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Should the world fund food aid to North Korea? Should the world fund food aid to North Korea?
(about 3 hours later)
Marcus Noland: an ethical conundrumMarcus Noland: an ethical conundrum
For nearly three decades a chronic food emergency has gripped North Korea. In the 1990s a famine killed up to five per cent of the pre-crisis population.For nearly three decades a chronic food emergency has gripped North Korea. In the 1990s a famine killed up to five per cent of the pre-crisis population.
Humanitarian activities by the UN’s World Food Programme (WFP) and private relief groups constitute the longest ongoing engagement between the hermit state and the international community. But the North Korean regime’s actions create an ethical conundrum which may be reaching its breaking point.Humanitarian activities by the UN’s World Food Programme (WFP) and private relief groups constitute the longest ongoing engagement between the hermit state and the international community. But the North Korean regime’s actions create an ethical conundrum which may be reaching its breaking point.
The long-running food crisis is the outcome of decades of economic mismanagement and a political system that absolves its leadership of any real accountability.The long-running food crisis is the outcome of decades of economic mismanagement and a political system that absolves its leadership of any real accountability.
The country is cold and mountainous, but government has pursued an irrational policy of national self-sufficiency, instead of exporting industrial products, earning foreign exchange, and importing bulk grains, as its neighbours China, South Korea, and Japan do. The result has been environmental degradation and recurrent shortages.The country is cold and mountainous, but government has pursued an irrational policy of national self-sufficiency, instead of exporting industrial products, earning foreign exchange, and importing bulk grains, as its neighbours China, South Korea, and Japan do. The result has been environmental degradation and recurrent shortages.
The most recent Unicef survey suggests that 10% of the country’s two-year-olds are afflicted with severe stunting. Stunting of that degree at that age is irrecoverable and confers a lifetime of physical and mental challenges.The most recent Unicef survey suggests that 10% of the country’s two-year-olds are afflicted with severe stunting. Stunting of that degree at that age is irrecoverable and confers a lifetime of physical and mental challenges.
The country is cold and mountainous, but government has pursued an irrational policy of national self-sufficiencyThe country is cold and mountainous, but government has pursued an irrational policy of national self-sufficiency
When the country finally admitted in 1995 that it was facing famine, the international community responded with considerable generosity, at one point feeding roughly a third of the population. But the North Korean government has never accepted the international norms in the provision of aid, impeding normal assessment, monitoring, and evaluation functions of the relief organisations.When the country finally admitted in 1995 that it was facing famine, the international community responded with considerable generosity, at one point feeding roughly a third of the population. But the North Korean government has never accepted the international norms in the provision of aid, impeding normal assessment, monitoring, and evaluation functions of the relief organisations.
Critically, with assistance ramping up, the government cut commercial grain imports – in essence using humanitarian aid as a form of balance of payments support, freeing up resources to finance the importation of advanced military weaponry.Critically, with assistance ramping up, the government cut commercial grain imports – in essence using humanitarian aid as a form of balance of payments support, freeing up resources to finance the importation of advanced military weaponry.
Even at the famine’s peak, the resources needed to close the gap were modest, in the order of $100-$200m, or about five to 20% of revenues from exported goods and services, or one to two per cent of contemporaneous national income.Even at the famine’s peak, the resources needed to close the gap were modest, in the order of $100-$200m, or about five to 20% of revenues from exported goods and services, or one to two per cent of contemporaneous national income.
We evidently care more about hungry North Koreans than their government doesWe evidently care more about hungry North Koreans than their government does
Today, the gap could be closed for something in the order of $8-19m — less than 0.2% of national income or one per cent of the military budget.Today, the gap could be closed for something in the order of $8-19m — less than 0.2% of national income or one per cent of the military budget.
Donor fatigue has set in. The WFP’s assistance requests are grossly undersubscribed and the organisation may be forced to shut down its remaining programme. And if it tries to soldier on with reduced resources, its ability to monitor its own activities will be badly affected, risking aid diversion and catastrophic scandal.Donor fatigue has set in. The WFP’s assistance requests are grossly undersubscribed and the organisation may be forced to shut down its remaining programme. And if it tries to soldier on with reduced resources, its ability to monitor its own activities will be badly affected, risking aid diversion and catastrophic scandal.
