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| Public Ouster in North Korea Unsettles China | Public Ouster in North Korea Unsettles China |
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| BEIJING — North Koreans had long known Jang Song-thaek as the No. 2 figure in their country, the revered uncle and mentor of Kim Jong-un, the paramount leader. Then on Monday state-run television showed two green-uniformed guards clutching a glum-looking Mr. Jang by the armpits and pulling him from a meeting of the ruling party after he was denounced for faction-building, womanizing, gambling and other acts as dozens of former comrades watched. | BEIJING — North Koreans had long known Jang Song-thaek as the No. 2 figure in their country, the revered uncle and mentor of Kim Jong-un, the paramount leader. Then on Monday state-run television showed two green-uniformed guards clutching a glum-looking Mr. Jang by the armpits and pulling him from a meeting of the ruling party after he was denounced for faction-building, womanizing, gambling and other acts as dozens of former comrades watched. |
| The spectacle of Mr. Jang’s humiliating dismissal and arrest was a highly unusual glimpse of a power struggle unfolding inside the nuclear-armed country. But the major impact may be outside, and nowhere is the downfall more unnerving than in China. | The spectacle of Mr. Jang’s humiliating dismissal and arrest was a highly unusual glimpse of a power struggle unfolding inside the nuclear-armed country. But the major impact may be outside, and nowhere is the downfall more unnerving than in China. |
| North Korea’s longtime protector and economic lifeline, China has considered strategically close relations with North Korea a pillar of foreign policy and a bulwark against the United States military presence in South Korea. Despite Chinese irritation with North Korea’s nuclear tests and other bellicose behavior, China had built a good relationship with Mr. Jang as the trusted adult who would monitor Mr. Kim, who is less than half his age. | North Korea’s longtime protector and economic lifeline, China has considered strategically close relations with North Korea a pillar of foreign policy and a bulwark against the United States military presence in South Korea. Despite Chinese irritation with North Korea’s nuclear tests and other bellicose behavior, China had built a good relationship with Mr. Jang as the trusted adult who would monitor Mr. Kim, who is less than half his age. |
| Any shift by China concerning North Korea has the potential to significantly alter the political equilibrium in Asia, where the divided Korean Peninsula has been a fact of life for more than 60 years. While there is no indication that the Chinese intend to change their view, it seemed clear that even Beijing’s top leaders were surprised by Mr. Jang’s abrupt downfall on Sunday, and even more on Monday by the North Korean state television broadcast. | Any shift by China concerning North Korea has the potential to significantly alter the political equilibrium in Asia, where the divided Korean Peninsula has been a fact of life for more than 60 years. While there is no indication that the Chinese intend to change their view, it seemed clear that even Beijing’s top leaders were surprised by Mr. Jang’s abrupt downfall on Sunday, and even more on Monday by the North Korean state television broadcast. |
| “Jang was a very iconic figure in North Korea, particularly with economic reform and innovation,” said Zhu Feng, professor of international relations at Peking University, and a specialist in North Korea. “He is the man China counted on to move the economy in North Korea. This is a very ominous signal.” | “Jang was a very iconic figure in North Korea, particularly with economic reform and innovation,” said Zhu Feng, professor of international relations at Peking University, and a specialist in North Korea. “He is the man China counted on to move the economy in North Korea. This is a very ominous signal.” |
| Mr. Jang’s dismissal was a shock not only because he had long been considered a core member of the country’s ruling elite and a regent and confidant of Mr. Kim, who assumed power only two years ago upon the death of his father, Kim Jong-il. The way that Mr. Jang was dismissed also was considered extraordinary, as the North Korea government has almost always maintained secrecy over its inner workings, power struggles and skulduggery during the more than six decades of rule by the Kim family. | |
| “Kim Jong-un was declaring at home and abroad that he is now the truly one and only leader in the North, that he will not tolerate a No. 2,” said Yang Moo-jin, an analyst at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul, South Korea. | “Kim Jong-un was declaring at home and abroad that he is now the truly one and only leader in the North, that he will not tolerate a No. 2,” said Yang Moo-jin, an analyst at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul, South Korea. |
