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The phantom at the Iran nuclear talks: weaponisation The phantom at the Iran nuclear talks: weaponisation
(about 13 hours later)
As the senior negotiators from six world powers and Iran sat down in Vienna this week to try to draft a comprehensive nuclear settlement, the American delegation has sought to damp down expectations. Briefing the press before this week's round of talks, a senior administration official said:As the senior negotiators from six world powers and Iran sat down in Vienna this week to try to draft a comprehensive nuclear settlement, the American delegation has sought to damp down expectations. Briefing the press before this week's round of talks, a senior administration official said:
Everyone comes to the table wanting a diplomatic solution..But having the intention does not mean it will happen..Frankly, this is very, very difficult. Though we are drafting… it does not mean agreement is imminent.Everyone comes to the table wanting a diplomatic solution..But having the intention does not mean it will happen..Frankly, this is very, very difficult. Though we are drafting… it does not mean agreement is imminent.
The briefing was an attempt to control the pendulum effect on expectations. Through the early spring of this year, western diplomats were so impressed by the seriousness of purpose of the Iranian president, Hassan Rouhani, and his foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, that they recalibrated their assessment of the likelihood of a comprehensive settlement from "long shot" to a 50-50 possibility. The upgrade was so sharp it caused a certain amount of whiplash in general perceptions and a spreading presumption that the deal would done. No diplomat wants to go into negotiations against that backdrop.The briefing was an attempt to control the pendulum effect on expectations. Through the early spring of this year, western diplomats were so impressed by the seriousness of purpose of the Iranian president, Hassan Rouhani, and his foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, that they recalibrated their assessment of the likelihood of a comprehensive settlement from "long shot" to a 50-50 possibility. The upgrade was so sharp it caused a certain amount of whiplash in general perceptions and a spreading presumption that the deal would done. No diplomat wants to go into negotiations against that backdrop.
As the senior US official pointed out that are still huge gaps to close. There is the question of capacity. Iran currently has about 19,000 centrifuges installed, 11,000 of them spinning, and has stated ambitions for more.As the senior US official pointed out that are still huge gaps to close. There is the question of capacity. Iran currently has about 19,000 centrifuges installed, 11,000 of them spinning, and has stated ambitions for more.
The west is thinking in terms of five or six thousand, so ensure Iran does not have the capacity to enrich enough uranium for a bomb in a just a few months. The west would rather Tehran was at least a year from that 'breakout' capacity. That will be difficult for Rouhani and Zarif as it implies the dismantling of cherished centrifuges, which have taken on almost mythic status in the pantheon of national self-esteem. It risks humiliation but extending breakout capacity is a western red line. In fact, it is the bottom line.The west is thinking in terms of five or six thousand, so ensure Iran does not have the capacity to enrich enough uranium for a bomb in a just a few months. The west would rather Tehran was at least a year from that 'breakout' capacity. That will be difficult for Rouhani and Zarif as it implies the dismantling of cherished centrifuges, which have taken on almost mythic status in the pantheon of national self-esteem. It risks humiliation but extending breakout capacity is a western red line. In fact, it is the bottom line.
But there is another issue waiting in the wings - the past. The general western intelligence consensus is that Iran had an organised weaponisation programme exploring how to build a warhead up to 2003, and that if research continued it was in a more dispersed manner.But there is another issue waiting in the wings - the past. The general western intelligence consensus is that Iran had an organised weaponisation programme exploring how to build a warhead up to 2003, and that if research continued it was in a more dispersed manner.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been looking into these past 'possible military dimensions' (PMD's) of the Iran programme, and earlier this year struck a new deal with the Rouhani government about how IAEA inspectors should go about their investigations. But that agreement has not led so far to a visit to the military site at Parchin, where western intelligence believes there was once a facility for testing the explosive components of a warhead, and has been more recently the site of an apparent clean-up.The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been looking into these past 'possible military dimensions' (PMD's) of the Iran programme, and earlier this year struck a new deal with the Rouhani government about how IAEA inspectors should go about their investigations. But that agreement has not led so far to a visit to the military site at Parchin, where western intelligence believes there was once a facility for testing the explosive components of a warhead, and has been more recently the site of an apparent clean-up.
