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Reassuring Eastern Europe Reassuring Eastern Europe
(3 months later)
LONDON — The centerpiece of President Obama’s recent trip to Europe was a $1 billion program of new military exercises on land, at sea and in the air, to reassure our friends and allies of America’s commitment to their security. That may sound like a lot of money, but in terms of military spending, it’s not much at all. LONDON — The centerpiece of President Obama’s recent trip to Europe was a $1 billion program of new military exercises on land, at sea and in the air, to reassure our friends and allies of America’s commitment to their security. That may sound like a lot of money, but in terms of military spending, it’s not much at all.
More important, the so-called European Reassurance Initiative has failed to impress America’s Eastern European allies. Polish officials, for instance, quickly labeled it insufficient.More important, the so-called European Reassurance Initiative has failed to impress America’s Eastern European allies. Polish officials, for instance, quickly labeled it insufficient.
Instead of spending money to transport troops and equipment in and out of Eastern Europe, President Obama should adopt a bolder strategy: American and NATO forces should have new, permanent bases in Poland and elsewhere on the territory of NATO members in Central and Eastern Europe. American forces would be welcomed there and host countries could bear a substantial portion of the costs.Instead of spending money to transport troops and equipment in and out of Eastern Europe, President Obama should adopt a bolder strategy: American and NATO forces should have new, permanent bases in Poland and elsewhere on the territory of NATO members in Central and Eastern Europe. American forces would be welcomed there and host countries could bear a substantial portion of the costs.
The main objection to such a move is that it would contradict a 1997 accord called the NATO-Russia Founding Act. In that accord, NATO pledged no “additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces” in the East.The main objection to such a move is that it would contradict a 1997 accord called the NATO-Russia Founding Act. In that accord, NATO pledged no “additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces” in the East.
But circumstances have changed. The 1997 accord was an attempt by Bill Clinton’s administration, in which I served, to persuade Russia that NATO expansion was not a threat as there were no plans to move conventional or nuclear forces closer to Russia’s borders. Now, the situation is reversed.But circumstances have changed. The 1997 accord was an attempt by Bill Clinton’s administration, in which I served, to persuade Russia that NATO expansion was not a threat as there were no plans to move conventional or nuclear forces closer to Russia’s borders. Now, the situation is reversed.
Russia, by invading and absorbing Crimea and provoking a civil war in Ukraine, has not only violated a guiding principle of that accord — the sanctity of international borders — but now it poses a genuine threat to America’s allies.Russia, by invading and absorbing Crimea and provoking a civil war in Ukraine, has not only violated a guiding principle of that accord — the sanctity of international borders — but now it poses a genuine threat to America’s allies.
This possibility was envisaged by America’s secretary of state at the time, Madeleine Albright, who understood that the relatively benign Russia of President Boris N. Yeltsin might revert to a more dangerous foe. That’s why Ms. Albright ensured that the language was carefully crafted so as not to rule out for all time the stationing of new NATO forces in countries closer to Moscow.This possibility was envisaged by America’s secretary of state at the time, Madeleine Albright, who understood that the relatively benign Russia of President Boris N. Yeltsin might revert to a more dangerous foe. That’s why Ms. Albright ensured that the language was carefully crafted so as not to rule out for all time the stationing of new NATO forces in countries closer to Moscow.
Washington should therefore declare the basing provision of the 1997 accord null and void and react proportionately to Russia’s violation of the agreement. NATO planners could then decide where new bases should be created so that American troops, allied forces or new equipment and supplies, or combinations of all these, could best serve NATO’s mission of collective defense and deterrence.Washington should therefore declare the basing provision of the 1997 accord null and void and react proportionately to Russia’s violation of the agreement. NATO planners could then decide where new bases should be created so that American troops, allied forces or new equipment and supplies, or combinations of all these, could best serve NATO’s mission of collective defense and deterrence.
From the outset of the crisis in Ukraine, the Obama administration has tried to steer a middle course in its response to Russia’s aggression. On one hand, the military, diplomatic and economic steps taken were designed both to punish Russia for its invasion of Crimea and to reassure America’s allies of Washington’s commitment to their security. On the other hand, the economic sanctions imposed and the military exercises ordered have been calibrated to avoid provoking President Vladimir V. Putin into further aggression and an escalating confrontation with the United States.From the outset of the crisis in Ukraine, the Obama administration has tried to steer a middle course in its response to Russia’s aggression. On one hand, the military, diplomatic and economic steps taken were designed both to punish Russia for its invasion of Crimea and to reassure America’s allies of Washington’s commitment to their security. On the other hand, the economic sanctions imposed and the military exercises ordered have been calibrated to avoid provoking President Vladimir V. Putin into further aggression and an escalating confrontation with the United States.