We evidently care more about hungry North Koreans than their government does. We should provide assistance. But we should be clear-eyed about the terms of that engagement and seek to provide aid in ways consistent with our values and our obligations under international law.We evidently care more about hungry North Koreans than their government does. We should provide assistance. But we should be clear-eyed about the terms of that engagement and seek to provide aid in ways consistent with our values and our obligations under international law.
Marcus Noland is director of studies at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. He blogs for North Korea: Witness to TransformationMarcus Noland is director of studies at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. He blogs for North Korea: Witness to Transformation
Jang Jin-sung: stop funding food aidJang Jin-sung: stop funding food aid
North Korean exiles will tell you that the international community must stop funding food aid. We say this not out of spite with regard to a nation whose leadership invests in luxuries, nuclear tests and missile launches while the welfare of its subjects remains low among its priorities. We say this for pragmatic and humanitarian reasons, because the assumptions that lie behind funding food aid have hindered economic reform in our homeland, not helped it.North Korean exiles will tell you that the international community must stop funding food aid. We say this not out of spite with regard to a nation whose leadership invests in luxuries, nuclear tests and missile launches while the welfare of its subjects remains low among its priorities. We say this for pragmatic and humanitarian reasons, because the assumptions that lie behind funding food aid have hindered economic reform in our homeland, not helped it.
Today, the fatal threat for the regime lies not in the outside world, but within the country itself. More specifically, this is the jangmadang – an underground economy arisen from the ashes of economic collapse in the 1990s, and which consist of market activities taking place beyond the remit of the regime’s control mechanisms.Today, the fatal threat for the regime lies not in the outside world, but within the country itself. More specifically, this is the jangmadang – an underground economy arisen from the ashes of economic collapse in the 1990s, and which consist of market activities taking place beyond the remit of the regime’s control mechanisms.
The assumptions that lie behind funding food aid have hindered economic reform in our homeland, not helped itThe assumptions that lie behind funding food aid have hindered economic reform in our homeland, not helped it
The regime depends on its subjects putting loyalty and obedience to the Kim dynasty above all other values. But the jangmadang has awoken among ordinary people values that are detrimental to this: the worth of individual work, of independent choices, of outside information.The regime depends on its subjects putting loyalty and obedience to the Kim dynasty above all other values. But the jangmadang has awoken among ordinary people values that are detrimental to this: the worth of individual work, of independent choices, of outside information.
This fundamental transformation from below, the notion that lives may be lived outside the domain of loyalty to the system, is the greatest imminent threat to the regime’s power – which is held in place by inculcating the cult of the Kim dynasty, surveillance controls and the coercive mobilisation of its subjects in the name of the ruling Kim’s legitimacy.This fundamental transformation from below, the notion that lives may be lived outside the domain of loyalty to the system, is the greatest imminent threat to the regime’s power – which is held in place by inculcating the cult of the Kim dynasty, surveillance controls and the coercive mobilisation of its subjects in the name of the ruling Kim’s legitimacy.
The regime lost the ability to bind people’s economic loyalty to the system with the collapse of the Public Distribution System and its failure to subsequently implement currency reforms. It allocated rights and privileges for engaging in market activities to companies held under Korean Workers’ Party or military auspices to try to prevent the erosion of its economic monopolies and to concentrate economic power in the hands of its stakeholders.The regime lost the ability to bind people’s economic loyalty to the system with the collapse of the Public Distribution System and its failure to subsequently implement currency reforms. It allocated rights and privileges for engaging in market activities to companies held under Korean Workers’ Party or military auspices to try to prevent the erosion of its economic monopolies and to concentrate economic power in the hands of its stakeholders.
