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In Eastern Europe, Ukraine Crisis Focuses Minds on NATO and Military Spending In Eastern Europe, Ukraine Crisis Focuses Minds on NATO and Military Spending
(about 2 hours later)
WARSAW — A window-rattling F-16 passed just above the main control tower at the Polish military’s 32nd Air Base, screaming across the same stark plains that have seen armies sweep across them throughout the nation’s history.WARSAW — A window-rattling F-16 passed just above the main control tower at the Polish military’s 32nd Air Base, screaming across the same stark plains that have seen armies sweep across them throughout the nation’s history.
“Ninety percent of what you see here has been either rebuilt or built from scratch in the last nine years,” said Lt. Col. Tomasz Jatczak, commander of air operations at the base in Lask, southwest of Warsaw, where a contingent of 170 American troops arrived Friday to begin a monthlong NATO training exercise with their Polish counterparts. “Ninety percent of what you see here has been either rebuilt or built from scratch in the last nine years,” said Lt. Col. Tomasz Jatczak, commander of air operations at the base in Lask, southwest of Warsaw, where a contingent of 170 American troops arrived Friday to begin a monthlong NATO training exercise with their Polish counterparts.
But if the base, with its pristine runways, gleaming hangars and sparkling new command headquarters, embodies the hope of integrating Eastern Europe fully into the Western alliance, it is also a reminder of how far much of the region still has to go in building the kind of military capability that would allow it to feel secure in the face of a newly aggressive Russia. But if the base, with its pristine runways, gleaming hangars and sparkling new command headquarters, embodies the hope of integrating Eastern Europe fully into the Western alliance, it is also a reminder of how far much of the region still has to go in building the kind of military capability that would allow it to feel secure in the face of a newly aggressive Russia.
Eastern European nations have been among the loudest in calling for a more assertive response from NATO to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and to Moscow’s support for the separatist rebels in eastern Ukraine. But many of those same countries have been laggards in meeting the military spending commitments that come with NATO membership or still have a long way to go in building the kind of military strength necessary to deter Russia. Eastern European nations have been among the loudest in calling for a more assertive response from NATO to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its support for the separatist rebels in eastern Ukraine. But many of those same countries have been laggards in meeting the military spending commitments that come with NATO membership or still have a long way to go in building the kind of military strength necessary to deter Russia.
After years in which a combination of fiscal pressures and a complacent trust in the alliance’s protection may have led them to drop their guard, those nations are facing new pressure to pump more money into their own defense, in one of their most fundamental shifts in priorities since the end of the Cold War. After years in which a combination of fiscal pressures and a complacent trust in the alliance’s protection may have led them to drop their guard, those nations are facing new pressure to pump more money into their own defense, in one of their most fundamental shifts in priorities since the end of the Cold War.
The result has been increases in defense spending and promises of more to come in countries up and down NATO’s eastern flank, though after years of plummeting defense spending many countries are building from a very limited capability and remain years away from fielding anything resembling a formidable force against a military as large as Russia’s. The result has been increases in defense spending and promises of more to come in countries up and down NATO’s eastern flank, though after years of plummeting defense spending, many countries are building from a very limited capability and remain years away from fielding anything resembling a formidable force against a military as large as Russia’s.
NATO asks member states to spend 2 percent of their gross domestic product on their armed forces, yet only a handful of them actually do. Estonia, the small Baltic state at the alliance’s far eastern edge, is one of them, and Poland, by far the largest and richest country on that flank, is at 1.95 percent.NATO asks member states to spend 2 percent of their gross domestic product on their armed forces, yet only a handful of them actually do. Estonia, the small Baltic state at the alliance’s far eastern edge, is one of them, and Poland, by far the largest and richest country on that flank, is at 1.95 percent.
“This is one of the reasons that when President Obama comes to the region, he visits Estonia and Poland,” said Karlis Bukovskis, deputy director of the Latvian Institute of International Affairs.“This is one of the reasons that when President Obama comes to the region, he visits Estonia and Poland,” said Karlis Bukovskis, deputy director of the Latvian Institute of International Affairs.
But even the most vulnerable nations, including some with sizable Russian ethnic minorities that might tempt a repeat of Russia’s incursion into Ukraine, are spending far less than the 2 percent benchmark. Latvia and Lithuania are spending less than 1 percent, though both have indicated they intend to ratchet up to 2 percent by 2020. Hungary and Slovakia are at about 1 percent and Romania, which recently announced that it would bolster military spending, is at about 1.5 percent. But even the most vulnerable nations, including some with sizable Russian ethnic minorities that might tempt a repeat of Russia’s incursion into Ukraine, are spending far less than the 2 percent benchmark. Latvia and Lithuania are spending less than 1 percent, though both have indicated they intend to ratchet up to 2 percent by 2020. Hungary and Slovakia are at about 1 percent, and Romania, which recently announced that it would bolster military spending, is at about 1.5 percent.
The unease has moved to Scandinavia as well: Sweden recently announced an increase in military spending.The unease has moved to Scandinavia as well: Sweden recently announced an increase in military spending.
“It is looking like, as a result of Russia’s actions in Ukraine, that military spending is likely to start increasing in those countries that are nearest to Russia, the frontline and the Nordic countries,” said Sam Perlo-Freeman, head of the military expenditure project at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.“It is looking like, as a result of Russia’s actions in Ukraine, that military spending is likely to start increasing in those countries that are nearest to Russia, the frontline and the Nordic countries,” said Sam Perlo-Freeman, head of the military expenditure project at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
Poland, driven by a growing economy, a “peace dividend” coming from the end of its involvement in the Afghan conflict and a law requiring it to spend at least 1.95 percent of its G.D.P. on the military, is several years into a major modernization program of its aging military, including a new missile defense system, submarines, attack and support helicopters, battlefield management systems, high-tech equipment for troops and assorted military electronics. Poland — driven by a growing economy, a “peace dividend” coming from the end of its involvement in the Afghan conflict, and a law requiring it to spend at least 1.95 percent of its G.D.P. on the military — is several years into a major modernization program of its aging military, including a new missile defense system, submarines, attack and support helicopters, battlefield management systems, high-tech equipment for troops and assorted military electronics.
