This article is from the source 'nytimes' and was first published or seen on . It last changed over 40 days ago and won't be checked again for changes.
You can find the current article at its original source at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/21/world/europe/ukrainian-tumult-highlights-european-unions-errors.html
The article has changed 8 times. There is an RSS feed of changes available.
| Version 0 | Version 1 |
|---|---|
| Ukrainian Tumult Highlights E.U.’s Past Missteps and Future Dangers | |
| (about 2 hours later) | |
| BRUSSELS — When antigovernment protesters first took to the streets of the Ukrainian capital, Kiev, late last year, José Manuel Barroso, the president of the European Union’s executive arm, applauded the demonstrators for “writing the new narrative” for a 28-nation bloc weighed down by economic gloom and growing public skepticism about its purpose. | BRUSSELS — When antigovernment protesters first took to the streets of the Ukrainian capital, Kiev, late last year, José Manuel Barroso, the president of the European Union’s executive arm, applauded the demonstrators for “writing the new narrative” for a 28-nation bloc weighed down by economic gloom and growing public skepticism about its purpose. |
| Three months on, with those same pro-Europe protesters now victorious but their country being dismembered by Russia, Ukraine’s political tumult has instead brought back an old story line — a confrontation redolent of the Cold War that has only underscored Europe’s divisions and exposed the chasm between the bloc’s high-minded aspirations and the rough reality of geopolitics as practiced by President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia. | Three months on, with those same pro-Europe protesters now victorious but their country being dismembered by Russia, Ukraine’s political tumult has instead brought back an old story line — a confrontation redolent of the Cold War that has only underscored Europe’s divisions and exposed the chasm between the bloc’s high-minded aspirations and the rough reality of geopolitics as practiced by President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia. |
| European Union leaders gathered Thursday in Brussels to consider further responses to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and steps to discourage Mr. Putin from additional encroachments into eastern and southern Ukraine. Deeply divided by the economic and political interests of their own individual countries, they are expected to add a few names to a list of Russians and Ukrainians hit by an asset freeze and travel ban announced in Brussels on Monday but are unlikely to deliver on earlier threats to impose broad economic sanctions on Russia. | European Union leaders gathered Thursday in Brussels to consider further responses to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and steps to discourage Mr. Putin from additional encroachments into eastern and southern Ukraine. Deeply divided by the economic and political interests of their own individual countries, they are expected to add a few names to a list of Russians and Ukrainians hit by an asset freeze and travel ban announced in Brussels on Monday but are unlikely to deliver on earlier threats to impose broad economic sanctions on Russia. |
| As they argue over what to do, the same tension between how far to go in asserting a role for Europe, while avoiding steps that Moscow might consider unduly provocative, hangs over the discussions, much as it had in the months that ultimately led to Russia’s stealthy invasion of Crimea. Today it is clear that somewhere within its cumbersome policy-making machinery, the European Union miscalibrated that balance. | As they argue over what to do, the same tension between how far to go in asserting a role for Europe, while avoiding steps that Moscow might consider unduly provocative, hangs over the discussions, much as it had in the months that ultimately led to Russia’s stealthy invasion of Crimea. Today it is clear that somewhere within its cumbersome policy-making machinery, the European Union miscalibrated that balance. |
| For years before Ukraine fractured, European leaders went out of their way to reassure Moscow that their approach to Ukraine would pose no threat — that it was not the zero-sum game that Mr. Putin ultimately saw it to be. The question now for the bloc is whether soft-pedaling only gives Russia a free hand, and how it can draw a firmer line. | For years before Ukraine fractured, European leaders went out of their way to reassure Moscow that their approach to Ukraine would pose no threat — that it was not the zero-sum game that Mr. Putin ultimately saw it to be. The question now for the bloc is whether soft-pedaling only gives Russia a free hand, and how it can draw a firmer line. |
| “The European Union definitely miscalculated about Russia’s reaction,” said Linas Linkevicius, the foreign minister of Lithuania, a Baltic state with a long and painful history of living in Moscow’s shadow. | “The European Union definitely miscalculated about Russia’s reaction,” said Linas Linkevicius, the foreign minister of Lithuania, a Baltic state with a long and painful history of living in Moscow’s shadow. |
| “When you play soccer there are rules of the game but the other side turned out to be playing rugby with a bit of wrestling,” he added. | “When you play soccer there are rules of the game but the other side turned out to be playing rugby with a bit of wrestling,” he added. |
