Ahmad Chalabi: the pariah who could become Iraq's next prime minister
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Version 0 of 1. If any confirmation were needed of the disintegration of Iraq and the failure of US policy, then surely it must be the second coming of Ahmad Chalabi. Once persona non grata in the US embassy in Iraq, he has been welcomed back into the fold, cited in the New York Times as a serious contender to replace Nouri al-Maliki, endorsed by Paul Wolfowitz, and talked up as a saviour by sections of the Iraqi government. The US wants a replacement for Maliki, but why Chalabi, who has negligible grassroots support in Iraq? He is said to be able to unite the different factions, but has any figure done more to play off one against the other? The answer comes down to Chalabi's considerable skill in elite manoeuvring. Never particularly interested in or adept at mass politics, he is exceptional at twisting arms and wooing behind the scenes. Chalabi is the scion of a wealthy merchant family whose fortunes, made under the pro-British monarch, were upended by the Qasim revolution in 1958. The family was driven into exile. Chalabi, by all accounts, seeks to reverse that historic loss, and now stands as close as he ever did to ruling Iraq. Chalabi's rise began with his assumption of control over Mebco, a family business in Lebanon, in 1975, with whose resources he built and controlled the now notorious Petra Bank from 1977. The wealth he accumulated gave him the opportunity to build powerful political relationships. He formed ties to the American Enterprise Institute, the Senate foreign relations committee, and Judith Miller of the New York Times. It is also from this period that Chalabi's alliance with Iran originates, for it was the Islamic Republic that he saw as a power base for Iraqi Shias against the Ba'athist regime. However, it was in the wake of the collapse of Petra Bank and the subsequent revelations concerning cooked books, that Chalabi – having absconded to avoid trial – was most empowered to pursue his political ambitions. While in London, he set up a new business, CardTech, with the profits of Petra Bank, but devoted more of his time to forming links with influential Iraqi exiles. The first formal alliance he founded was the Joint Action Committee, a group of exiles who prevailed upon the US to help ensconce them in power in Baghdad. Bush Sr authorised a CIA programme to organise Saddam Hussein's overthrow, and the CIA set out to recruit Chalabi. By 1993 he had set up the Iraqi National Congress with the help of the John Rendon PR firm, attained $4m funding a year, and received a personal letter of support for the organisation from vice-president Al Gore. His plans in this period came to little. He attempted, with the support of CIA agent Bob Baer, to get the US to support an INC-instigated rebellion against the regime, with US troops stepping in to finish off the job. The US instead leaned on Ayad Allawi and his Iraqi National Accord, who tried to depose Hussein in a putsch while leaving the Ba'athist power structure intact. Moreover, the US distrusted Chalabi for his deals with Iranian intelligence and his attempts to play rival Kurdish leaders off against one another. Even that setback was only temporary. Shunned by the administration, he tilted toward its neoconservative opponents and won a fresh layer of supporters. To existing allies such as the British MP Ann Clwyd and the academic Kanan Makiya, he added neoconservatives such as Richard Perle, Wolfowitz and Doug Feith. He also pursued a campaign in the media, again using his prodigious contacts list, to convince Americans that their government had betrayed an authentic democratic revolution. The 1998 Iraq Liberation Act, which earmarked $2m for the INC, was a major success of this strategy. But it was as an ally of the Bush administration that Chalabi's most effective work was done. The state department under Bush was far more generous with funding, and Chalabi used it to great effect, turning a number of journalists, and helping to disseminate falsehoods about Iraq's biological and chemical weapons. He participated in the postwar planning for Iraq, and even constructed his own Free Iraqi Forces militia, a group with whom he tried to stage a liberation march into Baghdad. His militia went nowhere, but Chalabi was put in charge of the Higher National De-Ba'athification Commission, in which role he was alleged to have shaken down Iraqi businessmen. His nephew was installed in the multibillion-dollar Trade Bank of Iraq, which gave his CardTech firm a big contract, and his allies made a fortune from reconstruction. When his 2005 election bid went abysmally, the Bush administration helped him to gain the post of deputy prime minister and acting oil minister. But even for the Bush administration, Chalabi was too untrustworthy. His name always came up whenever the subject was missing money in Iraq. He was too close to Iranian intelligence for someone who was supposed to be an asset. And when the administration tried to rein him in, he tilted briefly towards the Sadrists and decided he was against the occupation he had helped bring about. Chalabi only ever took advantage of the systems of corruption and coercion made available to him by Washington. For years, he has been peripheral to US strategy. Now, once again, the White House seems to need him. His allies in Baghdad and Washington claim he can reach out to Sunni Muslims, despite having spent years backing sectarian Shia forces and implementing "de-Ba'athification". Any government led by him would surely have a short life. That the US is considering him is a sign of how deep their despair has become. |