North Korea: wicked uncle

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/dec/10/north-korea-wicked-uncle

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It is no good pretending that we know much about what is going on in North Korea, because we don't. But, since the decisions of this dysfunctional state can have dangerous consequences, events sometimes force us to guess. Such is the case with the dismissal of Jang Song-thaek, Kim Jong-un's uncle, mentor, and principal link with the Chinese. In just a few days Jang has gone from being a pillar of the regime to an unperson, accused, disgraced, and edited out of the official record.

The reasons for his fall cannot be found in the state media account of his crimes of mismanagement, corruption, and "leading a dissolute and depraved life". It might be hazarded that quite a few senior members of the Korean Workers' party would be in trouble if sins of this kind were consistently pursued. No, Jang has overstepped the mark in some other way, and to such an extent that his punishment has been blazoned to the world in a manner quite unprecedented in North Korea, where shifts in the balance of power within the ruling elite have always gone on behind a curtain.

There are several contrasting, although not necessarily exclusive, explanations for his downfall. One is that he had come to be seen by Kim Jong-un as an overmighty power behind the throne. He was a man whose support had been useful in what may well have been a wobbly takeover by the young Kim. But now, the argument goes, his pretensions had become intolerable, and he and the whole network of clients he had built up within the party and bureaucracy had to go. The South Korean president Park Geun-hye has spoken of a large scale purge and reign of terror.

The other explanation is that Jang had become too identified with the Chinese agenda for North Korea. That agenda includes economic reform on Chinese lines, favourable terms for China in its trade with North Korea, and restraint on nuclear weapons development. Kim has been reluctant to go the whole way on reforms, outspoken on what he saw as the selling of North Korea's resources at too low a price, and he has disregarded China's advice on nuclear weapons tests.

China's interests represent the ultimate constraint on North Korea. True, Beijing fears the collapse of the regime, abhors reunification of the country on western terms, and sees denuclearisation as something to be tackled in the far future, on all of which issues it is at one with Pyongyang. But it frets at its inability to control North Korean policy, and may believe that the ultimate solution is for North Korea to become a permanent and more obedient dependency of China. There is thus no real warmth between the two leaderships. Perhaps Jang pointed out the need to consider China's interests once too often.

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