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From Tahrir Square to Emaar Square: Cairo's private road to a private city From Tahrir Square to Emaar Square: Cairo's private road to a private city
(5 months later)
In mid-February, the developer behind the world’s tallest building, the Burj Khalifa in Dubai, signed a deal with the Egyptian defence ministry. The agreement clears the way for the construction of Emaar Square, the centrepiece of a mixed-use development – exclusive residential units, a golf course, open-air shopping for international luxury brands – that is part of UAE-based Emaar’s exclusive Uptown Cairo complex.In mid-February, the developer behind the world’s tallest building, the Burj Khalifa in Dubai, signed a deal with the Egyptian defence ministry. The agreement clears the way for the construction of Emaar Square, the centrepiece of a mixed-use development – exclusive residential units, a golf course, open-air shopping for international luxury brands – that is part of UAE-based Emaar’s exclusive Uptown Cairo complex.
The defence ministry, which owns the massive tract of land where Uptown Cairo will be built, is Egypt’s largest landowner and manager. In 1997, a presidential decree gave the military the right to manage all undeveloped non-agricultural land – 87% of the country, by one estimate. In the city of Cairo, this translates to massive, walled plots of land in lucrative locations, monitored from watchtowers. Signs forbid photography and identify them as military zones, but no military activity takes place here. They are vacant, awaiting their turn to be transformed into hotels, housing for military officers or upmarket malls.The defence ministry, which owns the massive tract of land where Uptown Cairo will be built, is Egypt’s largest landowner and manager. In 1997, a presidential decree gave the military the right to manage all undeveloped non-agricultural land – 87% of the country, by one estimate. In the city of Cairo, this translates to massive, walled plots of land in lucrative locations, monitored from watchtowers. Signs forbid photography and identify them as military zones, but no military activity takes place here. They are vacant, awaiting their turn to be transformed into hotels, housing for military officers or upmarket malls.
Emaar Square is the latest and biggest of these military-secured developments. A private road will link it to Cairo’s road network, likely requiring the “cleansing” of the poor homeowners in the Jabal al-Ahmar area. (Egypt’s military has a lengthy track record of forcibly evicting residents, sometimes using lethal force, in favour of private interests – but nearly always citing security as the reason.) This is a private road to a private city – the chants for “bread, freedom, social justice” in Tahrir Square three years ago will not be heard in Emaar Square.Emaar Square is the latest and biggest of these military-secured developments. A private road will link it to Cairo’s road network, likely requiring the “cleansing” of the poor homeowners in the Jabal al-Ahmar area. (Egypt’s military has a lengthy track record of forcibly evicting residents, sometimes using lethal force, in favour of private interests – but nearly always citing security as the reason.) This is a private road to a private city – the chants for “bread, freedom, social justice” in Tahrir Square three years ago will not be heard in Emaar Square.
The deal between the defence ministry and Emaar went unnoticed in the news; three years since the revolution, in a way it is business as usual. So how did we get from Tahrir Square to Emaar Square?The deal between the defence ministry and Emaar went unnoticed in the news; three years since the revolution, in a way it is business as usual. So how did we get from Tahrir Square to Emaar Square?
The Egyptian revolt is not usually discussed as an urban struggle, one that not only takes place in cities but also seeks to undo the very mechanisms that have produced Egypt’s uneven urban environment. The events of Tahrir Square were a protest against the extreme unevenness of development in Egypt, in which the state neglects the urban majority while providing concessions to Gulf investors and local entities linked directly to the military state apparatus.The Egyptian revolt is not usually discussed as an urban struggle, one that not only takes place in cities but also seeks to undo the very mechanisms that have produced Egypt’s uneven urban environment. The events of Tahrir Square were a protest against the extreme unevenness of development in Egypt, in which the state neglects the urban majority while providing concessions to Gulf investors and local entities linked directly to the military state apparatus.
