How Libya can deal with the problem of militias

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/11/libya-militias-national-army

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Libya is back in the headlines after a powerful Islamist-dominated militia group abducted the country's prime minister, Ali Zeidan, amid anger over a US special forces raid on Saturday during which a Libyan al-Qaida suspect, Abu Anas al-Liby, was seized. The impunity with which militia groups are able to operate in the country puts it on par with the lawlessness that has been seen in Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia, where even some of the most audacious and organised of militants are unable to reach as sensitive and important a target as a sitting prime minister.

Libya is different for the reason that it has no national army. It has a series of disparate autonomous militia groups who are heavily entrenched in Libya's politics, economy and society. In other words, they are now a part of the daily routine and have become inseparable from the state and broader Libyan society. The independence this gives them has worsened Libya's security environment, given that various militia groups are at odds with one another, often resulting in clashes between them, as well as with the state itself.

Post-conflict states like Libya are generally required to, first and foremost, develop a strong state and centralise authority in the country, if indeed a centralist political and constitutional process is preferred. In Libya, the failure to disarm militias has only bought them more time to consolidate their hold on the country. Elections last year, the country's first in decades and its first since the former regime was ousted, compounded the militia problem by allowing prominent, well-organised and armed groups to consolidate their positions, legitimise their influence as well as cement their newfound status and power.

In other words, Libya cannot move forward, stabilise and become the democratic state most Libyans and the international community hoped it would be when Muammar Gaddafi was ousted in November 2011.

Three realistic scenarios now lie ahead. First, Libya can aim to continue its process of reconciliation and engagement, hoping that militia groups can somehow be persuaded to lay down their arms, become active and genuine players in a political process as well as collectively form a national army. This, however, is unlikely. Efforts have been made toward integrating militias into the political process and reaching some form of plausible and long-term settlement, albeit to no avail.

The second option is to accept the status quo and accept that Libya's security environment will continue to be loosely structured and decentralised. This political and security framework is a product of the post-Arab-spring Libyan uprising, which allowed independent revolutionary brigades, tied to semi-independent major cities such as Misrata, to operate as state within states and mount attacks against the former regime on two separate fronts from the east and west of the country.

This option will require the militias to be integrated into a representative and proper power-sharing mechanism that will essentially see Libya adopt federalism. In other words, sustain the militias' current military control but as part of a regulated framework underpinned by dispute-resolution mechanisms and one that makes them more organised, efficient and accountable forces able to not just protect their local regions but also Libya's borders. The challenge, however, will be convincing Libyans that this is not tantamount to partition, which most are fiercely against.

The final option runs the risk of producing more intense violence and bloodshed, civil war in other words that could take Libya to the brink. Producing a viable and heavily armed national army would encourage militia groups to embolden their own forces and weaponry, with the aim of preparing themselves for a war with the state in what would be their battle for survival. Prominent militia groups may be encouraged to relinquish their weapons and subject themselves to state authority. Then again, they may call the state's bluff.

All of these are long-term solutions for the country. Some carry a higher risk of producing more violence and bloodshed than others. All three, in any case, will require Libyans to take bold, painful and decisive steps. In the short-term, the country is likely to witness reprisal attacks as well as continued clashes. The kidnapping of the prime minister may prompt militia groups to assert their positions and capitalise on the state's apparent weakness and severe loss of credibility.

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