This article is from the source 'guardian' and was first published or seen on . It last changed over 40 days ago and won't be checked again for changes.

You can find the current article at its original source at http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/mar/17/crimea-success-ukraine-putin-russia-borders

The article has changed 2 times. There is an RSS feed of changes available.

Version 0 Version 1
Moscow's Crimea success could lead to it redrawing Ukraine's eastern border Moscow's Crimea success could lead to it redrawing Ukraine's eastern border
(about 3 hours later)
Vladimir Putin is a KGB professional who shows every sign of being a bad man, quite possibly a prodigious thief as well. Offensive though it is to the memory of millions of Russians murdered by Hitler (far more even than his hero Stalin killed), Putin's orchestration of Crimea's defection from Ukraine offers a disturbing comparison with German annexation of the Czech Sudetenland with Neville Chamberlain's connivance in 1938. Vladimir Putin is a KGB professional who shows every sign of being a bad man, quite possibly a prodigious thief as well. Offensive though it is to the memory of millions of Russians murdered by Hitler (far more even than his hero Stalin killed), Putin's orchestration of Crimea's defection from Ukraine offers a disturbing comparison with the German annexation of the Czech Sudetenland with Neville Chamberlain's connivance in 1938.
But Putin and the joyful Russian-speaking citizens of Crimea do have a case to which outraged western denunciations make little concession despite their diplomatic impotence and military passivity. "We are not talking about military options... this is not a Crimean war," the foreign secretary, William Hague, said on Monday morning. He invoked economic sanctions which will hurt Russia (and us), but he spoke in the spirit of Chamberlain. But Putin and the joyful Russian-speaking citizens of Crimea do have a case to which outraged western denunciations make little concession despite their diplomatic impotence and military passivity. "We are not talking about military options … this is not a Crimean war," the foreign secretary, William Hague, said on Monday morning. He invoked economic sanctions which will hurt Russia (and us), but he spoke in the spirit of Chamberlain.
Well, that's good. Most wars are more easily started than ended as we should remember in this 1914 anniversary year. The Anglo-French Crimean war of 1853-56 was an ill-conceived shambles, not forgotten locally. So were some of our more recent interventions, notably Iraq and Afghanistan, which many players in the international game of selective moral indignation regard as being as illegal as this month's manoeuvres on the Crimean peninsula.Well, that's good. Most wars are more easily started than ended as we should remember in this 1914 anniversary year. The Anglo-French Crimean war of 1853-56 was an ill-conceived shambles, not forgotten locally. So were some of our more recent interventions, notably Iraq and Afghanistan, which many players in the international game of selective moral indignation regard as being as illegal as this month's manoeuvres on the Crimean peninsula.
In a bad-tempered, despairing article in the Guardian last week, Marina Lewycka set out some of the historic context of this troubled region with its hard-to-defend borders, vast and fluid. As a Sheffield-based novelist and lecturer of Ukrainian origins – on both sides of the ethnic divide – Lewycka has earned her right to denounce our petulant ignorance as well as Putin's cynicism. In a bad-tempered, despairing article in the Guardian last week, Marina Lewycka set out some of the historic context of this troubled region with its hard-to-defend borders, vast and fluid. As a Sheffield-based novelist and lecturer of Ukrainian origins – on both sides of the ethnic divide – Lewycka has earned her right to denounce our petulant ignorance as well as Putin's cynicism.
As she reminds us all, fearsome and traumatic things have happened in Ukraine well within living memory, which is why some western Ukrainians, Catholics who were once part of west-facing empires and many ethnic Russians in the eastern provinces so mistrust and abuse each other when a political crisis turns bad. Try the Yale history professor Timothy Snyder – or here on Cif for a different voice on the bloody past.As she reminds us all, fearsome and traumatic things have happened in Ukraine well within living memory, which is why some western Ukrainians, Catholics who were once part of west-facing empires and many ethnic Russians in the eastern provinces so mistrust and abuse each other when a political crisis turns bad. Try the Yale history professor Timothy Snyder – or here on Cif for a different voice on the bloody past.
It helps to explain why Moscow's glib claims of a "fascist" takeover in Kiev resonate with so many Russians. It's a familiar theme, the Soviet equivalent of "reds under the beds" in the west, especially in the American heartlands far from oceans and the wider world beyond. Kiev has made enough mistakes and has enough grubby bedfellows – not many, but clearly enough – to make the charge credible. So what happened in the popular overthrow of Moscow hack and klepto-president (both sides agree on that detail) Viktor Yanukovych was a pro-western coup, right comrades?It helps to explain why Moscow's glib claims of a "fascist" takeover in Kiev resonate with so many Russians. It's a familiar theme, the Soviet equivalent of "reds under the beds" in the west, especially in the American heartlands far from oceans and the wider world beyond. Kiev has made enough mistakes and has enough grubby bedfellows – not many, but clearly enough – to make the charge credible. So what happened in the popular overthrow of Moscow hack and klepto-president (both sides agree on that detail) Viktor Yanukovych was a pro-western coup, right comrades?