In its understandable attempt to strike such a balance, however, the Obama administration has erred on the side of caution. As a result, key allies in Central and Eastern Europe have legitimate security concerns, as they watch Mr. Putin’s cronies continue to wreak havoc in eastern Ukraine. In recent weeks, aircraft have been shot down and pitched battles have been fought at airports, government buildings and checkpoints. Casualties are already in the hundreds, and with fighting continuing, no end to this civil war is in sight.In its understandable attempt to strike such a balance, however, the Obama administration has erred on the side of caution. As a result, key allies in Central and Eastern Europe have legitimate security concerns, as they watch Mr. Putin’s cronies continue to wreak havoc in eastern Ukraine. In recent weeks, aircraft have been shot down and pitched battles have been fought at airports, government buildings and checkpoints. Casualties are already in the hundreds, and with fighting continuing, no end to this civil war is in sight.
It’s true that Ukraine’s recent election of a new president is an encouraging development. So is Russia’s decision to withdraw tens of thousands of troops from Ukraine’s border. But Crimea is now, for all practical purposes, part of Russia — a spoil of a war against Ukraine that is far from over.It’s true that Ukraine’s recent election of a new president is an encouraging development. So is Russia’s decision to withdraw tens of thousands of troops from Ukraine’s border. But Crimea is now, for all practical purposes, part of Russia — a spoil of a war against Ukraine that is far from over.
Eastern European countries whose security depends on American guarantees have watched Washington declare Asia more important than Europe; they have observed Syria’s murderous leader ignore Mr. Obama’s “red line” against the use of chemical weapons; and they perceive the withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq as a reflection of the war-weariness of the American public. These allies are not going to be won over by half-measures or minimal military steps.Eastern European countries whose security depends on American guarantees have watched Washington declare Asia more important than Europe; they have observed Syria’s murderous leader ignore Mr. Obama’s “red line” against the use of chemical weapons; and they perceive the withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq as a reflection of the war-weariness of the American public. These allies are not going to be won over by half-measures or minimal military steps.
The painful truth is that despite their NATO membership and Mr. Obama’s solemn promise in Warsaw last week, the citizens and leaders of, for example, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia wonder whether America would really risk a war with Russia to defend them.The painful truth is that despite their NATO membership and Mr. Obama’s solemn promise in Warsaw last week, the citizens and leaders of, for example, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia wonder whether America would really risk a war with Russia to defend them.
There is ample legal precedent from the Cold War for how Washington should react to Moscow’s violation of international accords. When the Soviet Union violated arms control agreements in the 1980s, the United States adopted a policy of “appropriate and proportional responses,” in the words of President Ronald Reagan.There is ample legal precedent from the Cold War for how Washington should react to Moscow’s violation of international accords. When the Soviet Union violated arms control agreements in the 1980s, the United States adopted a policy of “appropriate and proportional responses,” in the words of President Ronald Reagan.
It is beyond dispute that Mr. Putin has violated the United Nations Charter, the NATO-Russia Founding Act and a 1994 binding agreement under which Ukraine gave up the nuclear weapons on its soil in exchange for Russia’s acceptance of Ukraine’s territorial integrity.It is beyond dispute that Mr. Putin has violated the United Nations Charter, the NATO-Russia Founding Act and a 1994 binding agreement under which Ukraine gave up the nuclear weapons on its soil in exchange for Russia’s acceptance of Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
Without increasing the overall number of American troops in Europe, new permanent basing arrangements in the East would be a proportionate response to Moscow’s decision to threaten and use force against Ukraine in violation of international law. Anything less would be unlikely to reassure our Eastern European allies.Without increasing the overall number of American troops in Europe, new permanent basing arrangements in the East would be a proportionate response to Moscow’s decision to threaten and use force against Ukraine in violation of international law. Anything less would be unlikely to reassure our Eastern European allies.
Of course, rearranging NATO forces won’t solve the crisis in Ukraine. That will take years of careful diplomacy, backed by the leverage of sanctions against Russia and economic support for Kiev’s fragile democracy. But establishing new bases in NATO’s East will enable Washington to regain the upper hand in this crisis.Of course, rearranging NATO forces won’t solve the crisis in Ukraine. That will take years of careful diplomacy, backed by the leverage of sanctions against Russia and economic support for Kiev’s fragile democracy. But establishing new bases in NATO’s East will enable Washington to regain the upper hand in this crisis.
It will also ensure that Mr. Putin pays a lasting price for his aggression. That makes it far less likely that he will attempt in the Baltics or Poland what he got away with in Georgia in 2008 and in Crimea this year.It will also ensure that Mr. Putin pays a lasting price for his aggression. That makes it far less likely that he will attempt in the Baltics or Poland what he got away with in Georgia in 2008 and in Crimea this year.
James P. Rubin, a visiting scholar at Oxford University’s Rothermere American Institute, was an assistant secretary of state for public affairs during the Clinton administration.James P. Rubin, a visiting scholar at Oxford University’s Rothermere American Institute, was an assistant secretary of state for public affairs during the Clinton administration.