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| Version 1 | Version 2 |
|---|---|
| Putin's excuse for a referendum is wrong: Crimea isn't Kosovo – at all | Putin's excuse for a referendum is wrong: Crimea isn't Kosovo – at all |
| (about 2 months later) | |
| Contrarians and critics of American foreign policy like to play a game called Less Hypocritical Than Thou. The rules are simple: | Contrarians and critics of American foreign policy like to play a game called Less Hypocritical Than Thou. The rules are simple: |
| Rule No 1: seek out the narrative about a global crisis triggered by some “bad” international actor; | Rule No 1: seek out the narrative about a global crisis triggered by some “bad” international actor; |
| Rule No 2: point out the ways in which the US has done the very same thing at some point in recent history; | Rule No 2: point out the ways in which the US has done the very same thing at some point in recent history; |
| Rule No 3: stress the need to perceive world politics from another point of view; | Rule No 3: stress the need to perceive world politics from another point of view; |
| Rule No 4: revel in the hypocrisy of your intellectual adversaries. | Rule No 4: revel in the hypocrisy of your intellectual adversaries. |
| This is a fun game, especially when many pundits and officials elide obvious parallels between the crisis of the moment and recent American history. And it’s certainly been easy to play Less Hypocritical Than Thou with respect to Ukraine. When John Kerry said earlier this month that, “You just don’t in the 21st century behave in 19th-century fashion by invading another country on completely trumped up pretext”, it did not take long for social media to hoot with derision at the unironic echoes of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. | This is a fun game, especially when many pundits and officials elide obvious parallels between the crisis of the moment and recent American history. And it’s certainly been easy to play Less Hypocritical Than Thou with respect to Ukraine. When John Kerry said earlier this month that, “You just don’t in the 21st century behave in 19th-century fashion by invading another country on completely trumped up pretext”, it did not take long for social media to hoot with derision at the unironic echoes of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. |
| Less Hypocritical Than Thou seems even easier to play after Sunday’s Crimean referendum, in which votes came in overwhelmingly for joining Russia. The Ukrainian version of the game is: | Less Hypocritical Than Thou seems even easier to play after Sunday’s Crimean referendum, in which votes came in overwhelmingly for joining Russia. The Ukrainian version of the game is: |
| Rule No 1: observe consensus about Putin as a bad, bullying actor; | Rule No 1: observe consensus about Putin as a bad, bullying actor; |
| Rule No 2: bring up Kosovo! | Rule No 2: bring up Kosovo! |
| Rule No 3: point out parallels between Kosovo and Crimea; | Rule No 3: point out parallels between Kosovo and Crimea; |
| Rule No 4: revel in the hypocrisy of your intellectual adversaries. | Rule No 4: revel in the hypocrisy of your intellectual adversaries. |
| From Russia Today decrying American hypocrisy to to Vladimir Putin citing the “well-known Kosovo precedent” in a post-vote phone call with President Obama, the US approach to Kosovo’s independence has been the go-to case for highlighting American hypocrisy. | |
| The parallels seem pretty obvious: not entirely unlike Crimea, Kosovo was an autonomous republic with a majority of citizens that belonged to an ethnic minority. And the ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo feared Serbian repression, just as Russians living in Crimea feared the newly-empowered Ukrainian nationalists that has assumed power in Kiev. | |
| But there is a difference: in Kosovo, the US was supporting a region that had declared independence a decade after suffering systematic abuse and painstaking negotiations for autonomy. Right now, Moscow and Washington are arguing over what is very much the jerry-rigging of a referendum on independence – despite no evidence of abuse, no opportunity for peacefully negotiating change, all in direct contradiction of international law. | But there is a difference: in Kosovo, the US was supporting a region that had declared independence a decade after suffering systematic abuse and painstaking negotiations for autonomy. Right now, Moscow and Washington are arguing over what is very much the jerry-rigging of a referendum on independence – despite no evidence of abuse, no opportunity for peacefully negotiating change, all in direct contradiction of international law. |
| Let’s count the ways why Moscow and its defenders are sighting false precedent and taking tu quoque-ery too far: | Let’s count the ways why Moscow and its defenders are sighting false precedent and taking tu quoque-ery too far: |
| What was the role of using force? | What was the role of using force? |
| In 1999, without any United Nations imprimatur, NATO used lethal force to thwart Serbian actions in that autonomous republic, killing hundreds on the ground. Russia acted more stealthily and peacefully in Crimea, effectively taking control of the peninsula with nary a shot being fired. | In 1999, without any United Nations imprimatur, NATO used lethal force to thwart Serbian actions in that autonomous republic, killing hundreds on the ground. Russia acted more stealthily and peacefully in Crimea, effectively taking control of the peninsula with nary a shot being fired. |
| Advantage Moscow, it would seem. | Advantage Moscow, it would seem. |
| Except that Kosovars could point to a legitimate, documented trail of Serbian abuses before they declared independence. The US could point to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199 (with Russia voting in favor) and note with concern “the excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav Army which have resulted in numerous civilian casualties”. | Except that Kosovars could point to a legitimate, documented trail of Serbian abuses before they declared independence. The US could point to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199 (with Russia voting in favor) and note with concern “the excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav Army which have resulted in numerous civilian casualties”. |
| In contrast, Russia acted unilaterally in Crimea – and officially, the Russian government still denies that Russian troops are the ones controlling the territory. | In contrast, Russia acted unilaterally in Crimea – and officially, the Russian government still denies that Russian troops are the ones controlling the territory. |
| What was the pathway to independence? | What was the pathway to independence? |
| In Kosovo, NATO’s actions left a de facto independent state. Nevertheless, Kosovo took its route to independence after nearly a decade of frustrating negotiations that tried to accommodate Serbian and Russian interests. | In Kosovo, NATO’s actions left a de facto independent state. Nevertheless, Kosovo took its route to independence after nearly a decade of frustrating negotiations that tried to accommodate Serbian and Russian interests. |
| The Crimean referendum, mind you, was planned less than two weeks after Russia seized control of the region. | The Crimean referendum, mind you, was planned less than two weeks after Russia seized control of the region. |
| Stepping back, the big difference between Kosovo and Crimea is that the US only took action after giving diplomacy numerous chances. (Today, the sanctions are coming.) Russia, on the other hand, has chosen to occupy first and negotiate later. Cynics might argue that the outcomes have been the same. But process matters in foreign policy, and Russia’s process has been a shambles. | Stepping back, the big difference between Kosovo and Crimea is that the US only took action after giving diplomacy numerous chances. (Today, the sanctions are coming.) Russia, on the other hand, has chosen to occupy first and negotiate later. Cynics might argue that the outcomes have been the same. But process matters in foreign policy, and Russia’s process has been a shambles. |
| None of this is to say that the United States is free of hypocrisy, or that critics of US policy toward Kosovo didn’t warn that something like this would happen. Defenders of Russia’s actions in Crimea can make a case that the United States opened the door to such actions – it’s just not a terribly convincing one. | None of this is to say that the United States is free of hypocrisy, or that critics of US policy toward Kosovo didn’t warn that something like this would happen. Defenders of Russia’s actions in Crimea can make a case that the United States opened the door to such actions – it’s just not a terribly convincing one. |