We need new solutions for governing this disunited kingdom
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Version 0 of 1. This year marks the centenary of the outbreak of the first world war. But there is another, much less regarded, yet significant centenary occurring this year – 1914 saw the passage of the Government of Ireland Act, the first extensive legislation for devolution in what was then the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. This 1914 measure provided for Irish home rule and a new parliament at Dublin – changes that many Liberals and Irish nationalists had been demanding for decades. World war led to the implementation of the Government of Ireland Act being delayed: and it was anyway rendered void by the Easter rebellion of 1916. Nonetheless, in 2014, this act is well worth remembering. It is a reminder, to begin with, that fiercely competing visions of the organisation and identities of the UK have a long history. Accounts of the forthcoming independence referendum in Scotland sometimes give the impression that it's merely a recent and specific piece of purely local difficulty. In reality, there have always been cracks in the fabric, and not just north of the border. Many of the Victorian and Edwardian activists who campaigned for Irish home rule, for instance, also wanted what they called "home rule all round": separate parliaments not simply for Ireland, but also for the Scots and the Welsh – and for the English. "If home rule for England presents serious problems," argued one journalist in 1911, "we had better face them at once. They are not going to be solved either by postponing or ignoring them." The fact that this "home rule all round" campaign was overtaken by world war in 1914 is a reminder, too, of how contingent and uneven has been the evolution of the UK, and how intimately connected with the incidence of war and peace. The so-called Act of Union between England and Wales in 1536, the Act of Union linking these two countries with Scotland in 1707, and the Act of Union between Great Britain and Ireland in 1800-1, were all implemented either in the midst of major warfare, or at a time of acute fear of war and invasion. By the same token, the years between 1689 and 1815, which saw six major wars between Britain and France, also witnessed the invention of many of the myths and motifs associated with Britishness: the current national anthem and Rule Britannia, for instance, were both composed in that era. By contrast, periods of peace – especially when protracted – have often been accompanied by agitation for some kind of "break-up of Britain". Thus, sustained struggle for Irish home rule commenced in the 1870s, some 50 years or so after Waterloo had finally brought an end to the cycle of Anglo-French wars. Even the relatively brief period of European peace that occurred between the two world wars saw not only the creation of the Irish Free State (as it was then called), but also the foundation of the Welsh National party, and the emergence in 1934 of the Scottish National party. The rising fortunes now of Scottish nationalism thus accord in part with patterns that were evident in the past. During and immediately after the second world war, unionism in Scotland – as elsewhere in the UK – was able to draw sustenance and strength from a common military struggle for survival, and from the common relief and satisfaction at victory in 1945. By the 1970s, however, a new postwar generation was emerging, and so – once again, and as in the writings of nationalists such as Tom Nairn – were calls for a break-up of Britain. In other words, in order to understand the structure of the UK, and its current fractures, there is a need to look not just at comparatively recent developments, alignments and pressures, but also at much longer and deeper histories. The same applies in the realm of ideas. One of the notable features of present-day debates on possible Scottish independence has been the lack of imagination and creativity thus far displayed by most of those seeking to make the unionist case. The assumption appears to be that appeals to economic individualism and fostered fears of the unknown will by themselves be sufficient to make Scots hesitate about opting for independence. This strategy may or may not prove effective, but it shortchanges the public, and not just in Scotland. Scots are being offered arguments in support of independence, and warnings against it. Neither they, nor anyone else in the UK, are being provided with alternative visions of what an amended, re-imagined union might conceivably be like, or what it might be for. This is very different from the quality of debate out of which the Government of Ireland Act of 1914 emerged. The late 19th century saw all sorts of federal solutions being proposed for the UK's many fault lines, sometimes at a high level. Winston Churchill both supported separate parliaments for Wales, Scotland, and Ireland; and wanted England to be divided into seven regional authorities, each with its own assembly and responsibility for local education, policing and housing. Another future prime minister, David Lloyd George, also advocated some kind of organisational recognition that England was not a monolith but rather, divided – as he provocatively put it – between "the progressive north", and a Tory-dominated south. Ambitious, clever and pragmatic unionists both, these men were not afraid to put their heads above the parapet and speculate about new modes of governance. Perhaps some of their early 21st-century successors should consider doing the same? Our editors' picks for the day's top news and commentary delivered to your inbox each morning. |