy territory was never going to be easy, particularly not against the well-armed, experienced fighters of the Somali militant group known as the Shabab. But American officials said the operation quickly became even more difficult when Navy SEALs discovered far more civilians than they expected, making for the kind of “imperfect intelligence” that ended up scuttling the mission. |
| The target of the raid was Abdikadir Mohamed Abdikadir, who uses the nom de guerre Ikrima and is suspected of helping orchestrate a series of grenade attacks and shootings that have killed Kenyan civilians and security personnel. | The target of the raid was Abdikadir Mohamed Abdikadir, who uses the nom de guerre Ikrima and is suspected of helping orchestrate a series of grenade attacks and shootings that have killed Kenyan civilians and security personnel. |
| According to a Kenyan intelligence report, he has been connected to multiple plots against Parliament, the United Nations office in Nairobi, Kenyan military installations, an Ethiopian restaurant in the Kenyan capital and an airport, none of which materialized. | According to a Kenyan intelligence report, he has been connected to multiple plots against Parliament, the United Nations office in Nairobi, Kenyan military installations, an Ethiopian restaurant in the Kenyan capital and an airport, none of which materialized. |
| But perhaps most important, he is seen as a pivotal connection for an array of extremists across vast distances, from Tanzania to Yemen — a veteran militant with intimate knowledge of the ties between Kenyan terrorists, the Shabab and Al Qaeda. | But perhaps most important, he is seen as a pivotal connection for an array of extremists across vast distances, from Tanzania to Yemen — a veteran militant with intimate knowledge of the ties between Kenyan terrorists, the Shabab and Al Qaeda. |
| Planning for the raid to capture him began weeks ago, American officials said, but after the deadly siege on the Westgate mall in Nairobi last month the operation took on special urgency. By snatching such an international planner, American officials appeared intent on uncovering the next Westgate before it happened, particularly before a similar attack could take place on an American company or embassy in the region, or perhaps even on the mainland United States. | Planning for the raid to capture him began weeks ago, American officials said, but after the deadly siege on the Westgate mall in Nairobi last month the operation took on special urgency. By snatching such an international planner, American officials appeared intent on uncovering the next Westgate before it happened, particularly before a similar attack could take place on an American company or embassy in the region, or perhaps even on the mainland United States. |
| The Navy SEALs approached the Somali coast under cover of darkness on Saturday, killing several Shabab militants and escaping without any casualties of their own. But they retreated empty-handed, failing to seize Mr. Abdikadir or the potential trove of intelligence he might possess and handing the Shabab a symbolic victory in the process. | The Navy SEALs approached the Somali coast under cover of darkness on Saturday, killing several Shabab militants and escaping without any casualties of their own. But they retreated empty-handed, failing to seize Mr. Abdikadir or the potential trove of intelligence he might possess and handing the Shabab a symbolic victory in the process. |
| The intelligence flaws were partly to blame, American officials said. As a group of about 20 commandos entered the Shabab compound in Baraawe, Somalia, they encountered many more civilians than they anticipated, including women and children, American officials briefed on the operation said. | The intelligence flaws were partly to blame, American officials said. As a group of about 20 commandos entered the Shabab compound in Baraawe, Somalia, they encountered many more civilians than they anticipated, including women and children, American officials briefed on the operation said. |
| When the gun battle with Shabab fighters erupted, not only was the element of surprise lost, but the mission commander also feared that a prolonged firefight could kill large numbers of civilians. | When the gun battle with Shabab fighters erupted, not only was the element of surprise lost, but the mission commander also feared that a prolonged firefight could kill large numbers of civilians. |
| “The variables were increasing, not decreasing,” said one of the officials, both of whom spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss details of the operation that have not yet been made public. | “The variables were increasing, not decreasing,” said one of the officials, both of whom spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss details of the operation that have not yet been made public. |
| It was unclear why the commandos underestimated the number of civilians present. Obtaining precise information in such a hostile environment is extremely difficult, the American official said. | It was unclear why the commandos underestimated the number of civilians present. Obtaining precise information in such a hostile environment is extremely difficult, the American official said. |