| Anchored in elaborate rules and regulations, the European Union has repeatedly been wrong-footed not only by Russia’s blunt methods and its disdain for established borders but also by the pace of unforeseen events in Ukraine. These started last November when the then President Viktor F. Yanukovych abruptly spurned a sweeping trade and political accord with Europe. | Anchored in elaborate rules and regulations, the European Union has repeatedly been wrong-footed not only by Russia’s blunt methods and its disdain for established borders but also by the pace of unforeseen events in Ukraine. These started last November when the then President Viktor F. Yanukovych abruptly spurned a sweeping trade and political accord with Europe. |
| His decision was not entirely unforeseeable, however. The European Union’s own intelligence analysis unit, Intcen, predicted in a secret report weeks before that Mr. Yanukovych would not sign the deal. | His decision was not entirely unforeseeable, however. The European Union’s own intelligence analysis unit, Intcen, predicted in a secret report weeks before that Mr. Yanukovych would not sign the deal. |
| But, according to diplomats involved in Europe’s policy toward Ukraine, so much bureaucratic energy had been invested in bringing Ukraine into the bloc’s so-called Eastern Partnership program that wishful thinking prevailed over hardheaded calculation, especially since Mr. Yanuvoych and his allies repeatedly restated their commitment to embrace Europe in the months ahead of his about-face. | But, according to diplomats involved in Europe’s policy toward Ukraine, so much bureaucratic energy had been invested in bringing Ukraine into the bloc’s so-called Eastern Partnership program that wishful thinking prevailed over hardheaded calculation, especially since Mr. Yanuvoych and his allies repeatedly restated their commitment to embrace Europe in the months ahead of his about-face. |
| Brussels seemed to become locked inside its own minutely calibrated bureaucratic mechanism and shut out events that threatened to throw grit in the works. | Brussels seemed to become locked inside its own minutely calibrated bureaucratic mechanism and shut out events that threatened to throw grit in the works. |
| A July 2013 paper by Edward Lucas, a senior associate at the Bratislava-based Central European Policy Institute, dismissed the whole process as a doomed “charade” in which “the E.U. begins to negotiate with itself” on how far to push Ukraine. The “fundamental flaw,” said Mr. Lucas, was an assumption that Mr. Yanuovych would respond to the carrots and sticks offered by Brussels in the same way as the leaders of Poland and other former communist states that had already joined. He did not and instead tried to squeeze both Brussels and Moscow for cash. | A July 2013 paper by Edward Lucas, a senior associate at the Bratislava-based Central European Policy Institute, dismissed the whole process as a doomed “charade” in which “the E.U. begins to negotiate with itself” on how far to push Ukraine. The “fundamental flaw,” said Mr. Lucas, was an assumption that Mr. Yanuovych would respond to the carrots and sticks offered by Brussels in the same way as the leaders of Poland and other former communist states that had already joined. He did not and instead tried to squeeze both Brussels and Moscow for cash. |
| When Stefan Fule, the union’s enlargement commissioner and one of its main interlocutors with Ukraine, visited Kiev in mid-November, Mr. Yanukovych told him clearly, according to officials in Kiev and Brussels, that he was having serious second thoughts about signing the long-planned association agreement with Europe at a summit meeting scheduled for the end of that month in Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania. | When Stefan Fule, the union’s enlargement commissioner and one of its main interlocutors with Ukraine, visited Kiev in mid-November, Mr. Yanukovych told him clearly, according to officials in Kiev and Brussels, that he was having serious second thoughts about signing the long-planned association agreement with Europe at a summit meeting scheduled for the end of that month in Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania. |
| Mr. Fule, upon his return to Brussels, informed ambassadors privately of the possible setback but in a public statement issued on Nov. 20 made no mention of any potential trouble and instead hailed the “determination” of Mr. Yanukovych and his allies to enact legislation on judicial reform and other matters as demanded by the European Union. | Mr. Fule, upon his return to Brussels, informed ambassadors privately of the possible setback but in a public statement issued on Nov. 20 made no mention of any potential trouble and instead hailed the “determination” of Mr. Yanukovych and his allies to enact legislation on judicial reform and other matters as demanded by the European Union. |
| Mr. Linkevicius, the Lithuanian foreign minister, said that Mr. Yanukovych had sent so many mixed signals about his intentions that it was impossible to really know what he intended do. “Until the very last moment our hope was alive,” he said. | Mr. Linkevicius, the Lithuanian foreign minister, said that Mr. Yanukovych had sent so many mixed signals about his intentions that it was impossible to really know what he intended do. “Until the very last moment our hope was alive,” he said. |