But this did nothing to tackle the fundamental structural obstacles to reform: for current stakeholders to remain powerful, funds must continue to be redirected to spending on the maintenance of control mechanisms, the propaganda machine of the Kim dynasty cult, and military threat-making diversion projects.But this did nothing to tackle the fundamental structural obstacles to reform: for current stakeholders to remain powerful, funds must continue to be redirected to spending on the maintenance of control mechanisms, the propaganda machine of the Kim dynasty cult, and military threat-making diversion projects.
Even at times when the regime is calling for food aid, it does not mean that the jangmadang will not have food on offer, whether stolen from state cooperatives or smuggled in from China. When up to three million North Koreans died of famine in the 1990s it was not just about there not being any food - it was about access. It was a tragedy suffered by those trapped in a totalitarian and dictatorial system with no jangmadang to turn to.Even at times when the regime is calling for food aid, it does not mean that the jangmadang will not have food on offer, whether stolen from state cooperatives or smuggled in from China. When up to three million North Koreans died of famine in the 1990s it was not just about there not being any food - it was about access. It was a tragedy suffered by those trapped in a totalitarian and dictatorial system with no jangmadang to turn to.
In today’s North Korea there are two rival forces in battle: the forces of the regime and the forces of the market. The former’s interests are better served by the maintenance of existing party, military and surveillance mechanisms of control. The latter are equivalent to North Korea’s progressives, who believe in a future that is possible beyond the absolute, stifling and structurally inhumane confines of the regime.In today’s North Korea there are two rival forces in battle: the forces of the regime and the forces of the market. The former’s interests are better served by the maintenance of existing party, military and surveillance mechanisms of control. The latter are equivalent to North Korea’s progressives, who believe in a future that is possible beyond the absolute, stifling and structurally inhumane confines of the regime.
An international community wishing to assist the North Korean people should recognise that funding food aid is a channel of limited efficiency. The majority of North Koreans depend not on the regime’s munificence but on market forces – they have already found this a more successful alternative, despite a disproportionate lack of international support or awareness.An international community wishing to assist the North Korean people should recognise that funding food aid is a channel of limited efficiency. The majority of North Koreans depend not on the regime’s munificence but on market forces – they have already found this a more successful alternative, despite a disproportionate lack of international support or awareness.
Jang Jin-sung was one of Kim Jong-il’s favourite state poets until he defected in 2004. He founded the North Korea news website New Focus InternationalJang Jin-sung was one of Kim Jong-il’s favourite state poets until he defected in 2004. He founded the North Korea news website New Focus International
Roberta Cohen: hungry people should not be penalisedRoberta Cohen: hungry people should not be penalised
Not surprisingly, the World Food Programme’s $200m plan for reaching malnourished women and children in North Korea through 2015 may be in danger of shutting down.Not surprisingly, the World Food Programme’s $200m plan for reaching malnourished women and children in North Korea through 2015 may be in danger of shutting down.
Donor fatigue and disillusionment have reached a tipping point, largely based on North Korea’s spending hundreds of millions, even billions of dollars on missile tests and launches, nuclear weapons and the development of intercontinental ballistic carriers.Donor fatigue and disillusionment have reached a tipping point, largely based on North Korea’s spending hundreds of millions, even billions of dollars on missile tests and launches, nuclear weapons and the development of intercontinental ballistic carriers.
Yet the donors – even those the inter-continental ballistic missiles are intended to target – are, like idiotas utiles, expected to pick up the tab for the food needs of the seven to eight million North Koreans (more than a third of the population) suffering from chronic malnutrition.Yet the donors – even those the inter-continental ballistic missiles are intended to target – are, like idiotas utiles, expected to pick up the tab for the food needs of the seven to eight million North Koreans (more than a third of the population) suffering from chronic malnutrition.