David Albright and Bruno Tertrais argue in today's Wall Street Journal ($) that Iran would have to come clean on all its past work as part of a comprehensive agreement.David Albright and Bruno Tertrais argue in today's Wall Street Journal ($) that Iran would have to come clean on all its past work as part of a comprehensive agreement.
Unless Iran takes seriously its obligations to the IAEA to address concerns about past military-nuclear efforts, Tehran will have established a powerful precedent of no-go zones for inspectors. Tehran could declare a suspect site a military base and thus off-limits. What better place to conduct clandestine, prohibited activities, such as uranium enrichment and weaponization?Unless Iran takes seriously its obligations to the IAEA to address concerns about past military-nuclear efforts, Tehran will have established a powerful precedent of no-go zones for inspectors. Tehran could declare a suspect site a military base and thus off-limits. What better place to conduct clandestine, prohibited activities, such as uranium enrichment and weaponization?
Tehran would have also defeated a central tenet of IAEA inspections: the need to determine both the accuracy and completeness of a state's nuclear declaration. Other countries contemplating the clandestine development of nuclear weapons will certainly watch Tehran closely.Tehran would have also defeated a central tenet of IAEA inspections: the need to determine both the accuracy and completeness of a state's nuclear declaration. Other countries contemplating the clandestine development of nuclear weapons will certainly watch Tehran closely.
Albright makes a similar argument (for free) in this piece on Parchin at the Institute for Science and International Security.Albright makes a similar argument (for free) in this piece on Parchin at the Institute for Science and International Security.
The problem with this is that even if Iran started working on weapons in the wake of the Iran-Iraq war (in which it saw the West as backing Saddam's use of chemical weapons against Iran) but was now prepared to give up any such aspirations, it might still refuse to contemplate a confession. It would be a huge embarrassment in view of the Supreme Leader's fatwa against nuclear weapons. Tehran could also see pressure for such a confession as a trick designed to justify a military attack. The question then for the West is whether to allow those fears stand in the way of deal that would constraint Iran's future programme.The problem with this is that even if Iran started working on weapons in the wake of the Iran-Iraq war (in which it saw the West as backing Saddam's use of chemical weapons against Iran) but was now prepared to give up any such aspirations, it might still refuse to contemplate a confession. It would be a huge embarrassment in view of the Supreme Leader's fatwa against nuclear weapons. Tehran could also see pressure for such a confession as a trick designed to justify a military attack. The question then for the West is whether to allow those fears stand in the way of deal that would constraint Iran's future programme.
The mood music being put out by diplomats in Vienna suggests that the issue will not be a deal breaker for now. One solution, set out in a detailled report produced by the International Crisis Group, is for the problem to be kicked down the road. A comprehensive deal clinched in the next few months would commit Iran to resolving the issue satisfactorily with the IAEA. It would not let Iran off the hook but neither would it jeopardise non-proliferation gains that could be achievable now.The mood music being put out by diplomats in Vienna suggests that the issue will not be a deal breaker for now. One solution, set out in a detailled report produced by the International Crisis Group, is for the problem to be kicked down the road. A comprehensive deal clinched in the next few months would commit Iran to resolving the issue satisfactorily with the IAEA. It would not let Iran off the hook but neither would it jeopardise non-proliferation gains that could be achievable now.
UPDATE: David Albright had this comment on this blog:
The problem with kicking the can down the road like you are suggesting is that unsc sanctions would be hard to remove. And if Iran will not cooperate now on something the IAEA views as a legitimate request under the safeguards agreement, why would Iran cooperate later when financial and oil sanctions are removed and it can make same (bogus) legal argument about not allowing access to military facilities and personnel. In terms of nonproliferation, a deal sidestepping IAEA, essentially telling the IAEA to stand down, would be unlikely to be positive for nonproliferation regime. This harm would be magnified, given the slight chance that Iran is going to address the IAEA's concerns later. Honestly, do you think Iran would?
Also, think of how Iran would play it. They could say (incorrectly of course but it would resonate in much of the world): We were right all along, we never had a nuclear weapons program. The West was just hassling us because they wanted to deny us civil nuclear technology.
The atmospherics would be terrible for Obama and those that want a sound, verifiable deal. So better not to rush and get a bad deal like the one you are suggesting.