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Is the US-Australia 'anchor of peace' immune from rust? Is the US-Australia 'anchor of peace' immune from rust?
(7 months later)
Most Australians view the bilateral relationship with the United States through the prism of a defence alliance – the ANZUS treaty. For over 60 years it’s been seen as a security blanket, occasionally a nuclear umbrella, or just an insurance policy with our great and powerful friend.Most Australians view the bilateral relationship with the United States through the prism of a defence alliance – the ANZUS treaty. For over 60 years it’s been seen as a security blanket, occasionally a nuclear umbrella, or just an insurance policy with our great and powerful friend.
But what Australians sometimes forget is that Americans tend to be wary of alliances. Both George Washington and Thomas Jefferson warned the new Republic to resist getting bogged down in the problems of others. Friendships, yes. Entangling alliances, no. And so from 1776 to the second world war, the US managed to avoid signing a formal treaty alliance with anyone, except Panama.But what Australians sometimes forget is that Americans tend to be wary of alliances. Both George Washington and Thomas Jefferson warned the new Republic to resist getting bogged down in the problems of others. Friendships, yes. Entangling alliances, no. And so from 1776 to the second world war, the US managed to avoid signing a formal treaty alliance with anyone, except Panama.
In the years since 1945, however, the US entered into treaties of alliance with over 50 countries. Among those, the ANZUS treaty, signed in September 1951 between Australia, New Zealand and the US, stands as a remarkable achievement in alliance durability. Like most of America’s other alliance commitments, however, the ANZUS treaty was designed in a different historical context, for a different strategic problem, the Cold War.In the years since 1945, however, the US entered into treaties of alliance with over 50 countries. Among those, the ANZUS treaty, signed in September 1951 between Australia, New Zealand and the US, stands as a remarkable achievement in alliance durability. Like most of America’s other alliance commitments, however, the ANZUS treaty was designed in a different historical context, for a different strategic problem, the Cold War.
For Australian strategic planners, this raises an important question: how durable is the alliance now? The most recent communiqué from the annual ministerial talks between Canberra and Washington says it will remain “an anchor of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond”. On her recent visit to Washington, foreign minister Julie Bishop described the alliance as “an indispensable instrument”.For Australian strategic planners, this raises an important question: how durable is the alliance now? The most recent communiqué from the annual ministerial talks between Canberra and Washington says it will remain “an anchor of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond”. On her recent visit to Washington, foreign minister Julie Bishop described the alliance as “an indispensable instrument”.
But in a period of transformational power shifts, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, concerns over the future of alliance solidarity are growing louder. These concerns range from the implications of budget restraints on burden sharing arrangements to the diverging interests of each alliance partner in relation to Asia’s shifting balance of economic and military power.But in a period of transformational power shifts, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, concerns over the future of alliance solidarity are growing louder. These concerns range from the implications of budget restraints on burden sharing arrangements to the diverging interests of each alliance partner in relation to Asia’s shifting balance of economic and military power.
Judgements about the utility and longevity of alliances are as old as alliances themselves. And several academic studies have shown that the reliability of alliance commitments can’t always be taken for granted. So, if alliances are not inevitable, and a different set of strategic pressures is changing the shape and direction of international and regional security, why do politicians on both sides of the Pacific assume that the “anchor of peace” is immune from rust?Judgements about the utility and longevity of alliances are as old as alliances themselves. And several academic studies have shown that the reliability of alliance commitments can’t always be taken for granted. So, if alliances are not inevitable, and a different set of strategic pressures is changing the shape and direction of international and regional security, why do politicians on both sides of the Pacific assume that the “anchor of peace” is immune from rust?
At a practical level, the constituent parts of the Australia-US alliance have never seemed stronger. A growing number of US marines are now on regular rotation for exercises throughout northern Australia, alliance cooperation has been extended to new non-traditional security threats such as cybersecurity and despite the fallout from the release of classified information by former US National Security Agency contractor, Edward Snowden, the depth and breadth of the intelligence relationship is unprecedented.At a practical level, the constituent parts of the Australia-US alliance have never seemed stronger. A growing number of US marines are now on regular rotation for exercises throughout northern Australia, alliance cooperation has been extended to new non-traditional security threats such as cybersecurity and despite the fallout from the release of classified information by former US National Security Agency contractor, Edward Snowden, the depth and breadth of the intelligence relationship is unprecedented.
Over the next 15 years, however, the Australia-US relationship will confront a regional security environment that will be more competitive and less amenable to bilateral security agreements. The debate in Australia over what we should do about that has become polarised between the idea of a radical shift towards a new power-sharing arrangement between the US and China and the typical political response of “steady as she goes”. Between these two poles, some commentators have raised the possibility of a third pathway for the alliance, a strategy of containing China’s ambitions until it becomes a more responsible stakeholder in the region’s economic and security architecture.Over the next 15 years, however, the Australia-US relationship will confront a regional security environment that will be more competitive and less amenable to bilateral security agreements. The debate in Australia over what we should do about that has become polarised between the idea of a radical shift towards a new power-sharing arrangement between the US and China and the typical political response of “steady as she goes”. Between these two poles, some commentators have raised the possibility of a third pathway for the alliance, a strategy of containing China’s ambitions until it becomes a more responsible stakeholder in the region’s economic and security architecture.
