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| Seeing Their Gains at Risk, Shiites Flock to Join Militias | Seeing Their Gains at Risk, Shiites Flock to Join Militias |
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| BAGHDAD — When he heard on Tuesday that Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, had fallen to Sunni militants, Abu Ali Alakabaie knew what he had to do. | BAGHDAD — When he heard on Tuesday that Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, had fallen to Sunni militants, Abu Ali Alakabaie knew what he had to do. |
| One of a number of Iraqi Shiite commanders who had been fighting on behalf of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria in recent years, he quickly packed his belongings and hit the road, racing to Baghdad, where he had heard that the militants were already reaching the northern suburbs. | One of a number of Iraqi Shiite commanders who had been fighting on behalf of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria in recent years, he quickly packed his belongings and hit the road, racing to Baghdad, where he had heard that the militants were already reaching the northern suburbs. |
| “After they occupied Mosul, we decided to come back from Syria to back the security forces here,” he said. | “After they occupied Mosul, we decided to come back from Syria to back the security forces here,” he said. |
| He arrived in Baghdad later on Tuesday, joining a growing throng of Iraqi militia commanders and fighters eager to put to work here the finely honed skills they had accumulated in Syria in years of fighting some of the same Sunni militants who were now attacking Iraq. “We now have great experience in guerrilla fighting,” he said, adding diplomatically, “The Iraqi Army has no experience doing that.” | He arrived in Baghdad later on Tuesday, joining a growing throng of Iraqi militia commanders and fighters eager to put to work here the finely honed skills they had accumulated in Syria in years of fighting some of the same Sunni militants who were now attacking Iraq. “We now have great experience in guerrilla fighting,” he said, adding diplomatically, “The Iraqi Army has no experience doing that.” |
| As he spoke Friday evening, hundreds of young Shiite men streamed past him, massing in a basketball arena in eastern Baghdad, lining up before recruiters like college students at a job fair. The officials took their names and addresses, to run background checks before adding them to the militia ranks. | As he spoke Friday evening, hundreds of young Shiite men streamed past him, massing in a basketball arena in eastern Baghdad, lining up before recruiters like college students at a job fair. The officials took their names and addresses, to run background checks before adding them to the militia ranks. |
| It wasn’t just one Shiite militia group recruiting but at least four — and perhaps more. It was hard to tell in the confusion as Shiites responded by the thousands to the call to arms issued earlier in the day by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, to protect fellow Shiites and to prop up the Shiite government of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki. | It wasn’t just one Shiite militia group recruiting but at least four — and perhaps more. It was hard to tell in the confusion as Shiites responded by the thousands to the call to arms issued earlier in the day by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, to protect fellow Shiites and to prop up the Shiite government of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki. |
| It was only three weeks ago that Mr. Maliki, given the number of seats his bloc had won, seemed to be in a strong position to secure a third term as prime minister. Yet his country now seemed in danger of slipping away from him. Sunni militants were in full control of Mosul and Tikrit, Saddam Hussein’s hometown, while the Kurds, ostensibly his allies, had taken over Kirkuk, an oil-rich city that they had long coveted. | |
| But it was more than that, as Iraq’s millions of Shiites knew very well. The United States invasion and occupation had handed them a once in a millennium opportunity to rule. And now, in a matter of five or six years, they seemed on the verge of squandering it. The sacred Shiite shrines at Samarra, Karbala and Najaf were threatened by the militants and their leaders in the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, who had sworn to level the sites. | But it was more than that, as Iraq’s millions of Shiites knew very well. The United States invasion and occupation had handed them a once in a millennium opportunity to rule. And now, in a matter of five or six years, they seemed on the verge of squandering it. The sacred Shiite shrines at Samarra, Karbala and Najaf were threatened by the militants and their leaders in the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, who had sworn to level the sites. |
