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| Russia feels double-crossed over Ukraine – but what will Putin do? | Russia feels double-crossed over Ukraine – but what will Putin do? |
| (about 2 hours later) | |
| What will Vladimir Putin do now? The Russian president has kept quiet on Ukraine since an hour-long telephone conversation with Barack Obama on Friday when the two men expressed a shared interest in backing the EU-negotiated settlement in Kiev. | What will Vladimir Putin do now? The Russian president has kept quiet on Ukraine since an hour-long telephone conversation with Barack Obama on Friday when the two men expressed a shared interest in backing the EU-negotiated settlement in Kiev. |
| But the Russian president's restraint is unlikely to last much longer as Moscow angrily contemplates Saturday's dramatic collapse of the EU deal and the apparent ruination of Russia's high-profile drive to lock its strategically vital southern neighbour in ever-closer political and economic union. | |
| With some justice, Russia views the parliamentary opposition's actions in toppling President Viktor Yanukovych, releasing his arch-rival, Yulia Tymoshenko, from prison, arresting ministers and in effect sacking the government as a cynical betrayal of the settlement mediated by EU foreign ministers, which envisaged a more gradual, less divisive transition. | |
| To a significant degree, the future security, political cohesion and territorial integrity of Ukraine depend on how Putin reacts in the next few days. If he does not act firmly, Putin may fear that Russia's much-repressed opposition will be encouraged to emulate the Kiev street revolution. As it stands, what Moscow views as a western-backed coup is a personal humiliation for Russia's pugnacious leader. He will not take it lightly. | |
| A furious Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, reflected these worries when he voiced "most serious concern" over Ukraine in a flurry of calls to the French, German and Polish foreign ministers, who brokered Friday's short-lived deal. | |
| "The opposition not only has failed to fulfil a single one of its obligations but is already presenting new demands all the time, following the lead of armed extremists and pogromists, whose actions pose a direct threat to Ukraine's sovereignty and constitutional order,'' Lavrov said. EU leaders should restrain these "rampaging hooligans", he said. | |
| Lavrov said much the same in a call to John Kerry, the US secretary of state, reminding him that Putin had told Obama that it was essential that the US use every opportunity to halt illegal actions. The demonstrators in the Maidan, as Kiev's central square is known, did not speak for all Ukraine, particularly not its mostly Russian-speaking eastern and Crimean regions. | |
| There's little doubt that Russia feels double-crossed. Lavrov's terminology appeared to provide grounds for potential direct intervention. Lawful external contributions to resolving Ukraine's problems, including economic assistance, were welcome, he said, but persistent, politically inspired western "intrusiveness" was dangerous. | |
| "We don't want to inflict ourselves on Ukraine as the western partners do. We don't advise anyone. This only does harm." | |
| This has been the consistent Russian view, put forward in numerous discussions with the EU since last November, when Yanukovych's decision to accept Russian aid and cheap gas led him to reject closer ties with Brussels. Moscow argues that expanded Ukraine-EU economic ties would be beneficial, but should not extend to drawing Ukraine into the EU's "sphere of influence". | |
| A key question now is whether Putin will decide to back Yanukovych in his desperate attempt to hang on to power, by rallying supporters in eastern Ukraine. Even if he dumps his discredited ally, Putin could still opt to encourage eastern regional leaders to reject Kiev's authority and pursue forms of greater autonomy. | A key question now is whether Putin will decide to back Yanukovych in his desperate attempt to hang on to power, by rallying supporters in eastern Ukraine. Even if he dumps his discredited ally, Putin could still opt to encourage eastern regional leaders to reject Kiev's authority and pursue forms of greater autonomy. |
| Down this road lies the dread prospect of partition, peacefully achieved or not. Right now, at least, a Georgia-style Russian military intervention does not seem likely. | Down this road lies the dread prospect of partition, peacefully achieved or not. Right now, at least, a Georgia-style Russian military intervention does not seem likely. |
| Putin will also have to decide whether his $15bn (£9bn) aid package and cheap gas deals can survive the change of leadership in Kiev. He has already threatened to cancel them. But if he does so, his hopes of a brotherly Ukraine as part of a mooted Russian-led Eurasian union will recede even further from view. | Putin will also have to decide whether his $15bn (£9bn) aid package and cheap gas deals can survive the change of leadership in Kiev. He has already threatened to cancel them. But if he does so, his hopes of a brotherly Ukraine as part of a mooted Russian-led Eurasian union will recede even further from view. |
| There is also the position of Russia's Black Sea fleet, based in the Crimea, to be considered. | There is also the position of Russia's Black Sea fleet, based in the Crimea, to be considered. |
| An ideal outcome would be a broad settlement involving Ukraine's new leadership (whose authority will in theory be established in May elections), Russia and the EU, arranged under the auspices of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, to which all the parties belong. | An ideal outcome would be a broad settlement involving Ukraine's new leadership (whose authority will in theory be established in May elections), Russia and the EU, arranged under the auspices of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, to which all the parties belong. |
| The aim would be acceptance, in principle and in practice, that Ukraine cannot and must not be forced to choose between east and west, and that its future peace and prosperity depends on balanced and respectful economic and other relationships with Europe and Moscow. | The aim would be acceptance, in principle and in practice, that Ukraine cannot and must not be forced to choose between east and west, and that its future peace and prosperity depends on balanced and respectful economic and other relationships with Europe and Moscow. |
| To achieve this outcome, the EU will be required to show greater imagination and generosity, in financial terms, towards Ukraine, as Ian Kearns of the European Leadership Network has argued. Support for an International Monetary Fund bailout, as urged by the British foreign secretary, William Hague, will be part of this. But EU capitals will have to cough up cash, too. | |
| As yet this is a fond hope. For Putin to support such a collaborative solution would require a degree magnanimity, political maturity and vision that he has signally failed to show in the past. | As yet this is a fond hope. For Putin to support such a collaborative solution would require a degree magnanimity, political maturity and vision that he has signally failed to show in the past. |