“Since Poland is already at 1.95 percent, going to 2 percent will be quite easy and politically good,” said Marcin Terlikowski, a military affairs expert at the Polish Institute of International Affairs. “Next year, it is expected to rise to 2.5 percent.”“Since Poland is already at 1.95 percent, going to 2 percent will be quite easy and politically good,” said Marcin Terlikowski, a military affairs expert at the Polish Institute of International Affairs. “Next year, it is expected to rise to 2.5 percent.”
But it will be a decade before the full impact of this modernization is felt in the field, he said.But it will be a decade before the full impact of this modernization is felt in the field, he said.
“Poland is the key,” said Andrew Michta, an adjunct fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “The bottom line is that the Poles are essentially the most serious of the countries in the region when it comes to investment in the military. This is no longer a post-Soviet military and it is modernizing rapidly.” “Poland is the key,” said Andrew Michta, an adjunct fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “The bottom line is that the Poles are essentially the most serious of the countries in the region when it comes to investment in the military. This is no longer a post-Soviet military, and it is modernizing rapidly.”
When it comes to the Baltic states, the issue is one of scale. They are all small countries with relatively tiny standing armies — 3,800 soldiers in Estonia plus a reserve force of 13,000, according to its government, 10,350 in Latvia, including its border guards, and about the same number in Lithuania, according to the Defence Suppliers Directory. When it comes to the Baltic states, the issue is one of scale. They are all small countries with relatively tiny standing armies — 3,800 soldiers in Estonia, plus a reserve force of 13,000, according to its government; 10,350 in Latvia, including its border guards; and about the same number in Lithuania, according to the Defense Suppliers Directory.
“The sense of vulnerability that they have is perfectly rational,” Mr. Michta said.“The sense of vulnerability that they have is perfectly rational,” Mr. Michta said.
In recent years, Russia has massed tens of thousands of troops for exercises just across their borders.In recent years, Russia has massed tens of thousands of troops for exercises just across their borders.
“Things are not that rosy in the Baltics,” said Mr. Terlikowski. “They never had a big army, so they must build it from scratch. Even under Communist rule, Poland always had an army, a command structure and a defense industry. It is easier to modernize something that already exists.” “Things are not that rosy in the Baltics,” Mr. Terlikowski said. “They never had a big army, so they must build it from scratch. Even under Communist rule, Poland always had an army, a command structure and a defense industry. It is easier to modernize something that already exists.”
When the Baltic states entered NATO a decade ago, they were urged not to spend their limited resources on building a large standing army, but to depend on others in the alliance to come to their aid in an emergency. Rather, the Baltic countries and other former Soviet satellite states focused their military spending on building specialties that they could offer the alliance, such as Estonia’s focus on cybersecurity. When the Baltic states entered NATO a decade ago, they were urged not to spend their limited resources on building large standing armies, but to depend on others in the alliance to come to their aid in an emergency. Instead, the Baltic countries and other former Soviet satellite states focused their military spending on building specialties that they could offer the alliance, such as Estonia’s focus on cybersecurity.
“Central and Eastern European countries that abolished conscription followed the principle of focusing on quality rather than quantity,” said Tomasz Szatkowski, president of the National Center for Strategic Studies in Warsaw. “But in the case of a classic threat, you also need quantity.”“Central and Eastern European countries that abolished conscription followed the principle of focusing on quality rather than quantity,” said Tomasz Szatkowski, president of the National Center for Strategic Studies in Warsaw. “But in the case of a classic threat, you also need quantity.”
The plan NATO has agreed on, to set up forward supply bases on the alliance’s eastern front in which 4,000 or so troops could be deployed within 48 hours, might be useful in combating a small, stealth insurgency — like the masked gunmen who arrived in Ukraine to set off that crisis — but would be useless in the face of an actual invasion. The plan NATO has agreed on — to set up forward supply bases on the alliance’s eastern front in which 4,000 or so troops could be deployed within 48 hours — might be useful in combating a small, stealth insurgency, like the masked gunmen who arrived in Ukraine to set off that crisis, but would be useless in the face of an actual invasion.
“What is required is to be able to hold off any aggression for at least a couple of weeks, to buy some time and provide some sort of sanctuary for reinforcements” from those in the alliance with larger armies, Mr. Szatkowski said.“What is required is to be able to hold off any aggression for at least a couple of weeks, to buy some time and provide some sort of sanctuary for reinforcements” from those in the alliance with larger armies, Mr. Szatkowski said.
Such a capability, though, is far in the future for the Baltic states, if it is reachable at all.Such a capability, though, is far in the future for the Baltic states, if it is reachable at all.
“Russia was not seen as an immediate threat before the Ukrainian thing,” Mr. Bukovskis said. “Now, we have the astonishing realization that something like that could actually happen. And we are a country, in the Latvian case, where we don’t even have armored vehicles. People are feeling a little bit embarrassed that they are asking for NATO’s assistance but, at the same time, they haven’t done their own homework.” “Russia was not seen as an immediate threat before the Ukrainian thing,” Mr. Bukovskis said. “Now, we have the astonishing realization that something like that could actually happen. And we are a country, in the Latvian case, where we don’t even have armored vehicles. People are feeling a little bit embarrassed that they are asking for NATO’s assistance, but, at the same time, they haven’t done their own homework.”