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Officials Say Toughest Work on Iran’s Nuclear Program Lies Ahead Officials Say Toughest Work on Iran’s Nuclear Program Lies Ahead
(about 5 hours later)
LONDON — The title of the interim agreement the United States and its negotiating partners reached Sunday with Iran to freeze much of its nuclear program — the “Joint Plan of Action” — is deceptively simple. A close reading of the four-page footnote-laden text makes clear that the most formidable diplomatic and technical challenges lie ahead. LONDON — The Obama administration’s successful push for an accord that would temporarily freeze much of Iran’s nuclear program has cast a spotlight on the more formidable challenge it now confronts in trying to roll the program back.
“Now the difficult part starts,” said Olli Heinonen, the former deputy director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency. For all of the drama of late-night make-or-break talks in Geneva, the deal that Secretary of State John Kerry and his negotiating partners announced early on Sunday was largely a holding action, meant to keep the Iranian nuclear program in check for six months while negotiators pursue a far tougher and more lasting agreement. By itself, the interim pact does not foreclose either side’s main options or require many irreversible actions — which was why the two sides were able to come to terms on it.
From the start, Obama administration officials described the initial agreement the world powers have now secured as a holding action that would keep the Iranian nuclear program in check for six months so that international negotiators would have time to pursue a more comprehensive agreement. That was also a reason for the sharp negative reactions the deal elicited on Sunday from two American allies, Israel and Saudi Arabia, who are deeply suspicious of Iranian intentions.
But the two sides were able to come to terms on that initial agreement precisely because it did not foreclose their options and required steps that for the most part are reversible. Named the “Joint Plan of Action,” the four-page agreement specifies in terse language the steps Iran would initially take to constrain its nuclear effort, and the financial relief it would get from the United States and its partners. A few technical details are left to footnotes. The agreement’s preamble says that a more comprehensive solution is the eventual goal, and the broad elements of that solution are given in bullet points on the final page.
The interim accord, for example, allows Iran to preserve most of its nuclear infrastructure, including the capabilities it would need to develop a nuclear device. The United States, for its part, would retain the core oil and banking sanctions it has imposed. The interim agreement allows Iran to preserve most of its nuclear infrastructure, and along with it the ability to develop a nuclear device, while the United States keeps in place the core oil and banking sanctions it has imposed.
Negotiating a comprehensive agreement would require much tougher choices by each side. And while the initial agreement sought to sketch out the parameters of a follow-on accord it did so in only the vaguest terms. The questions that the United States and Iran need to grapple with in the next phase of their nuclear dialogue, if they want to overcome their long years of enmity, are more fundamental.
Would the follow-on agreement last for five years, ten years or even more? The comprehensive agreement that is to be negotiated will not be open-ended, and there appears to be no meeting of the minds on how many years it would be in effect. “Now the difficult part starts,” said Olli Heinonen, the former deputy director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Even the planned duration of the comprehensive follow-up agreement is still up in the air. It will not be open-ended, but there is as yet no meeting of the minds on how many years it would be in effect. The interim agreement says only that it would be “for a period to be agreed upon.”
“The terms of the comprehensive agreement have yet to be defined, but it is suggested that that agreement will itself have an expiration date,” said Ray Takeyh, a former State Department and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “It would be good if the comprehensive agreement was more final.” “The terms of the comprehensive agreement have yet to be defined, but it is suggested that that agreement will itself have an expiration date,” said Ray Takeyh, a former State Department official and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “It would be good if the comprehensive agreement was more final.”
Enrichment remains another thorny issue. The Obama administration has made clear that it is not prepared to concede up front that Iran has a “right” to enrich uranium. Iran’s program to enrich uranium also needs to be dealt with in detail. The Obama administration has made clear that it is not prepared to concede at the start that Iran has a “right” to enrich uranium. But the interim deal, reflecting language proposed by the American delegation, says the follow-up agreement would provide for a “mutually defined enrichment program with practical limits and transparency.”
But the interim agreement makes clear makes clear that a follow-on agreement would provide for a “mutually defined enrichment program with practical limits and transparency.” So the question appears to be not whether Iran will be allowed to continue enriching uranium, but rather what constraints the United States and its negotiating partners will insist on in return, and how large an enrichment program they are willing to tolerate. The interim accord makes clear that it must be consistent with “practical needs.” Iran and the United States are likely to have very different ideas of what those needs are.
So the question is not whether the Obama administration is prepared to allow Iran to continue enriching uranium but rather what constraints the United States and its negotiating partners will insist on in return and how large an Iranian enrichment program they are willing to tolerate.
The interim accord makes clear that such an enrichment must be consistent with “practical needs” and Iran and the United States are likely to have very different ideas of what those requirements would be.
