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| This renewed violence suggests a bleak future for Palestinians and Israelis | This renewed violence suggests a bleak future for Palestinians and Israelis |
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| Ask either of the protagonists in this Israel-Hamas flare-up where it ends and they will likely, in private at least and spin notwithstanding, tell you the same thing. Another fragile ceasefire, Hamas retains control of Gaza, Israel retains its blockade against Hamas and by extension its collective punishment of the Gazan civilian population and Hamas continues to be boycotted internationally. Israel will claim that Hamas has been dealt a harsh blow, deterrence restored; Hamas will counter that the resistance stood its ground, that the Israeli Defence Forces were deterred from re-invading. | Ask either of the protagonists in this Israel-Hamas flare-up where it ends and they will likely, in private at least and spin notwithstanding, tell you the same thing. Another fragile ceasefire, Hamas retains control of Gaza, Israel retains its blockade against Hamas and by extension its collective punishment of the Gazan civilian population and Hamas continues to be boycotted internationally. Israel will claim that Hamas has been dealt a harsh blow, deterrence restored; Hamas will counter that the resistance stood its ground, that the Israeli Defence Forces were deterred from re-invading. |
| There are good reasons to bet on this outcome. Israel has no better option. The alternatives – bedding down for a prolonged re-occupation of Gaza, handing Gaza to friendly Palestinians on the back of an Israeli tank, or to Egypt, or weakening Hamas so much that Gaza becomes a Somalia or Anbar-like chaotic ungoverned space – are all either unrealistic or undesirable. Hamas itself has no winning card to play. | There are good reasons to bet on this outcome. Israel has no better option. The alternatives – bedding down for a prolonged re-occupation of Gaza, handing Gaza to friendly Palestinians on the back of an Israeli tank, or to Egypt, or weakening Hamas so much that Gaza becomes a Somalia or Anbar-like chaotic ungoverned space – are all either unrealistic or undesirable. Hamas itself has no winning card to play. |
| But in a much destabilised region, three factors are lurking to challenge these business-as-usual assumptions. First, overall developments are trending towards greater radicalisation. Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas's brand – peaceful cooperation with Israel – is discredited, having failed to deliver an easing, let alone removal, of Israel's occupation. Other than small-scale exceptions, Palestinians have not succumbed so far to the appeal of radical jihadi groups such as Isis. Partly this results from the continued strength of Hamas as a mainstream nationalist-Islamist force, albeit one that breaks international law by targeting Israeli civilians (still, a more reasonable version of the folks the UK and west are offering to train and arm in Syria). | But in a much destabilised region, three factors are lurking to challenge these business-as-usual assumptions. First, overall developments are trending towards greater radicalisation. Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas's brand – peaceful cooperation with Israel – is discredited, having failed to deliver an easing, let alone removal, of Israel's occupation. Other than small-scale exceptions, Palestinians have not succumbed so far to the appeal of radical jihadi groups such as Isis. Partly this results from the continued strength of Hamas as a mainstream nationalist-Islamist force, albeit one that breaks international law by targeting Israeli civilians (still, a more reasonable version of the folks the UK and west are offering to train and arm in Syria). |
| Weaken Hamas too much and the most likely result is more violent radicalism rather than an outbreak of Israelophilia. | Weaken Hamas too much and the most likely result is more violent radicalism rather than an outbreak of Israelophilia. |
| In Israel, parliamentary politics have lurched further to the right, with the peace camp becoming a bystander to a policy struggle increasingly waged between advocates of continued management and entrenchment of the occupation and supporters of a decisive vanquishing of the Palestinians and annexation of "Greater Israel". Extra-parliamentary settler radicals have graduated from bullying Palestinians to burning Palestinians with the abduction and immolation of Mohammed Abu Khdeir. With the Israeli state and military able to impose closures on the Palestinians, demolish homes, confiscate land, build settlements and conduct mass arrests, any private Israeli initiatives towards vigilantism had previously been minimal – that appears to be changing. Israeli military planners urge caution, but the political centre of gravity lies elsewhere. Israel's bombing campaign of Gaza continues, the death toll is approaching triple digits and politicians threaten a ground incursion. Among the Palestinians, in the West Bank, east Jerusalem and Israel itself, demonstrations, mostly peacefully, have gained momentum. While from Gaza the indiscriminate rocket barrage continues. The ability to de-escalate will therefore face a more challenging public environment. | |