In the Mubarak years, the state and its business cronies began a development plan called Cairo 2050. This would have led to the mass eviction of thousands of families, in order to transform the city into pockets of high-end residential development, golf courses and shopping centres. Much of the investment was to come from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Egypt's former regime was intent on the “Dubai-sation” of Cairo.In the Mubarak years, the state and its business cronies began a development plan called Cairo 2050. This would have led to the mass eviction of thousands of families, in order to transform the city into pockets of high-end residential development, golf courses and shopping centres. Much of the investment was to come from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Egypt's former regime was intent on the “Dubai-sation” of Cairo.
The revolution caused an unwanted turn: the Muslim Brotherhood was backed by Qatar rather than Saudi, Kuwait and UAE. But since the military re-took control in July last year, the battle over Egypt’s economy has tilted in favour of the old regime and its supporters, and the old Cairo 2050 projects are back on track, including the Maspero Triangle and Uptown Cairo.The revolution caused an unwanted turn: the Muslim Brotherhood was backed by Qatar rather than Saudi, Kuwait and UAE. But since the military re-took control in July last year, the battle over Egypt’s economy has tilted in favour of the old regime and its supporters, and the old Cairo 2050 projects are back on track, including the Maspero Triangle and Uptown Cairo.
Those who celebrate Dubai's urban model and wish for its expansion across the region make the unethical choice of ignoring the fact that the Gulf cities emerge out of a very specific relation between political power and capital: namely, that they are usually one and the same. The expansion of this model into cities such as Cairo, where the military has unchallenged access both to politics and capital (land, resources, construction), would have a disastrous impact on the urban majority – who will be marginalised, moved out of the way when necessary and put to work under unacceptable conditions, with no power to mobilise and with little pay. Those who celebrate Dubai's urban model and wish for its expansion across the region make the unethical choice of ignoring the fact that the Gulf cities emerge out of a very specific relation between political power and capital: namely, that they are usually one and the same. The expansion of this model into cities such as Cairo, where the military has unchallenged access both to politics and capital (land, resources, construction), would have a disastrous impact on the urban majority – who will be marginalised, moved out of the way when necessary and put to work under unacceptable conditions, with no power to mobilise and with little pay.
So why is this interesting? First, when the military, the biggest land owner and free from civilian oversight, makes a direct deal with a developer to build an exclusive and gated community in the heart of the capital, this is not a free market. It may be framed by the government as part of “building Egypt” and attracting investment, but it merely creates more opportunity for buyers to be locked into gated developments with no access to democratic municipal management: the residents of Emaar Square won’t pressure the government for services, they will deal with the company instead. (Such deals also give the growing “republic of retired generals” cushy jobs.)So why is this interesting? First, when the military, the biggest land owner and free from civilian oversight, makes a direct deal with a developer to build an exclusive and gated community in the heart of the capital, this is not a free market. It may be framed by the government as part of “building Egypt” and attracting investment, but it merely creates more opportunity for buyers to be locked into gated developments with no access to democratic municipal management: the residents of Emaar Square won’t pressure the government for services, they will deal with the company instead. (Such deals also give the growing “republic of retired generals” cushy jobs.)
Second, this is not a democracy, and certainly not revolutionary. The Emaar Square deal included the ministries of housing, local development, investment and the Cairo authorities. This co-operation is what will allow Emaar to build its private road. And yet these state institutions are failing to solve Egypt’s mounting urban problems, many of which are directly caused by the lack of accountability and the incompetence of these very institutions. Since the 1970s, the state has fallen short of providing services, of creating effective systems of urban management, and of producing expansion plans that allow local private capital to grow while protecting the sanctity of the common – the public sphere, and its manifestation in shared public spaces.Second, this is not a democracy, and certainly not revolutionary. The Emaar Square deal included the ministries of housing, local development, investment and the Cairo authorities. This co-operation is what will allow Emaar to build its private road. And yet these state institutions are failing to solve Egypt’s mounting urban problems, many of which are directly caused by the lack of accountability and the incompetence of these very institutions. Since the 1970s, the state has fallen short of providing services, of creating effective systems of urban management, and of producing expansion plans that allow local private capital to grow while protecting the sanctity of the common – the public sphere, and its manifestation in shared public spaces.