“This, of course, will be one of the central issues in the negotiations for a comprehensive agreement,” said Gary Samore, who served as senior aide on nonproliferation issues on the National Security Council during the Obama administration and is now president of United Against Nuclear Iran, an organization that urges that strong sanctions be imposed on Iran until it further restricts its nuclear efforts.“This, of course, will be one of the central issues in the negotiations for a comprehensive agreement,” said Gary Samore, who served as senior aide on nonproliferation issues on the National Security Council during the Obama administration and is now president of United Against Nuclear Iran, an organization that urges that strong sanctions be imposed on Iran until it further restricts its nuclear efforts.
The negotiators will confront a host of other difficult questions in pursuing a comprehensive agreement. “We will want very small and limited,” Mr. Samore said, referring to Iran’s enrichment efforts. “They want industrial scale.”
“Will the Fordow enrichment be shutdown? Will the Arak reactor be shut down or converted into a light water reactor?” said David Albright, the president of the Institute for Science and International Security. The negotiators will confront other difficult questions regarding elements of a comprehensive agreement that would be difficult to reverse. Will the underground Fordo enrichment plant have to be shut down? Will the heavy-water reactor that Iran is building near the town of Arak, which could produce plutonium for weapons, have to be dismantled or converted into a light-water reactor that is not useful for weapons development?
The interim deal, Mr. Albright added, “did not do enough to narrow down the limitations that will be in a final deal. The interim deal “did not do enough to narrow down the limitations that will be in a final deal,” said David Albright, the president of the Institute for Science and International Security.
With such a formidable array of issues, negotiators left open the possibility that initial agreement, which is to last for six months, may need to be extended. Or as the text of the interim agreement states it is “renewable by mutual consent.” Hoping to reassure Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, who called the easing of sanctions on Iran “a historic mistake,” President Obama told him that the United States would press for a comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear question in the months ahead.
If a more comprehensive agreement is not reached and an interim accord is extended Iran will still be able to make a dash for a bomb. The diplomats who worked out the interim agreement left open the possibility that it might be extended beyond six months. The text of the deal says it is “renewable by mutual consent.”
But the United States would have more somewhat more warning time of such a “breakout” due to increased verification, constraints on Iran’s installation of new centrifuges, the requirement that Iran convert its existing stock of uranium that has been enriched to 20 percent to a less usable form and the cap on Iran stockpile of 5 percent enriched uranium, among other measures. Some analysts said that hammering out a comprehensive solution seems so onerous that there may never be an enduring accord but only a succession of partial agreements. Even if a more comprehensive agreement is never reached, experts say, a limited agreement can still be useful.
Just how much longer it would take Iran to produce sufficient weapons-grade uranium for a bomb in the face of such constraints is a matter of debate among experts. Mr. Albright estimates that the breakout time would increase by several weeks or perhaps close to a month . The interim deal includes improved verification, constraints on Iran’s installation of new centrifuges, and the requirement that Iran dilute its existing stock of uranium enriched to 20 percent, or else convert it to oxide, a less readily used form. Moreover, the cap imposed on Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 5 percent would increase the time that Iran would need to make a dash for a bomb, adding several weeks or perhaps a month. “This may seem a small time,” Mr. Albright said. But because the interim deal also includes provisions that would make it easier to spot cheating swiftly, the added time “would be significant,” he said.
“This may seem a small time,” Mr. Albright said. But with international monitors daily checking films at the Natanz and Fordow enrichment facilities the increase “would be significant.” The United States successfully opposed Iran’s demand that it be allowed to continue installing components at the heavy-water plant at Arak. The interim pact also stipulates that Iran cannot test or produce fuel for that reactor or put it into operation. As it sought to strengthen the accord, the United States added a sweetener. As the talks progressed, the amount of oil revenue frozen in foreign banks that Iran would be allowed to retrieve was raised to $4.2 billion from $3.6 billon.
For their part, Obama administration officials acknowledge that any major breakthrough in ratcheting back Iran’s nuclear program will require negotiating the follow-on accord. Mr. Kerry said on Sunday that he was as committed to “the really hard part,” obtaining a comprehensive follow-up agreement, “which would require enormous steps in terms of verification, transparency and accountability.” Speaking in London before a meeting with William Hague, the British foreign secretary, he said, “We will start today, literally, to continue the efforts out of Geneva and to press forward.”
“Now the really hard part begins,” Mr. Kerry said on Sunday before a meeting here William Hague the British foreign secretary. “That is the effort to get the comprehensive agreement which would require enormous steps in terms of verification, transparency and accountability.”
We know this,” he added, “we will start today, literally, to continue the efforts out of Geneva and to press forward.”