China snubs North Korea with leader's visit to South Korea
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Version 0 of 1. Scott Snyder: Xi’s Seoul visit is a powerful expression of his displeasure with North Korea’s direction under Kim Jong-un When South Korea’s President Park Geun-hye welcomes Xi Jinping to the Blue House today, it will mark the first time that a Chinese leader will visit Seoul without having first visited Pyongyang. This is a remarkable development when one considers the close ideological and historic ties between China and North Korea, but it would be premature to assume that Beijing has abandoned Pyongyang for Seoul. China under Mao Zedong saved Kim Jong-un’s grandfather from certain defeat at the hands of UN forces led by General MacArthur during the 1950-1953 Korean War (still known in China as the “War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea”) by preventing the advance of allied forces to the China-North Korean border at the Yalu River and fighting to a stalemate. Although North Korea saw China’s normalisation of relations with South Korea in 1992 as a betrayal, and Sino-South Korean trade is now almost 40 times larger than its trade with North Korea, China has not allowed its 1961 security commitment to North Korea to lapse. Neither has Beijing withdrawn its extensive economic assistance or political support for North Korea. Even in the aftermath of North Korea’s 2010 shelling of South Korean islands, Beijing protected North Korea from international condemnation of those actions at the United Nations. No doubt, Xi’s Seoul visit is a powerful expression of his displeasure with North Korea’s direction under Kim Jong-un, but despite Beijing’s symbolic chastening of Pyongyang and stories that China has cut its export of oil to North Korea, China still places maintenance of North Korea’s stability as a top priority. South Korean efforts to gain China’s understanding for a South Korean-led reunification of the Korean peninsula and Park’s desire to warm up relations with Beijing may be understandable, but China may not be swayed by Seoul’s logic on Korean reunification as long as South Korea’s alliance with the United States remains central to South Korea. China may not be swayed by Seoul’s logic on Korean reunification as long as South Korea’s alliance with the United States remains central to South Korea China wants a reunified Korea to be friendly to Beijing, has explicitly stated its distrust of US alliances and its view that the US-Korea alliance would have no utility in the absence of a North Korean threat, and probably believes that its growing economic importance to South Korea will eventually provide it with the leverage necessary to marginalise the US security role on the peninsula. At present, Chinese and South Korean political and strategic differences on these issues impose real limits on the improvement of political relations between China and South Korea, despite a bilateral trade relationship of over $220 billion in 2013 and notwithstanding the current honeymoon in Sino-ROK relations under Xi and Park. Beijing probably believes that time and the forces of economic interdependence are on its side. The more difficult near-term questions for Xi may come after Seoul, when he may return to the more difficult task of determining how to more effectively deal with Pyongyang. Scott Snyder is senior fellow for Korea studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Follow him on Twitter @snydersas Adam Cathcart: Xi Jinping’s diplomatic goals in the South Korean capital do not perturb the North Korean regime in the least For all the international frisson which is being generated around Xi Jinping’s preference for travelling to Seoul over Pyongyang, there is one large demographic that seems unlikely to know or care anything about it: the North Korean people. For the 23 million people trapped within the otherworldly bubble of DPRK state media, the current news cycle is far more fixated on the revolutionary repertoire of an obscure Russian wind band than the itinerary of China’s head of state. To the extent that they might be discussed at all outside of North Korean elite circles, Xi Jinping’s diplomatic goals in the South Korean capital do not perturb the North Korean regime in the least. Nevertheless, ire must be displayed for the proper audiences. And, since well over 80% of its non-peninsular trade is with China, the North Korean state has to resort to indirect insults. One article referred to withstanding the “pressure of the great power chauvinists.” Another article in the Party newspaper called Park Geun-hye’s goal of denuclearisation (a goal very much shared by Xi Jinping) a “dog’s dream.” Meanwhile, Kim Jong-un demonstrates an almost Rabelasian appetite for, and delight in, watching missile launches. China has seen far worse, however, and the Chinese Communist Party continues to build up its northeastern frontier with the Korean peninsula. The Party Secretary for Jilin province was recently on the Sino-North Korean border, talking in Xi-inflected language about "accelerating the interconnection of Northeast Asian transportation routes” via new high-speed trains, and making the borderlands safe and prosperous. Trade with North Korea continues, even as reports emerge of problems with oil exports, deadly accidents and a total cessation of construction on two islands leased to China. Perfectly-timed defector narratives recently asserted that a letter to Chinese leaders helped to seal the death sentence for Kim Jong-un’s very uncle this past December. The People’s Republic of China has had diplomatic relations with Seoul since 1992, but its business ties to South Korea date back another decade. And South Korean business leaders are meeting with Xi in force on 4 July, investing heavily in Northeast China and gambling on the long-term prospect of gaining access to the minerals and manpower north of the 38th parallel. China's greatest leverage with Pyongyang is geographical, and Chinese dynasties have made a pattern of allying with southern Korean kingdoms to extinguish disrespectful foes in the north. As Xi Jinping cosies up to South Korean capitalists and dreams his canine dream of a nuclear-free peninsula, the North Korean leadership might keep that in mind. Adam Cathcart is a lecturer in Chinese History at University of Leeds, and Editor-in-Chief of SinoNK.com. Follow him on Twitter @adamcathcart Ralph Cossa: While China will send signals of its annoyance, it will not pull the plug and take Pyongyang off of life support I think the fact that Chinese President Xi Jinping has decided to go to Seoul prior to visiting Pyongyang, and instead of having Kim Jong-un visit Beijing, reflects both growing frustration on the part of the Chinese leadership with North Korea’s young General, as well as a growing level of distrust toward the North Korean regime. I’m told by Chinese security specialists that Pyongyang has been pushing hard for a Kim visit to China and that Beijing has been reluctant since it fears that a Kim Jong-un visit to Beijing might be followed shortly after his return home by another North Korean nuclear test, thus implying (falsely) that Beijing had given Kim a green light. The same logic would apply regarding a Xi visit to Pyongyang. This highlights the growing mistrust between the two nations, especially following Jang Song-thaek’s execution. Clearly both President Xi and South Korean President Park Guen-hye see the visit as a way to pressure Pyongyang to be more forthcoming and to act more responsibly. It also has the added “benefit” (from a PRC and ROK perspective; certainly not from a US perspective) of contrasting the increasingly close ties between Beijing in Seoul with the continued frosty relations both currently have with Tokyo. The visit also contrasts the increasingly close ties between Beijing and Seoul, with the frosty relations both currently have with Tokyo While Xi and Park may hope their second summit (the first was held last year) will have a sobering effect on Kim Jong-un, it is more likely to have the opposite effect. The North seems to still believe, based on logic that is clear only to those residing in Pyongyang, that China needs the North more than it needs China, and that while China will send signals of its annoyance from time to time, at the end of the day it will not pull the plug and take Pyongyang off of life support; any pain Pyongyang may experience will be temporary. As a result, the North is more likely to take steps that appear to up the ante since history has told them that the more confrontational Pyongyang appears, the more likely Beijing (and Washington and Seoul) will be to eventually reward them not for good behaviour but merely for the absence of bad behaviour. Pyongyang also appears to be attempting some sort of crude quid pro quo by all of a sudden cooperating with Tokyo on the abductees issue, even though this is likely to once again provide disappointing to Japan. Ralph Cossa is president of the Asia Forum at the the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Follow CSIS on Twitter @CSIS |