| Mr. Jang had visited China on a number of occasions and had been considered the most important advocate of the Chinese style of economic overhaul that the government in Beijing has been urging North Korea to embrace. | Mr. Jang had visited China on a number of occasions and had been considered the most important advocate of the Chinese style of economic overhaul that the government in Beijing has been urging North Korea to embrace. |
| At 67, Mr. Jang is of the same generation as China’s leaders. Unlike the 30-year-old Mr. Kim — who has not been to China and who remains a mystery despite the lineage to his grandfather Kim Il-sung, North Korea’s revolutionary founder — Mr. Jang was seen by Beijing as a steady hand and a trusted conduit into North Korea’s top leadership. He was one of China’s few high-level North Korean interlocutors. | |
| That the video of Mr. Jang’s arrest on Sunday at a Politburo meeting by military officers was released to the North Korean public, replete with tearful underlings shown denouncing him, was particularly unsettling for China. | That the video of Mr. Jang’s arrest on Sunday at a Politburo meeting by military officers was released to the North Korean public, replete with tearful underlings shown denouncing him, was particularly unsettling for China. |
| Mr. Jang went to Beijing in August 2012 for a six-day visit and met with President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. Special economic zones, where Chinese and other foreign investors would get preferential treatment in North Korea, were high on the agenda. | Mr. Jang went to Beijing in August 2012 for a six-day visit and met with President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. Special economic zones, where Chinese and other foreign investors would get preferential treatment in North Korea, were high on the agenda. |
| Just last month North Korea’s official media announced that 14 new special economic zones would be opened, and although they were relatively small, they were seen as a sign of fruition of some of the reforms China has advocated. | Just last month North Korea’s official media announced that 14 new special economic zones would be opened, and although they were relatively small, they were seen as a sign of fruition of some of the reforms China has advocated. |
| “Those zones were a consequence of Jang’s efforts,” Dr. Zhu said. “It’s possible Jang went too far on decentralizing and that threatened Kim Jong-un’s position.” | “Those zones were a consequence of Jang’s efforts,” Dr. Zhu said. “It’s possible Jang went too far on decentralizing and that threatened Kim Jong-un’s position.” |
| China’s official media gave prominent attention to the accusations against Mr. Jang, including some of the florid language used in North Korea’s own state-run news media that recited the litany of his newly disclosed transgressions at party expense: womanizing, gambling, drug abuse, “wining and dining at back parlors of deluxe restaurants” and, perhaps most important, a politically motivated ambition to challenge Mr. Kim as the “unitary center.” | |
| But also among the crimes that Mr. Jang was said to have committed was selling resources cheaply, an accusation that appears to have been aimed directly at China, the biggest buyer of North Korea’s iron ore and minerals. | But also among the crimes that Mr. Jang was said to have committed was selling resources cheaply, an accusation that appears to have been aimed directly at China, the biggest buyer of North Korea’s iron ore and minerals. |
| Soon after assuming power, Mr. Kim complained that North Korea’s resources, one of its few sources of outside income, were being sold too cheaply. He demanded higher prices for minerals, rare earths and coal, exported by the growing number of joint ventures between China and North Korea. | Soon after assuming power, Mr. Kim complained that North Korea’s resources, one of its few sources of outside income, were being sold too cheaply. He demanded higher prices for minerals, rare earths and coal, exported by the growing number of joint ventures between China and North Korea. |
| Mr. Kim’s complaints were widely reported in China and angered bargain-conscious Chinese mine operators, several of whom abandoned their North Korean operations. | Mr. Kim’s complaints were widely reported in China and angered bargain-conscious Chinese mine operators, several of whom abandoned their North Korean operations. |
| Now, the climate for Chinese investment in North Korea, which was not particularly good, would be likely to worsen, said Andrei Lankov, author of “The Real North Korea” and professor of history at Kookmin University in Seoul. | Now, the climate for Chinese investment in North Korea, which was not particularly good, would be likely to worsen, said Andrei Lankov, author of “The Real North Korea” and professor of history at Kookmin University in Seoul. |
