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Former US defense secretary Robert Gates' memoir is shocking, but not about Obama | Former US defense secretary Robert Gates' memoir is shocking, but not about Obama |
(about 3 hours later) | |
Former US defense secretary Robert Gates' harsh critique of the Obama White House in his forthcoming memoir, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, has Washington aflutter (it's set for release on 14 January). But Gates' central critique of the Obama administration, however, does not reveal any new truths. | Former US defense secretary Robert Gates' harsh critique of the Obama White House in his forthcoming memoir, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, has Washington aflutter (it's set for release on 14 January). But Gates' central critique of the Obama administration, however, does not reveal any new truths. |
Presidential candidates said what voters wanted to hear? Shocking! The White House tried to control and dictate policy? The horror! But unprecedented? Hardly. History is full of cases where soldiers and statesmen disagreed about policy. | Presidential candidates said what voters wanted to hear? Shocking! The White House tried to control and dictate policy? The horror! But unprecedented? Hardly. History is full of cases where soldiers and statesmen disagreed about policy. |
If President Kennedy had listened to the joint chiefs of staff during the Cuban Missile Crisis, he would have launched a full-on military invasion of Cuba as his generals unanimously advised him to do. The president was skeptical of that advice and he rightly selected another course of action. | If President Kennedy had listened to the joint chiefs of staff during the Cuban Missile Crisis, he would have launched a full-on military invasion of Cuba as his generals unanimously advised him to do. The president was skeptical of that advice and he rightly selected another course of action. |
But civilians also get it horribly wrong. | But civilians also get it horribly wrong. |
In 2003 when Army chief of staff general Eric Shinseki testified on Capitol Hill that "several hundred thousand" troops were required for the invasion and stabilization of Iraq, then defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, attacked Shinseki calling his assessment "wildly off the mark". We all know now, that in the end, it was the civilian leaders that were wildly off the mark. | In 2003 when Army chief of staff general Eric Shinseki testified on Capitol Hill that "several hundred thousand" troops were required for the invasion and stabilization of Iraq, then defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, attacked Shinseki calling his assessment "wildly off the mark". We all know now, that in the end, it was the civilian leaders that were wildly off the mark. |
And sometimes everyone gets it wrong. Vietnam was a war dreamt up by civilian leaders and wrongly executed by the military. No one wanted to pull the plug, but somebody should have. | And sometimes everyone gets it wrong. Vietnam was a war dreamt up by civilian leaders and wrongly executed by the military. No one wanted to pull the plug, but somebody should have. |
All presidents struggle to find a balance in civil-military relations. The military are the "experts" – they are the professionals that plan and fight wars. They understand the logistics that are necessary to make policy happen. But in liberal democracies, such as the US and the UK, the military serve, and are subordinate to, elected civilian leaders. It is inevitable that friction between civilians and the military occurs in the making of policy. | All presidents struggle to find a balance in civil-military relations. The military are the "experts" – they are the professionals that plan and fight wars. They understand the logistics that are necessary to make policy happen. But in liberal democracies, such as the US and the UK, the military serve, and are subordinate to, elected civilian leaders. It is inevitable that friction between civilians and the military occurs in the making of policy. |
And it is only natural that policy is ultimately driven by politics. Research studies tell us that variations in American domestic party politics and international power determine national strategy. Politicians respond to the pressure of voters. Liberal candidates such as Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama naturally opposed the surge in Iraq as their political bases, and most Americans at that point, opposed the war. | And it is only natural that policy is ultimately driven by politics. Research studies tell us that variations in American domestic party politics and international power determine national strategy. Politicians respond to the pressure of voters. Liberal candidates such as Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama naturally opposed the surge in Iraq as their political bases, and most Americans at that point, opposed the war. |
Secretary Gates and other defence professionals may disagree with the president, and the voters who elected him, but in the end, that is the way a democratic system works. Perhaps this is why Winston Churchill supposedly said democracy was the worst form of government – except for all the other ones. | Secretary Gates and other defence professionals may disagree with the president, and the voters who elected him, but in the end, that is the way a democratic system works. Perhaps this is why Winston Churchill supposedly said democracy was the worst form of government – except for all the other ones. |
On balance, I am sure that Secretary Gates, a man with a distinguished record serving eight presidents knows this truth, but it doesn't make it any less frustrating when you are trying to get a job done. And it is quite possible that President Obama put more faith in his political appointees than he should have – only time will tell. | |
Gates' fundamental critique, however, is one that crosses the political aisle. The use of military force is far too enchanting within American political circles. As Gates put it in a book excerpt published in the Wall Street Journal: | Gates' fundamental critique, however, is one that crosses the political aisle. The use of military force is far too enchanting within American political circles. As Gates put it in a book excerpt published in the Wall Street Journal: |
Today, too many ideologues call for US force as the first option rather than a last resort … This is particularly worth remembering as technology changes the face of war. A button is pushed in Nevada, and seconds later a pickup truck explodes in Mosul. A bomb destroys the targeted house on the right and leaves the one on the left intact. For too many people – including defense "experts," members of Congress, executive branch officials and ordinary citizens – war has become a kind of videogame or action movie: bloodless, painless and odorless. But my years at the Pentagon left me even more skeptical of systems analysis, computer models, game theories or doctrines that suggest that war is anything other than tragic, inefficient and uncertain. | Today, too many ideologues call for US force as the first option rather than a last resort … This is particularly worth remembering as technology changes the face of war. A button is pushed in Nevada, and seconds later a pickup truck explodes in Mosul. A bomb destroys the targeted house on the right and leaves the one on the left intact. For too many people – including defense "experts," members of Congress, executive branch officials and ordinary citizens – war has become a kind of videogame or action movie: bloodless, painless and odorless. But my years at the Pentagon left me even more skeptical of systems analysis, computer models, game theories or doctrines that suggest that war is anything other than tragic, inefficient and uncertain. |
This is Secretary Gates' most prescient observation. Whether it is "hawks" on the right, or "humanitarian interventionists" on the left, both sides of the American political aisle want to pull the trigger first and ask the hard questions later. | This is Secretary Gates' most prescient observation. Whether it is "hawks" on the right, or "humanitarian interventionists" on the left, both sides of the American political aisle want to pull the trigger first and ask the hard questions later. |
Sadly, however, Washington, a city where most people don't see past the next election, will most likely overlook this general critique of American society. The focus instead will be on political point scoring and on how Gates' criticisms might be used to political advantage in the 2016 presidential election (or even the 2014 mid-term elections). | Sadly, however, Washington, a city where most people don't see past the next election, will most likely overlook this general critique of American society. The focus instead will be on political point scoring and on how Gates' criticisms might be used to political advantage in the 2016 presidential election (or even the 2014 mid-term elections). |
In the end Gates' memoir will do little to affect the course of the next election, but his warnings about American militarism could have a positive impact on American foreign policy if only policy-makers could see the woods for the trees. | In the end Gates' memoir will do little to affect the course of the next election, but his warnings about American militarism could have a positive impact on American foreign policy if only policy-makers could see the woods for the trees. |
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