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| Cabinet papers reveal tough path of reform during Bob Hawke's term | Cabinet papers reveal tough path of reform during Bob Hawke's term |
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| Bob Hawke’s government agreed to toughen background checks on Australian intelligence agency staff to “allay any concern by our intelligence partners that our standards fall short of their own”, according to newly released cabinet documents from 1986 and 1987. | Bob Hawke’s government agreed to toughen background checks on Australian intelligence agency staff to “allay any concern by our intelligence partners that our standards fall short of their own”, according to newly released cabinet documents from 1986 and 1987. |
| The insight into the Australian government’s fears of risks posed by “treachery of employees” arises from the release of thousands of pages of cabinet material on New Year’s Day. | The insight into the Australian government’s fears of risks posed by “treachery of employees” arises from the release of thousands of pages of cabinet material on New Year’s Day. |
| The previously confidential material from 1986 and 1987 also documents the Labor government’s struggles to quantify the cost and benefit of the shelved Australia Card, and explains the government’s backflips over merging the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) and Special Broadcasting Service. Despite the search for budget savings, the government rejected allowing commercial sponsorship of the national broadcaster after the ABC board told the government it did not want to be associated with tobacco and liquor products. | The previously confidential material from 1986 and 1987 also documents the Labor government’s struggles to quantify the cost and benefit of the shelved Australia Card, and explains the government’s backflips over merging the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) and Special Broadcasting Service. Despite the search for budget savings, the government rejected allowing commercial sponsorship of the national broadcaster after the ABC board told the government it did not want to be associated with tobacco and liquor products. |
| The documents span the period in which the Hawke government was grappling with the tough business of economic reform as the then treasurer Paul Keating warned Australia was in danger of becoming a “banana republic”. While the Hawke-Keating governments are now seen as strongly reformist, the 1986-1987 cabinet papers show how the process was slow and difficult. The government constantly had to deal with unions, businesses and interest groups who sought to undermine reform in key areas such as industry assistance and industrial relations. | The documents span the period in which the Hawke government was grappling with the tough business of economic reform as the then treasurer Paul Keating warned Australia was in danger of becoming a “banana republic”. While the Hawke-Keating governments are now seen as strongly reformist, the 1986-1987 cabinet papers show how the process was slow and difficult. The government constantly had to deal with unions, businesses and interest groups who sought to undermine reform in key areas such as industry assistance and industrial relations. |
| In an interview with ABC Radio marking the release of the cabinet documents, Hawke reflected on Keating’s banana republic comment. "An important part of sensible economic management is that the population understand the facts and the economic challenges confronting them and this was a pretty dramatic way of letting the Australian people know that we still had a lot of problems,” Hawke said. | |
| In 2013, the Australian government contended with revelations over past attempts to spy on the Indonesian president, his wife and inner circle in 2009, arising from the leaking of a massive trove of documents by the former US National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden. The newly released 1986-1987 cabinet documents show the Hawke government dealing with versions of several issues raised for current governments in 2013 through Snowden's disclosures, such as the oversight of security and intelligence agencies. In 1986, the Hawke cabinet was also worried about the potential for an employee of intelligence agencies to release sensitive information about their activities. | In 2013, the Australian government contended with revelations over past attempts to spy on the Indonesian president, his wife and inner circle in 2009, arising from the leaking of a massive trove of documents by the former US National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden. The newly released 1986-1987 cabinet documents show the Hawke government dealing with versions of several issues raised for current governments in 2013 through Snowden's disclosures, such as the oversight of security and intelligence agencies. In 1986, the Hawke cabinet was also worried about the potential for an employee of intelligence agencies to release sensitive information about their activities. |
| A newly released cabinet memorandum from August 1986 said Britain and the US had “recently been confronted with a number of cases involving seriously damaging loss of sensitive security information because of the treachery of employees”. | A newly released cabinet memorandum from August 1986 said Britain and the US had “recently been confronted with a number of cases involving seriously damaging loss of sensitive security information because of the treachery of employees”. |
| “This has led them to review and tighten their own procedures for personnel security assessment, and to enquire about the procedures applying for Australian personnel who have access to their material. It seems prudent that Australia should act to correct any comparable deficiencies in its own procedures, out of concern for its own secrets and so that we can allay any concern by our intelligence partners that our standards fall short of their own,” the document said. | “This has led them to review and tighten their own procedures for personnel security assessment, and to enquire about the procedures applying for Australian personnel who have access to their material. It seems prudent that Australia should act to correct any comparable deficiencies in its own procedures, out of concern for its own secrets and so that we can allay any concern by our intelligence partners that our standards fall short of their own,” the document said. |