| China’s Foreign Ministry offered restrained comments on Monday regarding Mr. Jang’s dismissal, calling it an internal affair of North Korea. | China’s Foreign Ministry offered restrained comments on Monday regarding Mr. Jang’s dismissal, calling it an internal affair of North Korea. |
| “We will stay committed to promoting the traditional friendly, cooperative relationship” between China and North Korea, said the Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hong Lei. | “We will stay committed to promoting the traditional friendly, cooperative relationship” between China and North Korea, said the Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hong Lei. |
| Mr. Jang’s demotion raised the possibility of further instability in North Korea at a time when China is already confronting increased tensions with two of its other North Asian neighbors, Japan and South Korea. | Mr. Jang’s demotion raised the possibility of further instability in North Korea at a time when China is already confronting increased tensions with two of its other North Asian neighbors, Japan and South Korea. |
| An overriding fear of China’s is the collapse of the government in North Korea, an ally dating to the Korean War, which could lead to the reunification of the Korean Peninsula under a government in South Korea allied with the United States. | An overriding fear of China’s is the collapse of the government in North Korea, an ally dating to the Korean War, which could lead to the reunification of the Korean Peninsula under a government in South Korea allied with the United States. |
| “China worries about instability which might be provoked by such acts” as Mr. Jang’s dismissal, Mr. Lankov said. | “China worries about instability which might be provoked by such acts” as Mr. Jang’s dismissal, Mr. Lankov said. |
| Cheong Seong-chang, a senior analyst at Sejong Institute in South Korea, said the dismissal could signal more internal strife. “Given the extremely harsh stance against Jang and his followers,” he said, “a round of bloody purges will be inevitable as the regime roots out poisonous weeds from its leadership ranks.” | Cheong Seong-chang, a senior analyst at Sejong Institute in South Korea, said the dismissal could signal more internal strife. “Given the extremely harsh stance against Jang and his followers,” he said, “a round of bloody purges will be inevitable as the regime roots out poisonous weeds from its leadership ranks.” |
| Another concern for China was the question of whether Mr. Kim would conduct a new nuclear test, said Roger Cavazos, an American expert on North Korea, who is currently visiting Shanghai. | Another concern for China was the question of whether Mr. Kim would conduct a new nuclear test, said Roger Cavazos, an American expert on North Korea, who is currently visiting Shanghai. |
| In February, in an act of open defiance to the Chinese, Mr. Kim authorized the country’s third nuclear test. The Chinese had urged the new North Korean leader not to risk open confrontation with the United States by detonating the weapon. Shortly afterward, in a rare public criticism, China’s new president, Xi Jinping, accused North Korea of creating regional instability for “selfish gains.” | |
| “Every Chinese I have spoken with were worried that Kim Jong-un would test soon,” said Mr. Cavazos, a former United States Army intelligence officer who is now at the Nautilus Institute, a group that studies international security. | |
| Mr. Cavazos said Chinese academics were concerned that Mr. Kim was “more and more out of control.” He added, “Every nuclear test by North Korea puts China in a bad position.” | Mr. Cavazos said Chinese academics were concerned that Mr. Kim was “more and more out of control.” He added, “Every nuclear test by North Korea puts China in a bad position.” |
| That is in large part because as North Korea gets closer to demonstrating that it can miniaturize a nuclear weapon to fit atop a missile, the more the United States will increase its missile defenses in Northeast Asia. | That is in large part because as North Korea gets closer to demonstrating that it can miniaturize a nuclear weapon to fit atop a missile, the more the United States will increase its missile defenses in Northeast Asia. |
| As Mr. Kim rearranged the top echelons of the government, it was possible that the military would emerge the winner, said Cai Jian, deputy director of the Center for Korean Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai. It was most likely that “the military forces will become stronger” and that the “hard-liners will become more hard-line.” | |
| Mr. Cavazos agreed. “The military was demonstrating its loyalty to Kim Jong-un, and Kim Jong-un was demonstrating his loyalty to the military.” | Mr. Cavazos agreed. “The military was demonstrating its loyalty to Kim Jong-un, and Kim Jong-un was demonstrating his loyalty to the military.” |
Jane Perlez reported from Beijing, and Choe Sang-hun from Seoul, South Korea. Bree Feng contributed research from Beijing. | Jane Perlez reported from Beijing, and Choe Sang-hun from Seoul, South Korea. Bree Feng contributed research from Beijing. |