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The Guardian view on the response to the murder of David Haines The Guardian view on the response to the murder of David Haines
(2 days later)
Sickeningly, only the timing was probably really in much doubt. And on Saturday evening even that became starkly certain. After the killings of James Foley and Steven Sotloff at the hands of Islamic State (Isis) militants in Iraq in recent weeks, it was hard to ignore the grim inevitability that David Haines was all too likely to be the next victim. By accident of nationality alone, the British hostage was in line for the Isis slaughter campaign after the two murders of Americans. He himself probably knew it. So did his family, whose distress can only be guessed. So did the British government. So, equally numbly, did all of us. But that does not make the killing any the less shocking, outrageous and senseless. That senselessness is all the greater because Mr Haines spent so much of his life not as an invader or exploiter but simply as a humanitarian aid worker. To murder someone who spent his mature years bringing water, food and shelter to needy Croats, Sudanese, Libyans and Syrians amid some of the most destructive conflicts of the age shows a special kind of pitilessness. Sickeningly, only the timing was probably really in much doubt. And on Saturday evening even that became starkly certain. After the killings of James Foley and Steven Sotloff at the hands of Islamic State (Isis) militants in recent weeks, it was hard to ignore the grim inevitability that David Haines was all too likely to be the next victim. By accident of nationality alone, the British hostage was in line for the Isis slaughter campaign after the two murders of Americans. He himself probably knew it. So did his family, whose distress can only be guessed. So did the British government. So, equally numbly, did all of us. But that does not make the killing any the less shocking, outrageous and senseless. That senselessness is all the greater because Mr Haines spent so much of his life not as an invader or exploiter but simply as a humanitarian aid worker. To murder someone who spent his mature years bringing water, food and shelter to needy Croats, Sudanese, Libyans and Syrians amid some of the most destructive conflicts of the age shows a special kind of pitilessness.
The killing of Mr Haines was not an act of revenge. It was an act of provocation. Like the two murders of the American journalists, it was designed to frighten and to inflame. It seems nothing would please Isis more than for these killings to provoke an intemperate and thoughtless violent reaction from those at whom they are aimed. Such a reaction might, in Isis's crude and perverse logic, give them public legitimacy as victims rather than as killers. Such things have happened all too often in history. This in itself is a good enough reason for western leaders to have cool reactions. But there is also a case for saying that the hostage slaughter video campaigns are themselves a sign of Isis weakness, not Isis strength. The jihadis' spectacular military advance early this year in northern Iraq has been stalled in recent weeks by Kurdish fighters and US air strikes. These reverses may have spurred anger and exasperation in the jihadi ranks. That could explain why the ghoulish Isis propaganda blitz apparently aimed at provoking an overreaction from the US and the UK is taking place now rather than at any other time. The killing of Mr Haines was not an act of revenge. It was an act of provocation. Like the two murders of the American journalists, it was designed to frighten and to inflame. It seems nothing would please Isis more than for these killings to provoke an intemperate and thoughtless violent reaction from those at whom they are aimed. Such a reaction might, in Isis’s crude and perverse logic, give them public legitimacy as victims rather than as killers. Such things have happened all too often in history. This in itself is a good enough reason for western leaders to have cool reactions. But there is also a case for saying that the hostage slaughter video campaigns are themselves a sign of Isis weakness, not Isis strength. The jihadis’ spectacular military advance early this year in northern Iraq has been stalled in recent weeks by Kurdish fighters and US air strikes. These reverses may have spurred anger and exasperation in the jihadi ranks. That could explain why the ghoulish Isis propaganda blitz apparently aimed at provoking an overreaction from the US and the UK is taking place now rather than at any other time.
It may also explain why David Cameron's response since the Haines killing has so far been measured. It is not easy for modern politicians, faced with such outrageous acts and inevitable public revulsion, to move cautiously. With politics in low repute, the temptation to take dramatic headline-grabbing action is a very real one. The fear of being dismissed as weak, not just by political enemies but by public opinion, is something that haunts modern leaders. In that context Mr Cameron's summoning of a Sunday morning emergency Cobra committee was inevitable. So was his promise to take whatever steps were necessary to defeat Isis. But Mr Cameron's more careful words were important too. Britain would not respond unilaterally, would work with allies in the region and not over their heads, would not be sending ground troops, would work with the Iraqis, would mobilise support at the United Nations, and would continue to provide humanitarian aid. It may also explain why David Cameron’s response since the Haines killing has so far been measured. It is not easy for modern politicians, faced with such outrageous acts and inevitable public revulsion, to move cautiously. With politics in low repute, the temptation to take dramatic headline-grabbing action is a very real one. The fear of being dismissed as weak, not just by political enemies but by public opinion, is something that haunts modern leaders. In that context Mr Cameron’s summoning of a Sunday morning emergency Cobra committee was inevitable. So was his promise to take whatever steps were necessary to defeat Isis. But Mr Cameron’s more careful words were important too. Britain would not respond unilaterally, would work with allies in the region and not over their heads, would not be sending ground troops, would work with the Iraqis, would mobilise support at the United Nations, and would continue to provide humanitarian aid.
It was angry and determined stuff. How could it not be? Yet Mr Cameron's response also added up to an implicit recognition of the UK's constrained role in the escalating crisis. No request for military aid has been made by Iraq to the UK. If such a request were to come, things might change. That, though, should be a matter for parliament to debate. In spite of Mr Haines's horrific killing, to assert a unilateral UK military response at this stage in the process would not just have been to do what Isis wants. It would also, in the context of the evolving strategy signalled last week by President Obama, have been recklessly premature. It would have reinforced the old imperial stereotype and in the wrong way. The UK has the material ability to respond to a horrific international event of this kind, but it needs the moral and political ability too. Mr Cameron should only respond in ways that lend legitimacy to the action rather than put its legitimacy at risk. A key test at all times is efficacy, not just in a military sense but in a political and legal sense too. That point may have got a little closer this weekend. But it has not yet been reached. It was angry and determined stuff. How could it not be? Yet Mr Cameron’s response also added up to an implicit recognition of the UK’s constrained role in the escalating crisis. No request for military aid has been made by Iraq to the UK. If such a request were to come, things might change. That, though, should be a matter for parliament to debate. In spite of Mr Haines’s horrific killing, to assert a unilateral UK military response at this stage in the process would not just have been to do what Isis wants. It would also, in the context of the evolving strategy signalled last week by President Obama, have been recklessly premature. It would have reinforced the old imperial stereotype and in the wrong way. The UK has the material ability to respond to a horrific international event of this kind, but it needs the moral and political ability too. Mr Cameron should only respond in ways that lend legitimacy to the action rather than put its legitimacy at risk. A key test at all times is efficacy, not just in a military sense but in a political and legal sense too. That point may have got a little closer this weekend. But it has not yet been reached.
• This article was amended on 16 September 2014. An earlier version said that James Foley and Steven Sotloff had been killed in Iraq. However, it is thought they were killed in Syria.