| “The majority of espionage cases affecting security and intelligence agencies in recent years has shown two recurrent features: venality coupled with a character defect which has facilitated recruitment by a hostile intelligence service, and a personal resentment at unjust treatment (whether merely perceived or actual) in the workplace.” | “The majority of espionage cases affecting security and intelligence agencies in recent years has shown two recurrent features: venality coupled with a character defect which has facilitated recruitment by a hostile intelligence service, and a personal resentment at unjust treatment (whether merely perceived or actual) in the workplace.” |
| The document said the the passage of material between the various agencies of the Australian intelligence community – comprising the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Australian Secret Intelligence Service, Office of National Assessments, Joint Intelligence Organisation and the Defence Signals Directorate – meant they should share a common standard of background and security checking. The cost of bringing the final three agencies up to the new standard was estimated at $312,000 in salaries and $20,400 in travel. | The document said the the passage of material between the various agencies of the Australian intelligence community – comprising the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Australian Secret Intelligence Service, Office of National Assessments, Joint Intelligence Organisation and the Defence Signals Directorate – meant they should share a common standard of background and security checking. The cost of bringing the final three agencies up to the new standard was estimated at $312,000 in salaries and $20,400 in travel. |
| The new standard would place a “strong emphasis on personal interviews of nominated and developed referees” and an examination of financial pressures to ensure employees were not “vulnerable to offers of assistance and thereafter to recruitment by agents of hostile intelligence services”. It suggested “a case may be made in the future to embrace, or at least consider, the possible use in specific circumstances of investigative tools such as the polygraph” lie detector test. But parts of the document, including a section on how trustworthiness would be assessed, were censored from public release on security grounds. | The new standard would place a “strong emphasis on personal interviews of nominated and developed referees” and an examination of financial pressures to ensure employees were not “vulnerable to offers of assistance and thereafter to recruitment by agents of hostile intelligence services”. It suggested “a case may be made in the future to embrace, or at least consider, the possible use in specific circumstances of investigative tools such as the polygraph” lie detector test. But parts of the document, including a section on how trustworthiness would be assessed, were censored from public release on security grounds. |
| Separately, the Hawke cabinet was told in 1987 of the need to “recognise the changing face of international terrorism” – it was shifting away from siege-hostage situations towards incidents that lasted only a short time, such as bombings, assassinations and destruction of property. Ministers discussed the issue following the bombing of the Turkish consulate in Melbourne in the early hours of 23 November 1986. | |
| A cabinet memorandum in October 1987 said it was one of the most serious acts of terrorism in Australia since the assassination of the Turkish consul-general in Sydney in 1980. It said Victoria police arrested and charged a suspect within 48 hours, but revealed that the commonwealth only became aware of the explosion when an Asio officer heard a radio news bulletin at 2.40am. There were other communication problems. | |
| The document said that before Asio made contact, Victoria police did not recognise or act upon the significant fact that a Turkish consular mission was located in a building that was bombed, instead viewing it as a one-off criminal occurrence. | |
| “Any incident with a political flavour should be regarded as a potential terrorist incident unless proved otherwise,” the cabinet memorandum said in explaining the need for improved co-operation. “It needs to be understood by all state agencies that any terrorist incident is relevant to national security and that the commonwealth's interest is real and immediate.” | |
| The Hawke government’s controversial Australia Card proposal also features in the cabinet documents released by the National Archives of Australia. The proposed identity card attracted considerable public resistance on privacy grounds. | The Hawke government’s controversial Australia Card proposal also features in the cabinet documents released by the National Archives of Australia. The proposed identity card attracted considerable public resistance on privacy grounds. |
| Cabinet Submission 3510, on civil liberties, emphasises the proposed safeguards, including an independent watchdog to be known as the data protection agency. Submission 3507 noted that while some uses were unquantifiable, the cost effectiveness was $3.20 of benefits for every dollar of costs. Benefits envisaged included reduced tax evasion, better welfare administration and improved census data. The Defence Department is reported to have seen potential secondary uses for the card, including relying on the Australia Card rather than the pre-existing service cards. “Social Security has advised that it is not possible to estimate the benefits of the use of the Australia Card, other than that they will probably exceed the costs,” the document said. | Cabinet Submission 3510, on civil liberties, emphasises the proposed safeguards, including an independent watchdog to be known as the data protection agency. Submission 3507 noted that while some uses were unquantifiable, the cost effectiveness was $3.20 of benefits for every dollar of costs. Benefits envisaged included reduced tax evasion, better welfare administration and improved census data. The Defence Department is reported to have seen potential secondary uses for the card, including relying on the Australia Card rather than the pre-existing service cards. “Social Security has advised that it is not possible to estimate the benefits of the use of the Australia Card, other than that they will probably exceed the costs,” the document said. |