That the aid will reinforce the regime by enabling it to purchase military and luxury goods is hard to counter. Kim Jong-un’s lavish spending on ski resorts and water parks for Pyongyang’s elite has reportedly cost tens, even hundreds, of millions. To attract donors, North Korea will need to devote more of its own resources to agricultural reforms, incentives for food production, ending market restrictions, importing greater quantities of food and improving its deteriorating health structures.That the aid will reinforce the regime by enabling it to purchase military and luxury goods is hard to counter. Kim Jong-un’s lavish spending on ski resorts and water parks for Pyongyang’s elite has reportedly cost tens, even hundreds, of millions. To attract donors, North Korea will need to devote more of its own resources to agricultural reforms, incentives for food production, ending market restrictions, importing greater quantities of food and improving its deteriorating health structures.
Even so, some donors might not be eager to help a country that regularly hurls distasteful epithets and threatens its neighbours and beyond. In 2012, the United States cancelled a shipment of some 250,000 metric tons of food after Pyongyang reneged on an agreement by launching a long-range rocket.Even so, some donors might not be eager to help a country that regularly hurls distasteful epithets and threatens its neighbours and beyond. In 2012, the United States cancelled a shipment of some 250,000 metric tons of food after Pyongyang reneged on an agreement by launching a long-range rocket.
The most critical question, however, is whether hungry people should be penalised for the policies of their government. The answer is no. The stunting of children (one out of four under the age of five), high maternal mortality rates and tuberculosis for lack of vitamins and iron should be de-linked from political issues.The most critical question, however, is whether hungry people should be penalised for the policies of their government. The answer is no. The stunting of children (one out of four under the age of five), high maternal mortality rates and tuberculosis for lack of vitamins and iron should be de-linked from political issues.
But here the case of North Korea presents a dilemma: reaching the needy has often been thwarted by a lack of access and transparency. While donors, UN agencies and ngos have devised increasingly stringent monitoring conditions, including measuring children’s arms and providing corn soy blends so as not to be diverted to the military or elite, a widely disseminated United Nations report this year found that the government distributes food primarily to persons crucial to the regime, favours certain parts of the country, and avoids structural reforms of agriculture and health care out of fear of losing political control.But here the case of North Korea presents a dilemma: reaching the needy has often been thwarted by a lack of access and transparency. While donors, UN agencies and ngos have devised increasingly stringent monitoring conditions, including measuring children’s arms and providing corn soy blends so as not to be diverted to the military or elite, a widely disseminated United Nations report this year found that the government distributes food primarily to persons crucial to the regime, favours certain parts of the country, and avoids structural reforms of agriculture and health care out of fear of losing political control.
It therefore behooves the UN to press North Korea for strengthened monitoring and to link its aid to long term reforms designed to achieve sustainable results. And the UN must broaden its focus beyond traditional donors to China. As North Korea’s principal ally, recent estrangement notwithstanding, China should be urged to join in meeting shortfalls and in adopting international monitoring standards.It therefore behooves the UN to press North Korea for strengthened monitoring and to link its aid to long term reforms designed to achieve sustainable results. And the UN must broaden its focus beyond traditional donors to China. As North Korea’s principal ally, recent estrangement notwithstanding, China should be urged to join in meeting shortfalls and in adopting international monitoring standards.
Roberta Cohen is senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and co-chair of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea Roberta Cohen is non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution
James Hoare: many countries get their priorities wrongJames Hoare: many countries get their priorities wrong
When I was working in North Korea in 2001-2002, the WFP programme was one of the largest in the world. At that time, in the wake of the 1994 famine, WFP received plentiful supplies both in the form of food – sacks of US-donated corn could be seen at the ports, for example – and funding.When I was working in North Korea in 2001-2002, the WFP programme was one of the largest in the world. At that time, in the wake of the 1994 famine, WFP received plentiful supplies both in the form of food – sacks of US-donated corn could be seen at the ports, for example – and funding.
It was never enough, however, and WFP always had to prioritise. Pregnant mothers, children and the old were the targets. There were other benefits as well. It gave many North Korean officials the valuable experience of working with an international organisation, useful exposure for those who had little experience of the outside world.It was never enough, however, and WFP always had to prioritise. Pregnant mothers, children and the old were the targets. There were other benefits as well. It gave many North Korean officials the valuable experience of working with an international organisation, useful exposure for those who had little experience of the outside world.