| From 2008, when the European Union first launched its Eastern Partnership scheme, Europe’s efforts to extend democratic values and free trade to Ukraine and five other countries in the former Soviet Union were based on calculations that turned out to be wrong. | From 2008, when the European Union first launched its Eastern Partnership scheme, Europe’s efforts to extend democratic values and free trade to Ukraine and five other countries in the former Soviet Union were based on calculations that turned out to be wrong. |
| “We knew that we were heading for some issues with the Russians,” said Carl Bildt, Sweden’s foreign minister and an architect of the eastward push along with the Polish foreign minister, Radoslaw Sikorski. “But we have seen a different Russia emerging, during the last year in particular, than many anticipated.” | “We knew that we were heading for some issues with the Russians,” said Carl Bildt, Sweden’s foreign minister and an architect of the eastward push along with the Polish foreign minister, Radoslaw Sikorski. “But we have seen a different Russia emerging, during the last year in particular, than many anticipated.” |
| In its dealings with Russia, Mr. Bildt added, “we did two things wrong in retrospect.” The first, he said, was not to take issue with Moscow’s increasingly assertive claims since 2009 in its military doctrine that it had a right to protect Russians living outside the country, particularly in former Soviet lands. | In its dealings with Russia, Mr. Bildt added, “we did two things wrong in retrospect.” The first, he said, was not to take issue with Moscow’s increasingly assertive claims since 2009 in its military doctrine that it had a right to protect Russians living outside the country, particularly in former Soviet lands. |
| The second mistake, he added, was Europe’s muted reaction when Russia started last year to block the import of Ukrainian goods and threatened severe hardship if Kiev signed the trade and political pact with Brussels. “We should have been much clearer from summer 2013 onward about what the Russians were doing,” Mr. Bildt said. | The second mistake, he added, was Europe’s muted reaction when Russia started last year to block the import of Ukrainian goods and threatened severe hardship if Kiev signed the trade and political pact with Brussels. “We should have been much clearer from summer 2013 onward about what the Russians were doing,” Mr. Bildt said. |
| But officials in the Brussels headquarters of the European Commission, the union’s executive arm, say it was difficult to raise the alarm over Russian pressure last year because Ukraine itself kept mostly quiet about it until Mr. Yanukovych suddenly told Mr. Fule in November that trade restrictions imposed by Moscow had slashed key industrial sectors in Ukraine by 40 percent. | But officials in the Brussels headquarters of the European Commission, the union’s executive arm, say it was difficult to raise the alarm over Russian pressure last year because Ukraine itself kept mostly quiet about it until Mr. Yanukovych suddenly told Mr. Fule in November that trade restrictions imposed by Moscow had slashed key industrial sectors in Ukraine by 40 percent. |
| To some degree, the current clash is a result of the success of the early efforts to integrate Poland and the Baltic states into the West. | To some degree, the current clash is a result of the success of the early efforts to integrate Poland and the Baltic states into the West. |
| “Everyone thought the Eastern Partnership was just another flabby European project,” said Fiona Hill, a Russia expert at the Brookings Institution in Washington and co-author of a political biography of Mr. Putin. | “Everyone thought the Eastern Partnership was just another flabby European project,” said Fiona Hill, a Russia expert at the Brookings Institution in Washington and co-author of a political biography of Mr. Putin. |
| “But once a country signs up, it is in Weight Watchers and, if they follow the regimen, they change,” she said. “Russia realized this and did not like it.” Indeed, she added, Russia had already been deeply alarmed by the transformation of countries like Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania after they entered the European Union in 2004. | “But once a country signs up, it is in Weight Watchers and, if they follow the regimen, they change,” she said. “Russia realized this and did not like it.” Indeed, she added, Russia had already been deeply alarmed by the transformation of countries like Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania after they entered the European Union in 2004. |
| Their joining the European Union was followed swiftly by their admission to NATO, a sequence that strengthened Moscow’s view that Brussels served as a stalking horse for the American-led military alliance. | Their joining the European Union was followed swiftly by their admission to NATO, a sequence that strengthened Moscow’s view that Brussels served as a stalking horse for the American-led military alliance. |
