Afghan job crisis: why the fight against terrorism is the wrong motivator

http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/oct/24/afghanistan-terrorism-job-crisis

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Ten years after the fall of the Taliban and approximately $65bn (£40bn) in military and civilian aid, Afghanistan still lacks the most fundamental source of sustainable poverty reduction: decent employment. To date, there is no national labour force survey, employment strategy or youth employment strategy. Afghanistan made great progress in education – girls and boys have been enrolled in unprecedented numbers – only to find themselves unemployed upon graduation.

Every year, more than 400,000 young people enter the Afghan labour market – a number which is far beyond the labour market's capacity to absorb young workers. Given Afghanistan's high fertility rate of 5.1 children per woman and an on-going 'youth bulge', the pressure on the labour market can only be expected to increase.

Afghanistan's latest National risk and vulnerability assessment 2007/2008 shows youth unemployment rates of 10% for young men and 15% for young women. These relatively moderate figures mask high levels of underemployment, working poverty and generally low quality of work. The study found that 90% of jobs in Afghanistan can be classified as vulnerable employment. This begs the question of whether the distinction between employed and unemployed is helpful in the Afghanistan context.

So why have development agencies failed to address youth unemployment in Afghanistan? First, employment programmes have applied the logic of counter insurgency. An assumed link between male youth unemployment and insecurity (for which there is no conclusive empirical evidence) has led to donors – such as USAid – to initiate short-term youth employment programmes (often linked to infrastructure projects) disproportionately in geographic locations of military presence as an integral part of their counter-insurgency operations. For instance, a 2012 ILO report on employment in Afghanistan states that the USAid map of project is 'an exact replication of the security incidents map.'

Applying the logic, strategy and even tactics of counter-insurgency to create sustainable employment does not work because they are designed to be short-term, geographically limiting and mostly focused on males. The logic prevails because the development spending on Afghanistan is an integral part of the 2001 invasion and not an independent long-term development vision.

A second reason is the fact that donors have failed to build local capacity. There are already a number 'ghost employment service centres' that were established and funded by ILO in 2007 on behalf of the ministry of labour, social affairs, martyrs and disabled, and 'ghost vocational training centres', funded by Japan International Co-operation Agency, which stopped operating the moment the donors discontinued funding and handed it back to the government in 2009.

2014 transition: opportunities and strategies

The post-2014 withdrawal of international troops will undoubedly create a high level of uncertainty among the national and international community, and a potential reduction in aid. However, elections in 2014 may be an opportunity for a change in development policy which is less closely linked to the short-term and foreign policy interests of major donors, and which allows for real government ownership around the youth employment agenda.

Some progress in this area has already been made. Between December 2012 and September 2013, the office of the deputy minister of youth affairs developed a national youth policy, and youth unemployment is one of its key areas. The employment section provides a number of recommendations for further action which address the lack of labour and employment data, skills mismatch, employment services, entrepreneurship promotion, migration and workers' rights. The policy, which has contributions from all UN agencies and other youth employment organisations working in Afghanistan, is currently awaiting presidential approval. The cabinet is likely to approve it by the end of 2013.

It may feel 10 years too late but the timing now is opportune as it coincides with presidential elections next year. The youth has so far been a neglected part of the electorate. The fact that almost 70% of the population is now below the age of 25 puts pressure on the government and presidential candidates to take youth unemployment seriously.

For 2014 it is planned to build on this momentum and network of ministries, UN agencies, donors, NGOs and youth to develop a clear direction for the national youth strategy, including targets and costings. This will enable the government and donors to spend their money more effectively and in co-ordination with each other.

Apart from national youth strategy, there is provincial youth action plan pilot based on the local labour market. This is to ensure that the national policy and strategy will eventually lead to co-ordinated action and resource allocation at the district level. Data from socio-demographic and economic surveys, currently being carried out in three provinces, will be used for the pilot.

Co-ordinating the youth employment process in Afghanistan is going to be lengthy and complex due to political divisions and security issues. But getting all stakeholders ready to accept this reality and approach will be the beginning of a much needed national dialogue on youth employment.

Steffi Jochim is an international consultant for youth and development in Kabul.

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