The UK’s presence in the anti-Isis effort is principally political, not military
Version 0 of 1. Parliament’s vote to authorise UK air strikes against Isis in Iraq is almost certainly more important in terms of British domestic politics than in the current mayhem of the Middle East. Six RAF Tornados can do a lot of damage, but they are not militarily decisive. What the UK brings to the US-led alliance against Isis is European solidarity rather than conflict-defining hardware or effectiveness. The RAF will be flying many fewer missions over Iraq than it did over Libya after 2011. To dismiss the UK presence as merely symbolic would be too sweeping. Symbols are important. But the UK’s presence in the line-up against Isis is principally a political rather than a military presence. It is also important just because the vote went the way it did. Parliament’s unexpected rejection of David Cameron’s plan for intervention in Syria in 2013 had a big international knock-on effect. It stopped US mobilisation in its tracks. It empowered Russia to seize an opportunity to become a broker. It did lead, albeit unintentionally, to some action on Syrian chemical weapon stockpiles. And it weakened the west’s credibility in the Middle Eastern theatre more generally because it raised questions about the UK’s post-Iraq willingness to engage – and thus about the US’s options, too. If that vote had been repeated on Friday, the long-term consequences for British defence and foreign policy would have been big – and the effect on the US would not have been insignificant either. Thirteen months later, the west, the US and now the UK have re-engaged with the new context of the anti-Isis effort. The commitment Cameron won from the House of Commons on Friday was limited in scope, though it may be long-lasting. Michael Fallon, the defence secretary, talks about two to three years. But the chances of the RAF becoming involved in Syria are genuinely constrained. Not only is action in Syria explicitly ruled out by the motion that MPs passed, but the imminence of the general election means that Cameron will be reluctant to test the tolerance of a generally war-weary electorate too far. Internationally, the impact of British involvement depends on how the policy works on the ground, whether it wins allies or radicalises opponents, and above all on whether the conflict in Iraq and Syria is brought under some sort of order and control. The chances of this are so uncertain that it may well be months before anyone can draw useful conclusions. Wars do not follow neat plans. It only takes one misdirected air strike, one lost aircraft or one captured pilot to change all that. If something like that happened, the price for Friday’s vote might suddenly become intolerably high for Cameron. In domestic political terms, the result is a paradox. The result was overwhelming, just as it was when MPs debated Libya three years ago. Yet it is arguable that none of the three main political parties in Britain is exactly in the place it would like to be. The Conservatives would like to extend the anti-Isis conflict to Syria – but cannot. Labour admired Ed Miliband for speaking for the majority over Syria last year and may be a bit disappointed to see him support another Middle East intervention, albeit a limited one in which no British soldier will be engaged. The Liberal Democrats, who won so many Labour voters over with their anti-war stance in 2003 over Iraq have nothing distinctive to say about this new intervention. Meanwhile Nigel Farage’s Ukip, the Scottish and Welsh nationalist parties and the Greens all opposed the action, hoping to win over any anti-war and isolationist votes that happen to be going. |