| In a statement, the Pentagon spokesman George Little said, “While the operation did not result in Ikrima’s capture, U.S. military personnel conducted the operation with unparalleled precision and demonstrated that the United States can put direct pressure on Al Shabab leadership at any time of our choosing.” | In a statement, the Pentagon spokesman George Little said, “While the operation did not result in Ikrima’s capture, U.S. military personnel conducted the operation with unparalleled precision and demonstrated that the United States can put direct pressure on Al Shabab leadership at any time of our choosing.” |
| But there is also the question of whether, by engaging the group so aggressively, the United States might have made itself more of a target. The Shabab have claimed responsibility for deadly strikes in Uganda and Kenya, two nations that have sent troops to fight it in recent years, killing scores of civilians in what the group has called reprisals for military incursions into Somalia. | But there is also the question of whether, by engaging the group so aggressively, the United States might have made itself more of a target. The Shabab have claimed responsibility for deadly strikes in Uganda and Kenya, two nations that have sent troops to fight it in recent years, killing scores of civilians in what the group has called reprisals for military incursions into Somalia. |
| The United States has fought the Shabab directly as well, conducting missile and air attacks against Somali militants. But the American attacks have been sporadic, and the raid in Baraawe was the most significant operation by American troops in Somalia since commandos killed Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, a Qaeda operative, in a raid near the town four years ago. | The United States has fought the Shabab directly as well, conducting missile and air attacks against Somali militants. But the American attacks have been sporadic, and the raid in Baraawe was the most significant operation by American troops in Somalia since commandos killed Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, a Qaeda operative, in a raid near the town four years ago. |
| Already, the Shabab have used the retreat of the SEAL team as a morale boost and a propaganda tool, boasting that its fighters defeated the same Navy SEALs featured in movies and video games — the same unit that got Osama bin Laden. | Already, the Shabab have used the retreat of the SEAL team as a morale boost and a propaganda tool, boasting that its fighters defeated the same Navy SEALs featured in movies and video games — the same unit that got Osama bin Laden. |
| The Shabab were supposed to be on the run. The Somali militant group had lost ground and manpower. Instead, the raid served as an object lesson in the group’s tenacity and adaptability. Nor was it the first such attack successfully repulsed by the Shabab. A hostage-rescue mission by French special forces in January failed, leading to the deaths of two French soldiers and the hostage, a French intelligence officer. | |
| After Saturday’s attack, the Shabab have reinforced Baraawe with additional armed militants, local witnesses said. Residents said that the Shabab were furious about possible informants’ giving up the compound’s location and that they were arresting individuals suspected of being spies. | |
| “Our plan is to quickly launch offensives against the Shabab and our top priority is to liberate Baraawe in the Lower Shabelle and other areas where the Shabab are still in control,” said Abdirahman Omar Osman, a senior adviser and spokesman for the Somali president. The nation’s minister of defense, Abdikarim Haji Mohamud Fiqi, told state radio that the army was prepared to carry out offensives against Shabab strongholds. | |
| “Baraawe is the heart of the area controlled by Shabab, and it is the only remaining port they have where foreign fighters can get into Somalia by sea,” said a United Nations official with responsibility for tracking events in Somalia. | |
| The target of the raid, Ikrima, is seen as being central to the regional threat presented by the Shabab. “He has been very significant in facilitating networks, leading outside of Somalia especially in the wider East African region,” said Cedric Barnes, Horn of Africa director for the International Crisis Group. “He’s been around for a long time.” | The target of the raid, Ikrima, is seen as being central to the regional threat presented by the Shabab. “He has been very significant in facilitating networks, leading outside of Somalia especially in the wider East African region,” said Cedric Barnes, Horn of Africa director for the International Crisis Group. “He’s been around for a long time.” |