WFP has always had to fight off those who are opposed to giving any food to North Korea. Various reasons have been put forward for not supplying aid, including the charges that food was being diverted or that funds spent on the military should be spent on feeding the population. There be truth in such charges but the targeted groups still needed the assistance and WFP staff worked hard to make sure that they got it.WFP has always had to fight off those who are opposed to giving any food to North Korea. Various reasons have been put forward for not supplying aid, including the charges that food was being diverted or that funds spent on the military should be spent on feeding the population. There be truth in such charges but the targeted groups still needed the assistance and WFP staff worked hard to make sure that they got it.
Circumstances have changed since those days. There is donor fatigue; food aid to North Korea has been going on a long time. Other countries have equal or greater needs. While North Korea no longer faces the dire conditions of the 1990s, the state’s priorities appear not to include feeding the most vulnerable. Spending on the military, including missiles and nuclear weapons takes precedence – as does improving life for the elite. Some see in the WFP a bureaucracy that does not want to change. So the voices are again raised about ending food aid.Circumstances have changed since those days. There is donor fatigue; food aid to North Korea has been going on a long time. Other countries have equal or greater needs. While North Korea no longer faces the dire conditions of the 1990s, the state’s priorities appear not to include feeding the most vulnerable. Spending on the military, including missiles and nuclear weapons takes precedence – as does improving life for the elite. Some see in the WFP a bureaucracy that does not want to change. So the voices are again raised about ending food aid.
But the vulnerable remain. We know from nutritional surveys that lack of good food in early years means that many will be permanently affected. We also know that many countries get their priorities wrong; children go hungry even in the richest nations. To penalise those who are already suffering and who can do nothing to influence the government would be unjust. The WFP should be helped to continue its North Korean programme.But the vulnerable remain. We know from nutritional surveys that lack of good food in early years means that many will be permanently affected. We also know that many countries get their priorities wrong; children go hungry even in the richest nations. To penalise those who are already suffering and who can do nothing to influence the government would be unjust. The WFP should be helped to continue its North Korean programme.
Dr J E Hoare was Britain’s first diplomatic representative in North Korea from 2001-2002Dr J E Hoare was Britain’s first diplomatic representative in North Korea from 2001-2002
Steven Weber: time to change tackSteven Weber: time to change tack
The single most important decision any country makes is how to divide its resources between guns, butter and investment. To put this another way, societies choose between spending to defend what they have, increasing current consumption, and building for the future.The single most important decision any country makes is how to divide its resources between guns, butter and investment. To put this another way, societies choose between spending to defend what they have, increasing current consumption, and building for the future.
For decades now, the world has been subsidising North Korea’s choice to invest massively in defence at the expense of both investment and current consumption. Three regimes in Pyongyang have been given a partial free ride. What’s surprising is not that donors are fatigued; it’s that the fatigue has taken this long to set in.For decades now, the world has been subsidising North Korea’s choice to invest massively in defence at the expense of both investment and current consumption. Three regimes in Pyongyang have been given a partial free ride. What’s surprising is not that donors are fatigued; it’s that the fatigue has taken this long to set in.
A moral necessity for humanitarian relief is the obvious justification for food aid, but does it really make sense in this situation?A moral necessity for humanitarian relief is the obvious justification for food aid, but does it really make sense in this situation?
Subsidies can always be justified in some fashion. For decades after the second world war the US subsidised the defence expenditures of many of its European allies so that they could spend more on consumption and investment. It was controversial at times, and still is since it continues to this day. But the results spoke for themselves in the post-war European economic and social recovery.Subsidies can always be justified in some fashion. For decades after the second world war the US subsidised the defence expenditures of many of its European allies so that they could spend more on consumption and investment. It was controversial at times, and still is since it continues to this day. But the results spoke for themselves in the post-war European economic and social recovery.