| But the idea of bringing back Shiite militias sent a shudder through many, raising chilling memories of the sectarian war that raged in Iraq from 2005 through 2008, with torture chambers, ethnic cleansing of neighborhoods and bodies dumped in the Tigris with holes drilled in victims’ heads. Such a war, once unleashed, would be hard to quell, and Shiite leaders were well aware that the Sunni militants were willing to start one. | But the idea of bringing back Shiite militias sent a shudder through many, raising chilling memories of the sectarian war that raged in Iraq from 2005 through 2008, with torture chambers, ethnic cleansing of neighborhoods and bodies dumped in the Tigris with holes drilled in victims’ heads. Such a war, once unleashed, would be hard to quell, and Shiite leaders were well aware that the Sunni militants were willing to start one. |
| Sheikh Abdul Mehdi al-Karbalaie, Ayatollah Sistani’s representative was cautious on Friday. Speaking from Karbala, he said the numbers of fighters and volunteers “must fill the gaps within the security forces.” | Sheikh Abdul Mehdi al-Karbalaie, Ayatollah Sistani’s representative was cautious on Friday. Speaking from Karbala, he said the numbers of fighters and volunteers “must fill the gaps within the security forces.” |
| For now the Shiite militias-in-formation are maintaining that they are not anti-Sunni. But distrust, if not unspoken loathing, is apparent — a mirror image of the Sunni militants’ views of the Shiites and a disturbing omen for the days ahead. | For now the Shiite militias-in-formation are maintaining that they are not anti-Sunni. But distrust, if not unspoken loathing, is apparent — a mirror image of the Sunni militants’ views of the Shiites and a disturbing omen for the days ahead. |
| “Of course it’s risky if you arm civilians, but people have to defend their communities and localities,” said a Maliki adviser, adding that the government welcomed the ayatollah’s support. | “Of course it’s risky if you arm civilians, but people have to defend their communities and localities,” said a Maliki adviser, adding that the government welcomed the ayatollah’s support. |
| That Shiites feel they have to turn to militias to guarantee their protection is testimony to the country’s slide into chaos. The Iraqi Army, which the Americans spent around $20 billion trying to rebuild as a multi-sect, multiethnic force, has been so riven by sectarianism that it is unable or unwilling to protect Iraqi citizens and fight enemies of the Iraqi state in an evenhanded way. | That Shiites feel they have to turn to militias to guarantee their protection is testimony to the country’s slide into chaos. The Iraqi Army, which the Americans spent around $20 billion trying to rebuild as a multi-sect, multiethnic force, has been so riven by sectarianism that it is unable or unwilling to protect Iraqi citizens and fight enemies of the Iraqi state in an evenhanded way. |
| Shiite militias today are somewhat different from those active during the worst days of the sectarian fighting, when they were largely attached to political and religious parties and operated separately and often in opposition to the Iraqi Army. Current militias, some of which have been around for several years, aim to work with the security forces in a semi-integrated fashion, said several militia commanders. | Shiite militias today are somewhat different from those active during the worst days of the sectarian fighting, when they were largely attached to political and religious parties and operated separately and often in opposition to the Iraqi Army. Current militias, some of which have been around for several years, aim to work with the security forces in a semi-integrated fashion, said several militia commanders. |
| One commander, reached by phone at an Iraqi Army base where he is helping train the soldiers and work with commanders on counterterrorism strategy, sounded almost patronizing as he spoke of the problems. This commander, who identified himself only as Mohammed, for security reasons, described something akin to a buddy system in which the militia members would embed with the troops and push them to stand their ground. | One commander, reached by phone at an Iraqi Army base where he is helping train the soldiers and work with commanders on counterterrorism strategy, sounded almost patronizing as he spoke of the problems. This commander, who identified himself only as Mohammed, for security reasons, described something akin to a buddy system in which the militia members would embed with the troops and push them to stand their ground. |
| “What’s going on now is just a copy of what we did in Syria, planning and suggesting the movement of the troops,” he said. | “What’s going on now is just a copy of what we did in Syria, planning and suggesting the movement of the troops,” he said. |