| In the case of Ukraine, Europe never offered even the possibility of it one day joining the European Union, and NATO dropped Ukraine as a potential future member back in 2008. This raised hopes in Brussels that Moscow might not object too strongly. Russia initially expressed little unease about Europe’s Eastern Partnership plans, lulling Europe into a false sense of clear sailing ahead. | In the case of Ukraine, Europe never offered even the possibility of it one day joining the European Union, and NATO dropped Ukraine as a potential future member back in 2008. This raised hopes in Brussels that Moscow might not object too strongly. Russia initially expressed little unease about Europe’s Eastern Partnership plans, lulling Europe into a false sense of clear sailing ahead. |
| Mr. Bildt recalled that when he and Mr. Sikorski launched the Eastern Partnership idea in 2008, Russia seemed to be on much the same page. “We then still believed in some of the things the Russians were saying, that they wanted to have closer cooperation with us and wanted free trade for everyone,” he said. “We were all talking about a partnership of modernization. That was the buzzword then.” | Mr. Bildt recalled that when he and Mr. Sikorski launched the Eastern Partnership idea in 2008, Russia seemed to be on much the same page. “We then still believed in some of the things the Russians were saying, that they wanted to have closer cooperation with us and wanted free trade for everyone,” he said. “We were all talking about a partnership of modernization. That was the buzzword then.” |
| “Then at some point there was a change in the Russian position,” he added. | “Then at some point there was a change in the Russian position,” he added. |
| After Mr. Putin’s return to the Kremlin in 2012, after a four-year stint as prime minister, previous talk of shared interests in free trade and close cooperation gave way to increasingly forceful calls for the establishment of a Moscow-dominated rival to the European Union called the Eurasian Union. | After Mr. Putin’s return to the Kremlin in 2012, after a four-year stint as prime minister, previous talk of shared interests in free trade and close cooperation gave way to increasingly forceful calls for the establishment of a Moscow-dominated rival to the European Union called the Eurasian Union. |
| By last summer, Moscow embarked on a sustained campaign of pressure to dissuade former Soviet lands, including Ukraine, from siding with Europe. | By last summer, Moscow embarked on a sustained campaign of pressure to dissuade former Soviet lands, including Ukraine, from siding with Europe. |
| Ms. Hill said that Europe gravely misjudged Russia’s response to the prospect of Ukraine and other former Soviet republics aligning themselves with European ways. | Ms. Hill said that Europe gravely misjudged Russia’s response to the prospect of Ukraine and other former Soviet republics aligning themselves with European ways. |
| “The E.U. operates in a completely different framework, where you pool sovereignty and have the same temperature gauges, the same railway gauges and do lots of other boring things that have a profound impact,” she said. “Once you do this you don’t come back. Russia looked at places like Estonia and Poland and said we can’t let this happen to Ukraine.” | “The E.U. operates in a completely different framework, where you pool sovereignty and have the same temperature gauges, the same railway gauges and do lots of other boring things that have a profound impact,” she said. “Once you do this you don’t come back. Russia looked at places like Estonia and Poland and said we can’t let this happen to Ukraine.” |
| She disputed arguments that Europe was sideswiped by a sudden change in Mr. Putin’s strategy. “Putin hasn’t really changed,” she said. “He has become more confident, more paranoid.” | She disputed arguments that Europe was sideswiped by a sudden change in Mr. Putin’s strategy. “Putin hasn’t really changed,” she said. “He has become more confident, more paranoid.” |
| Of the six former Soviet republics that Brussels had hoped to pull into its orbit, only two, Moldova and Georgia, are still on track to sign association agreements with the European Union on schedule this summer. But that could easily change if Moscow ratchets up economic and other pressure to make them reconsider, as it did with Ukraine last year. | Of the six former Soviet republics that Brussels had hoped to pull into its orbit, only two, Moldova and Georgia, are still on track to sign association agreements with the European Union on schedule this summer. But that could easily change if Moscow ratchets up economic and other pressure to make them reconsider, as it did with Ukraine last year. |
| Ukraine now says it wants to revive the deal spurned by Mr. Yanukovych, but has been told by Europe that this will not be possible until it holds new elections in May. Instead, Europe has offered Ukraine a partial deal that will be sealed on Friday. | Ukraine now says it wants to revive the deal spurned by Mr. Yanukovych, but has been told by Europe that this will not be possible until it holds new elections in May. Instead, Europe has offered Ukraine a partial deal that will be sealed on Friday. |
| Asked how historians will judge Europe’s efforts to expand its law-abiding ways eastward, Mr. Linkevicius, Lithuania’s foreign minister, said: “At some distance, we will see how we are weak, how we are inconsistent. We are doing a lot of things too little and too late.” | Asked how historians will judge Europe’s efforts to expand its law-abiding ways eastward, Mr. Linkevicius, Lithuania’s foreign minister, said: “At some distance, we will see how we are weak, how we are inconsistent. We are doing a lot of things too little and too late.” |