| The second worrying factor is the paucity of potential mediators to facilitate a ceasefire this time around. The absence of determined mediation between Israel and Hamas was one reason that Israeli operation Cast Lead against Gaza in the winter of 2008-9 lasted so long: 22 days. Rapid Egyptian and US-led ceasefire efforts in November 2012 helped ensure that the then Israeli operation "Pillars of Defence" would last only eight days and with far less devastating consequences. But that was under President Morsi, who had good relations with Hamas and included high-level Egyptian and Arab League delegations to Gaza, which also helped ease tensions. This time, the Egyptian and Hamas leadership are at loggerheads, inter-Arab divisions are more rife, and hostility to the Muslim Brotherhood (to which Hamas is affiliated) is a defining faultline and mediators are scarce – all of which may embolden Israel further. Any international mediation will need regional interlocutors with good enough ties to Hamas. | The second worrying factor is the paucity of potential mediators to facilitate a ceasefire this time around. The absence of determined mediation between Israel and Hamas was one reason that Israeli operation Cast Lead against Gaza in the winter of 2008-9 lasted so long: 22 days. Rapid Egyptian and US-led ceasefire efforts in November 2012 helped ensure that the then Israeli operation "Pillars of Defence" would last only eight days and with far less devastating consequences. But that was under President Morsi, who had good relations with Hamas and included high-level Egyptian and Arab League delegations to Gaza, which also helped ease tensions. This time, the Egyptian and Hamas leadership are at loggerheads, inter-Arab divisions are more rife, and hostility to the Muslim Brotherhood (to which Hamas is affiliated) is a defining faultline and mediators are scarce – all of which may embolden Israel further. Any international mediation will need regional interlocutors with good enough ties to Hamas. |
| And finally there is Binyamin Netanyahu himself. The Israeli prime minister tends to avoid military adventures, but that has more to do with risk aversion than Solomonic wisdom. Netanyahu is sometimes mistakenly credited with being a pragmatist. He is an ideologue. He is also facing a domestic political challenge (mostly from the right) unprecedented since his return to power in 2009. Netanyahu has little to show for his cumulative eight years in office and his endless un-acted-on military threats against Iranians and Palestinians are beginning to ring rather hollow. Netanyahu may decide that the political risks associated with inaction trump all other considerations. | And finally there is Binyamin Netanyahu himself. The Israeli prime minister tends to avoid military adventures, but that has more to do with risk aversion than Solomonic wisdom. Netanyahu is sometimes mistakenly credited with being a pragmatist. He is an ideologue. He is also facing a domestic political challenge (mostly from the right) unprecedented since his return to power in 2009. Netanyahu has little to show for his cumulative eight years in office and his endless un-acted-on military threats against Iranians and Palestinians are beginning to ring rather hollow. Netanyahu may decide that the political risks associated with inaction trump all other considerations. |
| This past April, nine months of US-led peace talks predictably failed. Israel was again not budged from its settlements and occupation. Those talks have now been replaced by a new round of violence and killing. If the alternatives to meaningless talks and tragic violence – namely peaceful resistance, Palestinian recourse to international law and sanctioning of Israel in response to continued occupation – are given short shrift, then expect more of the same and a continued bleak outlook for both Palestinians and Israelis. | This past April, nine months of US-led peace talks predictably failed. Israel was again not budged from its settlements and occupation. Those talks have now been replaced by a new round of violence and killing. If the alternatives to meaningless talks and tragic violence – namely peaceful resistance, Palestinian recourse to international law and sanctioning of Israel in response to continued occupation – are given short shrift, then expect more of the same and a continued bleak outlook for both Palestinians and Israelis. |
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