But what good has come of subsidising North Korea’s food consumption? It’s hard to point to a single positive result. Pyongyang has done nothing but pocket the concessions and spend the greatest proportion of what resources it does have on military power to provoke its southern neighbour and the rest of the world. Including, of course, with a nuclear weapons programme that threatens to destabilise north-east Asia further, when it has a host of other problems to solve.But what good has come of subsidising North Korea’s food consumption? It’s hard to point to a single positive result. Pyongyang has done nothing but pocket the concessions and spend the greatest proportion of what resources it does have on military power to provoke its southern neighbour and the rest of the world. Including, of course, with a nuclear weapons programme that threatens to destabilise north-east Asia further, when it has a host of other problems to solve.
Humanitarian fatigue may not be humanity’s most admirable trait, but it’s a real oneHumanitarian fatigue may not be humanity’s most admirable trait, but it’s a real one
A moral necessity for humanitarian relief is the obvious justification for food aid, but does it really make sense in this situation? North Koreans are starving regardless and will continue to do so, because the world simply is not at present going to provide enough food to meet the nutritional needs of the population.A moral necessity for humanitarian relief is the obvious justification for food aid, but does it really make sense in this situation? North Koreans are starving regardless and will continue to do so, because the world simply is not at present going to provide enough food to meet the nutritional needs of the population.
Humanitarian fatigue may not be humanity’s most admirable trait, but it’s a real one and it’s not likely to be reversed unless the North Korean regime delivers something positive on security. And that’s less likely to happen if we keep the regime on slowly diminishing life support.Humanitarian fatigue may not be humanity’s most admirable trait, but it’s a real one and it’s not likely to be reversed unless the North Korean regime delivers something positive on security. And that’s less likely to happen if we keep the regime on slowly diminishing life support.
To gradually starve the country through donor fatigue is not an intentional strategy to bring about political change that could actually benefit the people of North Korea; it’s just a lazy default. There are better choices at both ends of the spectrum. One would be to cut off aid entirely and force Pyongyang’s hand. The other would be to massively increase food aid so that the population actually receives sufficient calories to thrive.To gradually starve the country through donor fatigue is not an intentional strategy to bring about political change that could actually benefit the people of North Korea; it’s just a lazy default. There are better choices at both ends of the spectrum. One would be to cut off aid entirely and force Pyongyang’s hand. The other would be to massively increase food aid so that the population actually receives sufficient calories to thrive.
Both strategies have obvious risks. Cut off aid and North Korea could strike out as a last ditch effort to force our hand in return. But Pyongyang might also be forced to spend more resources growing and buying food. Double down on aid and North Korea might take advantage and happily divert yet more of its resources into the military. But it might also take the signal of peaceful intentions as an opportunity to go further in its ever-so-slight opening to the world. In each case, the job of foreign policy leaders in the rest of the world is to find ways — and there are ways — to tilt the table toward the more desirable outcome.Both strategies have obvious risks. Cut off aid and North Korea could strike out as a last ditch effort to force our hand in return. But Pyongyang might also be forced to spend more resources growing and buying food. Double down on aid and North Korea might take advantage and happily divert yet more of its resources into the military. But it might also take the signal of peaceful intentions as an opportunity to go further in its ever-so-slight opening to the world. In each case, the job of foreign policy leaders in the rest of the world is to find ways — and there are ways — to tilt the table toward the more desirable outcome.
Some will object to the idea of using food as a weapon. But let’s be blunt: food is already a weapon. The North Koreans have been using it against us for decades, and we have responded with gradual fatigue that serves no long term goal. Better to turn the tables and take the initiative to bring about change, and give the human beings that have had the unfortunate luck to be born under Pyongyang’s rule a chance at a better future.Some will object to the idea of using food as a weapon. But let’s be blunt: food is already a weapon. The North Koreans have been using it against us for decades, and we have responded with gradual fatigue that serves no long term goal. Better to turn the tables and take the initiative to bring about change, and give the human beings that have had the unfortunate luck to be born under Pyongyang’s rule a chance at a better future.
Steven Weber is professor of political science at UC BerkeleySteven Weber is professor of political science at UC Berkeley