Instead, the institutions of the state came together to sign a deal for a private highway to a private city.Instead, the institutions of the state came together to sign a deal for a private highway to a private city.
The protests that began in 2011 showed how cities are stages for a struggle not only to shape urban space but also to create new forms of democratic representation. They shed light on how everyday spaces can become sites of resistance, revolution and transformation. This struggle is directly linked to the way power and capital have produced socially and economically unjust urban experiences. In Egypt, the military bear weapons in civilian spaces and have direct access to capital and assets (such as land and building materials) that directly shape cities and their development. This means that if people stand in the way of military bulldozers coming to remove their “illegal” homes or huts, those residents risk being tried in military court for obstruction.The protests that began in 2011 showed how cities are stages for a struggle not only to shape urban space but also to create new forms of democratic representation. They shed light on how everyday spaces can become sites of resistance, revolution and transformation. This struggle is directly linked to the way power and capital have produced socially and economically unjust urban experiences. In Egypt, the military bear weapons in civilian spaces and have direct access to capital and assets (such as land and building materials) that directly shape cities and their development. This means that if people stand in the way of military bulldozers coming to remove their “illegal” homes or huts, those residents risk being tried in military court for obstruction.
For the majority of Egyptians, cities have lost their vital role as places of economic possibility. Land is just one of many commodities monopolised by the military. There are also contracts worth billions of dollars of state money going directly to military contractors without a proper bidding process – from highway construction to slum clearance to redevelopment.For the majority of Egyptians, cities have lost their vital role as places of economic possibility. Land is just one of many commodities monopolised by the military. There are also contracts worth billions of dollars of state money going directly to military contractors without a proper bidding process – from highway construction to slum clearance to redevelopment.
The recent $40bn partnership with the UAE’s Arabtec Construction to build one million low-income housing units on land controlled by the military is just the latest example of how a small cabal shapes the urban environment. Companies associated with former or current military generals are part of a network that produces the essential building materials (chiefly cement and brick) used for everything from luxury condos in gated communities to new residential buildings that expand unilaterally into agricultural land. The spatial confrontations, often violent, in Egyptian squares between protesters and conscripts are in many ways vivid illustrations of Egypt’s struggle over its politics, economy and space – in other words, a struggle towards a more even urban development.The recent $40bn partnership with the UAE’s Arabtec Construction to build one million low-income housing units on land controlled by the military is just the latest example of how a small cabal shapes the urban environment. Companies associated with former or current military generals are part of a network that produces the essential building materials (chiefly cement and brick) used for everything from luxury condos in gated communities to new residential buildings that expand unilaterally into agricultural land. The spatial confrontations, often violent, in Egyptian squares between protesters and conscripts are in many ways vivid illustrations of Egypt’s struggle over its politics, economy and space – in other words, a struggle towards a more even urban development.
After the Egyptian government suddenly resigned last month, the former housing minister Ibrahim Mehlib was named premier; he appointed Mostafa Madbouly, a leading figure in the Cairo 2050 vision, to replace him. Will these experts in housing and urban development serve the interests of the majority of Egyptians living in cities? Or will they continue to serve the interests of a particular network of political and financial power? Emaar Square is all the indication you need.After the Egyptian government suddenly resigned last month, the former housing minister Ibrahim Mehlib was named premier; he appointed Mostafa Madbouly, a leading figure in the Cairo 2050 vision, to replace him. Will these experts in housing and urban development serve the interests of the majority of Egyptians living in cities? Or will they continue to serve the interests of a particular network of political and financial power? Emaar Square is all the indication you need.
• Mohamed Elshahed is a Cairo-based scholar completing his PhD with the Middle East department of NYU. A version of this article originally appeared at Cairobserver.• Mohamed Elshahed is a Cairo-based scholar completing his PhD with the Middle East department of NYU. A version of this article originally appeared at Cairobserver.