| While the United States managed to seize another high-profile target on Saturday in Libya — capturing Nazih Abdul-Hamed al-Ruqai, known as Abu Anas al-Libi, a suspect in the 1998 bombings of the United States Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, which killed 224 people — some analysts described Mr. Abdikadir as the more relevant of the two. | While the United States managed to seize another high-profile target on Saturday in Libya — capturing Nazih Abdul-Hamed al-Ruqai, known as Abu Anas al-Libi, a suspect in the 1998 bombings of the United States Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, which killed 224 people — some analysts described Mr. Abdikadir as the more relevant of the two. |
| “In many respects, he was the more valuable of the two targets this past weekend,” said J. Peter Pham, director of the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council in Washington. Unlike Mr. Ruqai, he said, Mr. Abdikadir’s knowledge was “more current,” as well as broad based, with contacts that stretched to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. | “In many respects, he was the more valuable of the two targets this past weekend,” said J. Peter Pham, director of the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council in Washington. Unlike Mr. Ruqai, he said, Mr. Abdikadir’s knowledge was “more current,” as well as broad based, with contacts that stretched to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. |
| “That’s why they didn’t wait for him to take a road trip and drop a Hellfire on him,” Mr. Pham said. “He taps into the different groups, moves people around, uses them for channels of resources or recruits.” | “That’s why they didn’t wait for him to take a road trip and drop a Hellfire on him,” Mr. Pham said. “He taps into the different groups, moves people around, uses them for channels of resources or recruits.” |
| While Mr. Abdikadir’s involvement in the Westgate attack — if any — is unknown, “he had the safe houses, the networks to set it up,” Mr. Pham said. He was “someone capable of executing,” Mr. Pham said. | While Mr. Abdikadir’s involvement in the Westgate attack — if any — is unknown, “he had the safe houses, the networks to set it up,” Mr. Pham said. He was “someone capable of executing,” Mr. Pham said. |
| The United Nations official said that Mr. Abdikadir is also thought to have helped plan the deadly storming of the United Nations compound in Mogadishu in June, which some analysts have compared to the Westgate attack in its tactics. | |
| Mr. Abdikadir is believed to have been a protégé of Qaeda operatives in East Africa, including Fazul Abdullah Mohammed and Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, both of whom have been killed. According to Mr. Pham, Mr. Abdikadir first moved to Somalia around 2006, where he commanded fighters from Kenya, both ethnic Kenyans and members of the Somali diaspora who had returned to fight. | Mr. Abdikadir is believed to have been a protégé of Qaeda operatives in East Africa, including Fazul Abdullah Mohammed and Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, both of whom have been killed. According to Mr. Pham, Mr. Abdikadir first moved to Somalia around 2006, where he commanded fighters from Kenya, both ethnic Kenyans and members of the Somali diaspora who had returned to fight. |
| In recent years, the American strategy for fighting the Shabab has been largely to contain and outsource, supporting troops from Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and elsewhere in the direct military operation against the group. That strategy was called into question after militants stormed the Westgate shopping mall, killing more than 60 people and reminding the world that East Africa was home to a significant cross-border terrorist threat. | In recent years, the American strategy for fighting the Shabab has been largely to contain and outsource, supporting troops from Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and elsewhere in the direct military operation against the group. That strategy was called into question after militants stormed the Westgate shopping mall, killing more than 60 people and reminding the world that East Africa was home to a significant cross-border terrorist threat. |
| The raid on Saturday raised the question of whether the American military focus would intensify. “If this is followed up with more military and covert actions against Shabab, it may signal a real shift in strategy,” said Ken Menkhaus, a professor of political science at Davidson College. | The raid on Saturday raised the question of whether the American military focus would intensify. “If this is followed up with more military and covert actions against Shabab, it may signal a real shift in strategy,” said Ken Menkhaus, a professor of political science at Davidson College. |
| Such an effort would need to “coincide with a greater emphasis to build Somali government capacity,” he said. “The two strategies are not necessarily mutually exclusive.” | Such an effort would need to “coincide with a greater emphasis to build Somali government capacity,” he said. “The two strategies are not necessarily mutually exclusive.” |
Nicholas Kulish reported from Nairobi, and Eric Schmitt from Washington. Mohammed Ibrahim contributed reporting from Mogadishu, Somalia, and Mark Mazzetti from Washington. |