| The government tried to tough out the resistance, and in August 1987 the cabinet decided to push the legislation through a joint sitting of parliament if necessary. Cabinet records show ministers were formally urged to get behind the government’s position. | The government tried to tough out the resistance, and in August 1987 the cabinet decided to push the legislation through a joint sitting of parliament if necessary. Cabinet records show ministers were formally urged to get behind the government’s position. |
| But resistance to the Australia Card continued, legal difficulties also emerged and in late September, the cabinet decided to abandon it. The upshot, which endures today, included the tax file number, Commonwealth Privacy Act and Office of the Privacy Commissioner. | But resistance to the Australia Card continued, legal difficulties also emerged and in late September, the cabinet decided to abandon it. The upshot, which endures today, included the tax file number, Commonwealth Privacy Act and Office of the Privacy Commissioner. |
| Within days of a major media reform decision, Rupert Murdoch launched a successful bid for the Herald and Weekly Times. The cabinet minute of 8 December 1986asserted there was no link between the two events. It said that “cabinet discussed the implications for media ownership in Australia of the attempt by Mr Rupert Murdoch to take over the HWT [and] noted that the timing of recent decisions, including on cross-media ownership, and the Murdoch takeover bid was simply a coincidence”. | Within days of a major media reform decision, Rupert Murdoch launched a successful bid for the Herald and Weekly Times. The cabinet minute of 8 December 1986asserted there was no link between the two events. It said that “cabinet discussed the implications for media ownership in Australia of the attempt by Mr Rupert Murdoch to take over the HWT [and] noted that the timing of recent decisions, including on cross-media ownership, and the Murdoch takeover bid was simply a coincidence”. |
| The Hawke cabinet was also advised in 1986 that complete rehabilitation of areas of Australia used to test British nuclear weapons may not be possible, with a full clean-up judged to be more expensive than the UK government would be willing to contemplate. | The Hawke cabinet was also advised in 1986 that complete rehabilitation of areas of Australia used to test British nuclear weapons may not be possible, with a full clean-up judged to be more expensive than the UK government would be willing to contemplate. |
| The then minister for Aboriginal affairs, Clyde Holding, presented the cabinet with a bluntly worded submission in response to a royal commission's recommendation that Aboriginal people be compensated for dispossession of the lands used for testing, saying the government had no option but to accept the principle. | The then minister for Aboriginal affairs, Clyde Holding, presented the cabinet with a bluntly worded submission in response to a royal commission's recommendation that Aboriginal people be compensated for dispossession of the lands used for testing, saying the government had no option but to accept the principle. |
| “The actions of previous Australian government [sic] in shepherding Aboriginal people from their traditional lands for the purpose of conducting atomic tests were both immoral and appallingly executed,” Holding wrote. “If we deny compensation, we shall stand condemned as surely as those who committed the outrage of dispossession in the first place.” | “The actions of previous Australian government [sic] in shepherding Aboriginal people from their traditional lands for the purpose of conducting atomic tests were both immoral and appallingly executed,” Holding wrote. “If we deny compensation, we shall stand condemned as surely as those who committed the outrage of dispossession in the first place.” |
| The cabinet, meanwhile, wrestled with the treatment of the former Labor politician and high court judge Lionel Murphy. In 1986, during the confused final stages of the controversy, the Hawke cabinet opened a new inquiry into him, resolved to defend it despite its apparent zeal, then prematurely closed the inquiry and decided a fortnight before Murphy’s death to pay his considerable legal costs. The saga stemmed from reports in late 1983 and early 1984 based on tapes, transcripts and summaries of illegal telephone intercepts reportedly made by some New South Wales police. | The cabinet, meanwhile, wrestled with the treatment of the former Labor politician and high court judge Lionel Murphy. In 1986, during the confused final stages of the controversy, the Hawke cabinet opened a new inquiry into him, resolved to defend it despite its apparent zeal, then prematurely closed the inquiry and decided a fortnight before Murphy’s death to pay his considerable legal costs. The saga stemmed from reports in late 1983 and early 1984 based on tapes, transcripts and summaries of illegal telephone intercepts reportedly made by some New South Wales police. |
| Cabinet documents were previously released only after 30 years, but this waiting time is progressively being reduced to 20 years. Until this is achieved, the National Archives is disclosing two years of records each year. More information about the 1986 and 1987 documents can be found on the website of the National Archives. | Cabinet documents were previously released only after 30 years, but this waiting time is progressively being reduced to 20 years. Until this is achieved, the National Archives is disclosing two years of records each year. More information about the 1986 and 1987 documents can be found on the website of the National Archives. |
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