It's all much more nuanced than that. A Crimean referendum staged under what amounts to Russian military occupation – navy and soldiers – and boycotted by the minority Ukrainians and (12%) Tatars ( expelled and butchered by Stalin) is pretty bogus. But it doesn't change the fact that Crimea is an anomaly, Russian since 1783 and transferred to Ukraine by Nikita Krushchev in 1954 – possibly when the Soviet leader was drunk, says Marina Lewycka. It's all much more nuanced than that. A Crimean referendum staged under what amounts to Russian military occupation – navy and soldiers – and boycotted by the minority Ukrainians and (12%) Tatars (expelled and butchered by Stalin) is pretty bogus. But it doesn't change the fact that Crimea is an anomaly, Russian since 1783 and transferred to Ukraine by Nikita Krushchev in 1954 – possibly when the Soviet leader was drunk, says Marina Lewycka.
Steve McQueen, the Oscar winner, might note in passing that up to two million Russians and Ukrainians were sold into slavery in the nearby Ottoman Empire when the Crimea was still under Mongul Tatar control. That's another local bit of folk memory which may help explain deep mutual fears. Steve McQueen, the Oscar winner, might note in passing that up to two million Russians and Ukrainians were sold into slavery in the nearby Ottoman Empire when Crimea was still under Mongul Tatar control. That's another local bit of folk memory which may help explain deep mutual fears.
Certainly Krushchev's quixotic gesture was an odd one, made in circumstances when the USSR still thought of itself as the wave of the future, when those ethnic divisions not dissolved in blood by Stalin would melt away in the brave new world. As nationalist leaders today – Nigel Farage and Alex Salmond among them – show, nationalism is as potent a brew as ever. Even mature democracies like ours find the issue tricky. Whose side would a Murodch-owned Sunski be on today if it was published in Crimea? Precisely.Certainly Krushchev's quixotic gesture was an odd one, made in circumstances when the USSR still thought of itself as the wave of the future, when those ethnic divisions not dissolved in blood by Stalin would melt away in the brave new world. As nationalist leaders today – Nigel Farage and Alex Salmond among them – show, nationalism is as potent a brew as ever. Even mature democracies like ours find the issue tricky. Whose side would a Murodch-owned Sunski be on today if it was published in Crimea? Precisely.
Moscow's clumsier versions of the Sun have been in overdrive. No wonder that most ethnic Russians in Crimea have voted this weekend for Mother Russia over the relative freedoms they enjoyed in Ukraine. Germans living on the Saar coalfield between France and the Third Reich did exactly the same in their 1935 referendum: they voted for Hitler.Moscow's clumsier versions of the Sun have been in overdrive. No wonder that most ethnic Russians in Crimea have voted this weekend for Mother Russia over the relative freedoms they enjoyed in Ukraine. Germans living on the Saar coalfield between France and the Third Reich did exactly the same in their 1935 referendum: they voted for Hitler.
And that's the real risk the world faces now. President Putin is the sort of leader in the sort of regime which likes to get the advice it wants to hear. The Kremlin must be thrilled with its recent string of diplomatic successes, making the West look even more feeble and divided over Syria than it actually is, staging the Sochi Olympics without those widely predicted (by us) terrorist attacks – and now calling Nato's bluff in Crimea.And that's the real risk the world faces now. President Putin is the sort of leader in the sort of regime which likes to get the advice it wants to hear. The Kremlin must be thrilled with its recent string of diplomatic successes, making the West look even more feeble and divided over Syria than it actually is, staging the Sochi Olympics without those widely predicted (by us) terrorist attacks – and now calling Nato's bluff in Crimea.
The risk is surely that this success will embolden Moscow to redraw Ukraine's eastern boundaries to reclaim Russian-speaking majority areas, Sudeten-style. Not too much we can do about that either. Then what? Putin has ambitions to create a rival counter-balance to the EU, recreating a form of the old Czarist/Soviet multinational empire that crashed after the Berlin Wall, the tragedy of his life.The risk is surely that this success will embolden Moscow to redraw Ukraine's eastern boundaries to reclaim Russian-speaking majority areas, Sudeten-style. Not too much we can do about that either. Then what? Putin has ambitions to create a rival counter-balance to the EU, recreating a form of the old Czarist/Soviet multinational empire that crashed after the Berlin Wall, the tragedy of his life.