Strategies of concert, containment and complacency are useful fodder for the strategic policy community to chew over. But they tell us little about the specific issues that could go wrong in the bilateral relationship that would have potential consequences for the alliance.Strategies of concert, containment and complacency are useful fodder for the strategic policy community to chew over. But they tell us little about the specific issues that could go wrong in the bilateral relationship that would have potential consequences for the alliance.
China will remain the most sensitive subject in the Australia-US relationship. A decade ago, the former Australian foreign minister, Alexander Downer, received a sharp rebuke from his American counterparts for suggesting that Australia’s alliance commitments might not be triggered automatically by conflict over Taiwan. In what was an otherwise unremarkable statement of fact, the response from Washington suggested a divergence of views over what constitutes an alliance commitment.China will remain the most sensitive subject in the Australia-US relationship. A decade ago, the former Australian foreign minister, Alexander Downer, received a sharp rebuke from his American counterparts for suggesting that Australia’s alliance commitments might not be triggered automatically by conflict over Taiwan. In what was an otherwise unremarkable statement of fact, the response from Washington suggested a divergence of views over what constitutes an alliance commitment.
Richard Armitage’s more recent warning about Australia free riding on American taxpayers is a reminder that Washington’s alliance expectations are growing. Although the Australian government has agreed to increase the defence budget to 2% of GDP, achieving this goal at a time of fiscal stringency will be difficult, if not impossible, in the short term. Richard Armitage’s more recent warning about Australia free riding on American taxpayers is a reminder that Washington’s alliance expectations are growing. Although the Australian government has agreed to increase the defence budget to 2% of GDP, achieving this goal at a time of fiscal stringency will be difficult, if not impossible, in the short term.
The 2013 Australian Defence White Paper made the bold assertion thatThe 2013 Australian Defence White Paper made the bold assertion that
The government does not believe that Australia must choose between its longstanding Alliance with the United States and its expanding relationship with China; nor do the United States and China believe that we must make such a choice.The government does not believe that Australia must choose between its longstanding Alliance with the United States and its expanding relationship with China; nor do the United States and China believe that we must make such a choice.
But choices will need to be made. Those choices will not be as simple as appeasing China or backing America’s continued primacy in Asia. The challenge that China represents to the alliance is structural. Through coercion and intimidation, Beijing seeks to change the strategic equilibrium in Asia that has flourished under US leadership. China is not a status quo power, and the alliance is very much about maintaining the status quo. So one of these things will need to change.But choices will need to be made. Those choices will not be as simple as appeasing China or backing America’s continued primacy in Asia. The challenge that China represents to the alliance is structural. Through coercion and intimidation, Beijing seeks to change the strategic equilibrium in Asia that has flourished under US leadership. China is not a status quo power, and the alliance is very much about maintaining the status quo. So one of these things will need to change.
Another test for ANZUS is that domestic sentiment in the US about the value of military alliances is getting harder to judge. For now, isolationism remains a minor current in American politics - the mainstream of both major parties is committed to international engagement. However, the rise of the Tea party movement shows that the populist appeal of an isolationist sentiment could grow. And in an era of fiscal uncertainty, the pressure on defence, foreign policy and aid budgets will continue to make America’s choices between home and abroad more difficult to make.Another test for ANZUS is that domestic sentiment in the US about the value of military alliances is getting harder to judge. For now, isolationism remains a minor current in American politics - the mainstream of both major parties is committed to international engagement. However, the rise of the Tea party movement shows that the populist appeal of an isolationist sentiment could grow. And in an era of fiscal uncertainty, the pressure on defence, foreign policy and aid budgets will continue to make America’s choices between home and abroad more difficult to make.
One of the key challenges for both the US and Australia is to articulate more clearly the risks and rewards of the alliance relationship to their respective publics. Both Washington and Canberra cannot assume that the next generations will have the same appreciation of the historical and cultural ties that bound the post-War generations in alliance solidarity.One of the key challenges for both the US and Australia is to articulate more clearly the risks and rewards of the alliance relationship to their respective publics. Both Washington and Canberra cannot assume that the next generations will have the same appreciation of the historical and cultural ties that bound the post-War generations in alliance solidarity.
A press release at the end of annual ministerial talks is a poor substitute for a more sustained and open dialogue with the public on the political, diplomatic and military value of the alliance. Failure to engage the public, in both countries, could see the alliance relegated to a historical artifact. Still friends? Of course. But an entangled alliance? Maybe not.A press release at the end of annual ministerial talks is a poor substitute for a more sustained and open dialogue with the public on the political, diplomatic and military value of the alliance. Failure to engage the public, in both countries, could see the alliance relegated to a historical artifact. Still friends? Of course. But an entangled alliance? Maybe not.