| “The militiamen will be at the front,” he said. “The Iraqi Army has no ideology, and because of this they let Mosul, Salahuddin and other areas fall into the hands of militants. We suggested to them to let every Iraqi soldier have a militiaman brother because we know the Iraqi soldier’s activity is not more than 50 percent. He’s just a man with a weapon, but if he saw a militiaman fighting with him, then he will be ashamed to withdraw.” | “The militiamen will be at the front,” he said. “The Iraqi Army has no ideology, and because of this they let Mosul, Salahuddin and other areas fall into the hands of militants. We suggested to them to let every Iraqi soldier have a militiaman brother because we know the Iraqi soldier’s activity is not more than 50 percent. He’s just a man with a weapon, but if he saw a militiaman fighting with him, then he will be ashamed to withdraw.” |
| Ali, another Shiite militia leader, described the militias more as a recruiting mechanism, and said the members would work full time for the army. “Now we have more than 14,000 volunteers in Muthanna Airport,” he said. “They came from all the provinces, but most of them from Baghdad. What we want is building a companion army from the volunteers, and this army will be supervised, equipped and run by the government. It’s similar to a public army. | Ali, another Shiite militia leader, described the militias more as a recruiting mechanism, and said the members would work full time for the army. “Now we have more than 14,000 volunteers in Muthanna Airport,” he said. “They came from all the provinces, but most of them from Baghdad. What we want is building a companion army from the volunteers, and this army will be supervised, equipped and run by the government. It’s similar to a public army. |
| “All Shiite factions have pushed their disagreements away and decided to join this army to protect Baghdad,” he said, adding a note of urgency: “The militants are just outside Baghdad, and even the main road between Baghdad and Diyala is partially under their control.” | “All Shiite factions have pushed their disagreements away and decided to join this army to protect Baghdad,” he said, adding a note of urgency: “The militants are just outside Baghdad, and even the main road between Baghdad and Diyala is partially under their control.” |
| Parallel to the recruitment effort by the militia, senior Iraqi Army commanders were going neighborhood to neighborhood to find replacements for those who had deserted. The day before at a stadium in the Husseiniya neighborhood, the commander of the Iraqi Army’s 11th Division, in charge of security for northern Baghdad, had addressed hundreds of sheikhs about the need to support the government. | Parallel to the recruitment effort by the militia, senior Iraqi Army commanders were going neighborhood to neighborhood to find replacements for those who had deserted. The day before at a stadium in the Husseiniya neighborhood, the commander of the Iraqi Army’s 11th Division, in charge of security for northern Baghdad, had addressed hundreds of sheikhs about the need to support the government. |
| Maj. Gen. Abdul Jabbar asked each of them to prove their support for the government by providing 50 volunteers to join informal fighting units, which would be attached to the military and deploy with them. | Maj. Gen. Abdul Jabbar asked each of them to prove their support for the government by providing 50 volunteers to join informal fighting units, which would be attached to the military and deploy with them. |
| Sheikh Ali Jabbar al-Lani made his 50 by bringing out, among others, his 15-year-old son, Ahmad. “Not only can I shoot an AK-47,” said the boy, who is a high school student, “but I can fieldstrip it too.” | Sheikh Ali Jabbar al-Lani made his 50 by bringing out, among others, his 15-year-old son, Ahmad. “Not only can I shoot an AK-47,” said the boy, who is a high school student, “but I can fieldstrip it too.” |
| Like many of the other “shabab” or youths who were pouring out in large numbers in Shiite neighborhoods throughout Baghdad and southern Iraq, Ahmad remembers the sectarian warfare that convulsed Iraq when he was a young boy, involved in duties like carrying messages under fire, replenishing ammunition and otherwise helping the older men fight. | Like many of the other “shabab” or youths who were pouring out in large numbers in Shiite neighborhoods throughout Baghdad and southern Iraq, Ahmad remembers the sectarian warfare that convulsed Iraq when he was a young boy, involved in duties like carrying messages under fire, replenishing ammunition and otherwise helping the older men fight. |
| Now, his four older brothers are all in the Iraqi Army, two of them deployed to Samarra and one to Mosul, who had to flee when the army collapsed there. | Now, his four older brothers are all in the Iraqi Army, two of them deployed to Samarra and one to Mosul, who had to flee when the army collapsed there. |
| “I’m not worried about him,” his father said. “This is his country. If God will let them come to Baghdad, they will have to pass Husseiniya, and we consider ourselves as the shield of Baghdad.” | “I’m not worried about him,” his father said. “This is his country. If God will let them come to Baghdad, they will have to pass Husseiniya, and we consider ourselves as the shield of Baghdad.” |