When Nato and the EU rapidly expanded to fill the vaccum created by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact bloc in the 90s – into Hungary, Poland (etc) and the Baltics, later into Bulgaria and Romania too – I could see the short-term rationale, but feared the long-term consequences. Russia ( "always too weak and too strong" in the old saying) would feel encircled and strike back when it could. When Nato and the EU rapidly expanded to fill the vacuum created by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact bloc in the 90s – into Hungary, Poland (etc) and the Baltics, later into Bulgaria and Romania too – I could see the short-term rationale, but feared the long-term consequences. Russia ( "always too weak and too strong" in the old saying) would feel encircled and strike back when it could.
In response, America would not honour its hastily-given pledges, even without a timid president, born in Hawaii, to whom Estonia must be "a far away country of which we know little", as Chamberlain said when selling out Czechoslovakia. The EU can no longer punch holes in a paper bag. Putin must sense opportunity. It is hardly surprising that the Poles (the most successful EU adopters) and the Baltic mini-states are jittery about Crimea. If the west does impose its threatened sanctions it may give Putin – who fears his internal democratic movement, as the Guardian's editorial points out – an excuse to squeeze vulnerable neighbours. In response, America would not honour its hastily-given pledges, even without a timid president, born in Hawaii, to whom Estonia must be "a far away country of which we know little", as Chamberlain said when selling out Czechoslovakia. The EU can no longer punch holes in a paper bag. Putin must sense opportunity. It is hardly surprising that the Poles (the most successful EU adopters) and the Baltic mini-states are jittery about Crimea. If the west does impose its threatened sanctions it may give Putin – who fears his internal democratic movement, as the Guardian's editorial points out – an excuse to squeeze vulnerable neighbours.
As in 1914, the risk of miscalculation is huge. US and EU electorates are fed up with costly foreign wars which do not deliver the peace and stability they were supposed to bring. But they will react with alarm if Russia turns off its gas taps without the kind of alternative sources of supply that Berlin is already talking about. Qatar, anyone ? As in 1914, the risk of miscalculation is huge. US and EU electorates are fed up with costly foreign wars which do not deliver the peace and stability they were supposed to bring. But they will react with alarm if Russia turns off its gas taps without the kind of alternative sources of supply that Berlin is already talking about. Qatar, anyone?
Moving any pieces on our interconnected global chess board has consequences. Leaders who are seen to be weak (Barack Obama) and those who rejoice in being seen as strong (Vlad the bare-chested) while actually vulnerable economically, are both capable of compensatory error.Moving any pieces on our interconnected global chess board has consequences. Leaders who are seen to be weak (Barack Obama) and those who rejoice in being seen as strong (Vlad the bare-chested) while actually vulnerable economically, are both capable of compensatory error.
Global markets, which dislike uncertainty, are already punishing Russia via falling share prices, suspended investment and a declining rouble. Oligarchs are nervously shifting ill-gotten billions out of banks where their assets may be frozen. It will all unsettle even further a world order that is fragile. Should we stage a referendum to return Kensington to Mother Britain while the local still retain a non-Russian majority there and before un-badged soldiers with snow on their boots start coming off EasyJet flights from Moscow? Global markets, which dislike uncertainty, are already punishing Russia via falling share prices, suspended investment and a declining rouble. Oligarchs are nervously shifting ill-gotten billions out of banks where their assets may be frozen. It will all unsettle even further a world order that is fragile. Should we stage a referendum to return Kensington to Mother Britain while the locals still retain a non-Russian majority there and before un-badged soldiers with snow on their boots start coming off EasyJet flights from Moscow?
Don't laugh. That's what Krushchev probably did when a far-sighted adviser warned him not to give away Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 and found himself locked up for his pains. And that's another thing. Has anyone checked the small print of Washington's bargain of the 19th century – it paid two cents an acre for the Alaska Purchase from Russia in 1867?Don't laugh. That's what Krushchev probably did when a far-sighted adviser warned him not to give away Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 and found himself locked up for his pains. And that's another thing. Has anyone checked the small print of Washington's bargain of the 19th century – it paid two cents an acre for the Alaska Purchase from Russia in 1867?
At the time, the Czar was strapped for cash (his Crimean war with Britain had been expensive) and sold it. In a fluid, opportunist world, some sharp-suited Kremlin lawyer may be about to suggest oily/icy Alaska is Russia's equivalent of the Parthenon Marbles and ask for it back. Nothing is for ever. Ask them in Crimea. At the time the Czar was strapped for cash (his Crimean war with Britain had been expensive) and sold it. In a fluid, opportunist world, some sharp-suited Kremlin lawyer may be about to suggest oily/icy Alaska is Russia's equivalent of the Parthenon Marbles and ask for it back. Nothing is for ever. Ask them in Crimea.